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ABSTRACT 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST PROGRAM FOR COLLEGE REMEDIAL MATHEMATICS: DESIGN, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND EVALUATION 
FEBRUARY 1989 
RONALD BARRY NARODE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
M.A.T., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Klaus Schultz 
The recent increase in enrollments in college remedial 
mathematics courses makes clear the need for the development of 
pedagogy and curriculum which is tailored to this relatively new 
class of service courses. Besides the need for courses which teach 
basic skills in arithmetic, general mathematics, and elementary and 
intermediate algebra, a growing concern for better thinking skills 
among college students has added an important new dimension to the 
teaching of remedial mathematics. The author has contributed 
substantially towards the development of a program at the University 
of Massachusetts which attempts to teach college freshmen basic 
arithmetic and critical thinking skills by incorporating recent 
research results in cognitive processes, metacognition, and 
cooperative learning into a specially designed curriculum. This 
dissertation develops a theoretical basis from which the remedial 
program may be evaluated and improved. The theoretical exposition 
includes a brief history of the philosophy of the constructivist 
perspective as well as an examination of the role of metacognition in 
From these two theoretical perspectives, and 
mathematics education. 
from the recent literature on constructivist mathematics education, a 
pedagogy is developed for remedial college mathematics. A 
curriculum, prepared largely, though not exclusively, by the author, 
is described from the point of view of the pedagogy. Instructional 
methods and sample lesson plans are also developed to illustrate how 
the curriculum may serve the pedagogy. Data from student performance 
on a pre- and post-test is analyzed for the evaluation of the UMass 
program and for the identification of gender differences in test 
performance. Finally, the author, in collaboration with a colleague 
who assisted in the preparation of the original curriculum, has 
rewritten a portion of the curriculum to illustrate some of the 
changes which this study indicates may be helpful. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: THE NEED FOR 
COLLEGE REMEDIAL MATHEMATICS 
Introduction 
Mathematics education, especially remedial mathematics 
education, will be influenced by future educators who respond to the 
following two observations: 1) the dramatic rise In enrollment In 
remedial arithmetic, general mathematics and algebra indicates the 
need for training in basic skills in content areas which are 
considered prerequisite not only for college but for the vocations 
also; 2) even students who have taken as many as three years of 
college preparatory mathematics do not demonstrate an understanding 
of the material sufficient to use it. From 1960 to 1980, college 
enrollment at universities and four-year colleges in remedial 
arithmetic, general mathematics and algebra increased by 165% 
(Usiskin, 1985). Two-year colleges report that 42X of mathematics 
enrollments in 1980-81 were in remedial courses. Dealing with 
remediation was described as the biggest problem facing two-year 
college mathematics faculty (Fey, Albers, and Fleming, 1981). As 
colleges continue to insist that minimum competency in mathematics be 
demonstrated for graduation, the enrollment in remedial mathematics 
courses can be expected to remain high. 
Perhaps more dramatic than the rise in enrollment is the poor 
performance of students who have already had several years of college 
preparatory mathematics. Results from the First Mathematics 
Assessment of the National Assessment of Educational Progress [NAEP] 
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(Carpenter, et al. 1978) indicate that just SOX of 17-year-olds and 
2 
60% of adults were able to correctly answer word problems with 
decimals and percents, perhaps the most frequently applied topic in 
mathematics today. Similar error rates were identified in the 
interpretation of algebraic equations. The following item appeared 
in the 1977-78 NAEP exam: 
Some people suggest the following formula be used to 
determine the average weight for boys between the 
ages of 1 and 7: 
W = 17 + 5A 
where W is the average weight in pounds and A is the 
boy's age in years. According to this formula, for 
each year older a boy gets, how much more should he 
weigh? 
(Carpenter, et al., 1982, p. 526) 
NAEP reports indicate that taking up to two years of algebra does not 
improve student success rates very much on this type of item. This 
particular item was answered correctly by 53% of those students who 
had taken no algebra, 58% of those students who had taken one year of 
algebra, and 64% of those students who had two years of algebra. Two 
years of high school algebra raised student success on this problem 
only 11%. Moreover, the lack of understanding of elementary algebra 
concepts is not confined to high school and college remedial 
mathematics courses. Approximately 37% of college freshmen in a 
calculus course were unable to translate a simple linear relationship 
into an equation. Seventy-three percent of college freshmen in 
calculus failed to correctly answer a structurally similar problem 
(Clement, 1982). Comparable error rates were reported for high 
school and college faculty when asked to trans 
late a linear equation 
3 
into a sentence (Lochhead, 1980). Apparently conceptual 
understanding is not assured through academic success. 
The response of the mathematics education community was to 
issue an appeal to teachers, state boards of education, local 
administrators, test writers and text book publishers to make problem 
solving and conceptual understanding of mathematics foundational to 
the mathematics curriculum. The two foremost recommendations from 
the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (1980) were: 
1. That problem solving be the focus of school 
mathematics in the 1980's. 
2. That basic skills in mathematics be defined to 
encompass more than computational facility. 
✓ 
Project EQuality (College Board, 1983) echoes this appeal by 
declaring that mathematics understanding is prerequisite to 
competency in all areas of college education. In addition to the 
ability to use calculators and computers, the report makes clear the 
need for conceptual understanding and the ability to demonstrate that 
understanding in problem solving. Another widely cited government 
report, "A Nation At Risk" (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983), states that the teaching of mathematics in high 
school should equip students with an understanding of basic 
mathematics concepts which will enable them to solve problems in 
college or in the workplace. The following areas were mentioned 
explicitly: 
a. Students should have an understanding of 
geometric and algebraic concepts. 
b. They should understand elementary probability 
and statistics. 
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c. Students should be able to apply mathematics in 
everyday situations. 
d. High school graduates should possess the skills 
to estimate, approximate, measure and test the 
accuracy of their calculations. 
Clearly the stated emphasis in mathematics education has shifted from 
rote computational facility and the manipulation of algebraic symbols 
toward an understanding of the concepts of basic mathematics which 
can be demonstrated through problem solving. Educators and education 
researchers are beginning to acknowledge that algebraic symbol 
manipulation, the area most emphasized in high school and college 
algebra curriculum, is quite useless if students are unable to 
express quantitative ideas precisely. 
Critical Thinking in Education 
In addition to content knowledge and problem solving, educators 
also recognize the need for better thinking skills among students. 
Much of the literature on analytical reasoning has stressed logic and 
scientific method as foundational to good thinking. These "reasoning 
capacities" are characterized as rational [i.e. logical] and 
linguistic skills, of which some examples follow (Arons, 1979): 
recognition, identification, and control of variables; arithmetical 
reasoning, forming and comprehending propositional statements; 
ability to paraphrase text; awareness of gaps in knowledge or 
information; understanding the need for operational definitions; 
ability to translate between symbol systems; ability to discriminate 
between inductive and deductive reasoning and between observation and 
inference; etc. Also included in this list is 
the need for students 
5 
to develop a self-consciousness about their own thinking and 
reasoning processes; a skill which has more recently been termed 
"metacognitive". Sternberg's (1985) psychological taxonomy of 
"critical thinking skills" categorizes most of the above skills into 
three types of thinking. The three components of critical thinking 
are: (1) performance components, which include the encoding and. 
comparison of stimuli, inductive and deductive reasoning, as well as 
I 
spatial visualization, reading, etc.; (2) knowledge-acquisition 
components, which involve the screening and selection of information 
and the integration of information with previous knowledge; and (3) 
metacomponents, which include judgements about the type of problem 
being solved, and monitoring the solution process. While such 
logical taxonomies may be useful to philosophers and theoreticians, 
educators may find a description of the characteristics of critical 
thinking more useful. Such a description would aid educators in 
identifying when such thinking, also referred to as "higher order 
thinking," is taking place. Resnick described several important 
characteristics of this type of thinking. Her description emphasizes 
the problematic aspects of critical thinking; the role of conflicting 
ideas, and the need to make judgements under uncertain conditions: 
Higher-Order Thinking: 
* Is non-algorithmic. That is, the path of action is 
not fully specified in advance. 
* Tends to be complex. The total path is not 
"visible," mentally speaking, from any single vantage 
point. 
* Often yields multiple solutions, each with costs 
and benefits, rather than unique solutions. 
* Involves nuanced judgement and interpretation. 
6 
* Involves the application of multiple criteria, 
which sometimes conflict with one another. 
Often involves uncertainty. Not everything is 
known that bears on the task at hand. 
Means self-regulation of the thinking process. We 
do not recognize higher-order thinking in an 
individual when someone else "calls the plays" at 
every step. 
Involves imposing meaning, finding structure in 
apparent disorder. (Resnick, 1986, p. 12) 
The last two characteristics will form the greater part of the basis 
for the proposed dissertation. They are respectively, metacognition, 
the self-monitoring of thought, and constructivism, the idea that 
meaning is imposed through individual purposive thinking. It is 
obvious that the kinds of skills evident in higher order thinking are 
not limited to the content of mathematics. They are the basis for 
analytical reasoning applied to any form of problem solving and all 
academic disciplines. 
Critical Thinking and Remedial Mathematics 
Remedial mathematics has traditionally served to "remediate" 
student mathematics deficiencies by drilling students in arithmetic 
computation and algebra symbol manipulation in order to prepare them 
for their next mathematics course. Such courses are attempts to 
"fill the gaps" or help students "brush up" by presenting one 
arithmetic or algebra technique after another in quick succession. 
Textbooks present topics with only the most terse description or 
"proof", followed by example problem solutions which students 
subsequently practice in "exercises". Answers to odd-numbered 
exercises are often printed at the end of the book, and practice 
7 
exams are usually included for further preparation. Word problems 
are generally included though not emphasized, and they are not used 
to teach concepts but to illustrate how certain techniques may be 
applied. If the concepts have not been understood, the difficulties 
students experience in solving word problems can be insuperable. It 
is not surprising that word problems are one of the least appreciated 
features of mathematics courses for students (Lester & Garofalo, 
1982). 
Remedial mathematics courses can do much more than just fill 
gaps in content. Critical thinking skills can be developed within 
the context of a mathematics curriculum designed to teach the 
concepts of arithmetic and introductory algebra. Word problem 
solving can serve as a vehicle for helping students develop 
conceptual understanding rather than serve as a post hoc test of 
their understanding. For this shift to occur the pedagogy of proof, 
example, drill and test needs to be subordinated to a pedagogy based 
on the discovery of concepts by students who need those concepts to 
solve problems. The fundamental difference in the two approaches 
lies in their respective epistemologies—that is, the status which 
each approach attributes to ideas and to the learning of ideas. The 
traditional approach views ideas as the currency of instruction; 
teachers teach ideas by presenting them clearly, while students 
demonstrate their learning by performing rote computations and 
manipulations. Contrary to the view of knowledge as "ideas proved 
true", the constructivist approach considers ideas to be 
idiosyncratic mental constructions; teachers cannot teach ideas, but 
they can ask questions so that their students can construct ideas for 
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themselves. The highest value of this "constructivist" approach to 
education is the intellectual autonomy of the student. The goal of 
constructivist remedial mathematics is to empower the student to 
think mathematically and critically. 
Goals of the Dissertation 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to develop and 
evaluate a constructivist pedagogy and curriculum for remedial 
mathematics which can serve as a guide to college institutions who 
may wish to implement such a program for their students. The content 
of remedial mathematics courses frequently includes topics in 
analytic geometry, algebra and trigonometry. However, the present 
proposal confines remediation to the topics of arithmetic and very 
elementary algebra and geometry. The intent of the curriculum is not 
only to prepare students for subsequent courses in calculus and 
. statistics, but mainly to prepare students to reason quantitatively 
and to apply mathematics to a variety of problems which they may 
encounter in their daily experiences. Students in need of such 
remediation often have little confidence in their mathematics 
abilities. Consequently, much of the present program is tailored to 
improving their self-image as mathematics students. An additional 
semester of remedial mathematics which deals with the basic concepts 
of algebra would no doubt be necessary for these students to succeed 
in "college level" mathematics courses. 
The program described in this thesis has been implemented at 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, since 1984, as the first of 
a two-semester sequence which prepares students for calculus, 
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statistics, or standardized testing for graduate school. The author, 
together with colleagues at the Cognitive Processes Research Group, 
University of Massachusetts, has developed and taught the course 
cooperatively for several years. Various colleagues1 material 
contributions will be acknowledged at the appropriate sections of 
this thesis. Their valuable non-material contributions to the 
formulation of the ideas presented here cannot be overstated nor 
properly acknowledged save through this attempt to bring those ideas 
coherently together. 
Theoretical Background: The Constructivist Perspective 
The "constructivist perspective" forms the theoretical 
framework from which a pedagogy for mathematics instruction is 
proposed. Although this perspective can be observed in the history 
of philosophical thought since the Pre-Socratics, the current 
formulation derives principally from the psychological theories of 
Piaget regarding intellectual development. According to Piaget 
(1954) the world is constructed by us so as to make sense of our 
experience. Interpretive frameworks are developed early in life to 
assimilate new experiences. These frameworks also change to 
accomodate those experiences. Moreover, the frameworks, also called 
structures, not only interpret what we perceive, they also determine 
what and how we perceive. For example: the infant who sees a ball 
roll out of sight behind a chair and shows no evidence of believing 
that the ball or anything else outside his/her immediate perceptual 
field exists, is living in a different world than the child who 
believes in the continued existence of objects, like balls behind 
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chairs, even when those objects are not immediately perceived. 
Knowing is not merely remembering. The child who knows that the ball 
"exists" behind the chair, though it is out of sight, may not, and 
need not, have seen that particular event before. The idea of the 
permanence of objects which pass out of the child's perceptual field 
is an idea that the child creates from previous actions. It is then 
generalized to many events. The intellectual growth of the human is 
not the imprinting of knowledge onto a more or less receptive 
slate . Rather, knowledge is actively created by purposive thought 
which attempts to assimilate new experiences into existing mental 
structures. The alteration of existing structures is necessary for 
and often coincident with the assimilation of new knowledge. In 
Piaget's terms: 
To my way of thinking, knowing an object does not 
mean copying it - it means acting upon it. It 
means constructing systems of transformations that 
correspond, more or less adequately, to reality. 
They are more or less isomorphic to transformations 
of reality. The transformational structures of which 
knowledge consists are not copies of the 
transformations in reality; they are simply possible 
isomorphic models among which experience can enable 
us to choose. Knowledge, then is a system of 
transformations that become progressively adequate." 
(1970, p. 15) 
To be useful to mathematics educators, Piaget's theory should 
be applicable to the development of mathematics concepts. In fact 
several mathematics education researchers have found evidence that 
children do, from a very early age, invent mathematics concepts for 
themselves. The literature on the development of counting strategies 
(Resnick, 1976; Carpenter, et al., 1982) indicates that children 
invent strategies without ever having been taught them specifically. 
For example, after learning to count all of the objecta aerially from 
two aeta of objecta, children apontaneoualy begin to "count on" from 
the larger of the two seta. If set A has fewer elements than set B, 
then the child will start counting objects in set A with the number 
B+1' Although the child may not be able to articulate the property 
of commutativity in adding, at least a rudimentary understanding may 
be inferred; and this prior to instruction. 
Invention is also apparent in student misconceptions. The 
analysis of errors or "bugs" in children's solutions of addition and 
subtraction problems (Brown & Burton, 1978; Maurer, 1987) shows that 
error patterns exist which are consistent, at least partially, with 
proper methods in the adding and subtracting algorithms. 
Misconceptions among college students regarding the use of variables 
(Clement, 1982), equations and data tables (Clement, Narode & 
Rosnick, 1981), and graphing (Clement, 1985; Schultz, et al., 1986) 
indicate that students invent ideas which, though mistaken, are so 
consistent with their previous ideas, and so useful to the student in 
solving problems, that repeated instruction to overcome the 
misconception is often unsuccessful. 
The dissertation incorporates three "general psycho-pedagogical 
principles" which are intended to facilitate critical thinking, and 
to help the student construct an ensemble of mathematical structures 
which are consistent with those of the teacher and useful in problem 
solving. Formulated by Eiaget (1973), these three principles are 
elucidated by Groen and Kieran: 
1. Real comprehension of a notion or a theory implies its 
reinvention by the pupil. As Piaget (1974) puts it 
elsewhere, "to understand is to invent." 
1 2 
2. Many of the processes a child uses in solving a problem are 
unconscious. (( Thus, the pupil will be far more capable of 
himself v, Und®^Standin8 in actions" than of expressing 
himself or herself verbally. Mathematical thinking can 
develop only if the pupil can become aware of these 
unconscious processes. 
3' F«dai,KathematiCS <i•e•• that ”hlch uses ab“™ct notation 
and other aspects of mathematical formalism) utilizes 
structures that may be quite different from those utilized 
m the nonformal "natural" mathematics of the child. What 
must be developed is a new structure reflecting a 
satisfactory coordination between the formal and the 
nonformal. Hence, formalization should be kept for a later 
moment as a systematization of the nonformal notions already 
acquired. (1983, p. 368-369) y 
The first of these three principles is a statement of the 
constructivist perspective mentioned previously and will be explored 
more thoroughly in a separate chapter in the dissertation. The 
second principle incorporates Piaget's hypothesis that action 
precedes knowledge, and that knowledge is essentially active. By 
"active", he means the active coordination of mental structures. 
Mental activity need not be related to any physical activity. The 
single most obvious indication of mental activity is the self¬ 
reflection on one's own thinking. Unfortunately, much of the mental 
processing during problem solving is not accessible to novices and 
must be made apparent to them through training in reflective 
introspection. Expressing ideas verbally is a skill which may be 
taught, so that the student's thought processes become apparent to 
both the student and the teacher. These metacognitive skills are 
prerequisite for mathematical thinking to develop. The third 
principle acknowledges that students develop a "natural" 
understanding of mathematics which is qualitatively different from 
formal mathematics. The goal is not only to allow the informal 
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understanding to develop, but to encourage its development by asking 
students to verbalize their thought processes while solving problems 
whose purpose and context is familiar to them. Only after the 
informal understanding is attained can the formal mathematical 
elaboration be understood. And even if the systematization of the 
informal notions is not achieved through formalism, as is often the 
case for students, at least they will have developed an informal 
understanding which is useful to them in problem solving. 
Content and Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized to incorporate the theoretical 
perspectives of constructivism and metacognition into the development 
of a pedagogy and curriculum appropriate for college remedial 
mathematics. In short, the dissertation consists of three areas of 
investigation: theory, theory applied to the development and 
implementation of pedagogy, and evaluation. 
The two chapters on theory [Chapters II and III] are attempts 
to establish the importance of epistemology to education generally 
and to science and mathematics education specifically. The chapter 
on the theory of Constructivism argues that the epistemological 
status of knowledge is subject to debate, and furthermore, that the 
epistemological position that a student, educator, and education 
researcher assume will have direct bearing on both educational 
activity and expectation. The chapter outlines the historical 
development of Constructivism and a philosophical and psychological 
perspective, beginning with the skepticism of Pre-Socratic Greek 
14 
philosophers and concluding with the genetic and constructivist 
epistemology of the Swiss psychologist, Piaget. 
The second theoretical chapter, entitled "Metacognition in Math 
and Science Education," takes up Piaget's notion of reflexive 
abstraction and expands his ideas to encompass more recent theories 
about the importance of metacognition, or thought about thought. A 
taxonomy of metacognition outlines the role of reflection with 
respect to three variables: reflection about oneself as a thinker, 
mathematician, scientist, etc. ["person variables"]; reflection about 
a particular learning task, for example, mathematics word problems, 
computation, solving equations, etc. ["task variables"]; and 
conscious monitoring of strategies and heuristics while solving 
problems or engaging in various learning tasks ["strategy variables"] 
(Flavell & Wellman, 1977). The theory of Metacognition assumes that 
epistemology is important to the content and style of learning, and 
suggests that reflection on one's beliefs about knowledge, about 
oneself as knower and learner in comparison to others, and about the 
tasks and the strategies used to succeed in learning tasks, has great 
significance for educators and learners. Finally, an argument is 
advanced for searching for methods to help students to develop a 
"metacognitive orientation," a predisposition for reflection that 
will help students to learn concepts, solve problems, and improve 
self-esteem. 
The implications of these two theoretical perspectives for 
remedial mathematics at the college level are incorporated into a 
plan for implementation in the classroom and in the curriculum. The 
chapter on pedagogy traces the history of 20th century mathematics 
curricular theory in the United States to identify the roots of 
constructivist pedagogy both in reaction to some theories such as 
Connectionism and Behaviorism,and as outgrowths of other theories 
such as Structuralism and Gestaltism. The definition and inclusion 
of important curricular notions contribute to the construction and 
analysis of a chapter of a text used in a constructivist classroom 
for remedial mathematics. Methods of instruction are subsequently 
described which use the text in a classroom in which students work 
cooperatively in pairs and small groups. Lecture is kept to a 
minimum so that students may engage in problem solving in an 
environment conducive for verbalization and reflection. The 
instructional goals are to empower students to think critically in 
the construction of powerful mathematical ideas [concepts], and also 
to communicate their ideas effectively and to listen effectively to 
the ideas expressed by others. Constructivist pedagogy attempts to 
shift student expectations that knowledge comes from authority, to 
the expectation that they and others construct knowledge in the 
process of problem solving and reflecting on their problem solving in 
a social context and ultimately with social consensus. 
The final chapter of this dissertation evaluates the 
constructivist program of remedial mathematics education which was 
implemented in the Math 010 course at the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. The construction of an evaluation instrument 
is described and analyzed. Using both Item Response Theory and 
Classical Test Theory, a math placement test which includes items 
with misconceptions in algebra and arithmetic is evaluated from 
several perspectives. The test is evaluated for both validity and 
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reliability. In addition to reporting the overall reliability of the 
test and each of the individual items, those items using 
misconceptions documented in the research literature are compared to 
items which require rote manipulation skills. The identification of 
algorithmic and higher-order thinking skills is important for 
evaluation of the constructivist program since the program assumes 
that the parallel and complementary understanding of both types of 
skills are necessary for mathematical understanding generally. 
Therefore, the evaluation instrument consists of pre- and post-tests 
which include subtests of items comprised of algorithmic 
manipulations type items and higher-order thinking skills type items. 
Due to the prevalent notion of gender differentiation in mathematics 
performance, a gender bias study was conducted on the evaluation 
instrument. The Math 010 course, as treatment between pre- and post¬ 
tests, was also evaluated for gender differences as indicated in the 
gain scores on the instrument and by correlating gender to grade in 
the course. 
Analysis of test results indicates that the Math 010 course 
significantly improved student performance in both algorithmic and 
higher-order thinking skills. However, students gained more in their 
algorithmic skills, as measured by the gain in number of correct 
responses on the test, than they did in higher-order thinking skills. 
Furthermore, women show greater gains than men on algorithmic skills; 
i.e. they begin slightly lower and end significantly higher on the 
algorithmic subtest. 
The dissertation concludes by suggesting a hypothesis for the 
gender difference in algorithmic skills gains, and by discussing the 
observation that the course appears not to succeed as well as 
intended in bringing algorithmic and conceptual understanding 
together in a meaningful way for the students. One suggestion for 
alleviating the problem of uniting these two types of mathematical 
understanding is to make the connection explicit. In an attempt to 
encourage teachers to make their understandings of the 
complementarity of algorithms and problem solving explicit for the 
students, and to afford the students the opportunity to read an 
elaboration of this relationship, a chapter of text was rewritten. 
The chapter of curriculum on fractions, discussed in the 
dissertation, was rewritten with sample solutions in a split-notebook 
format to allow students and teachers to read a thought process 
protocol solution on one side of a page of text and a mathematician's 
commentary on the other side of the same page. The method of 
reflecting on thought in process, coupled with the super-ordinate 
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reflection of a mathematics educator on the primary thought process 
solution, may provide students and educators with a model for 
learning which combines conceptual understanding with algorithmic 
knowledge in the context of problem solving. 
CHAPTER II 
CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MATH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 
Beneath all educational pedagogies lie philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of learning, knowledge, truth and 
morality. These different philosophies form the foundations of a 
variety of instructional programs in all academic disciplines. 
Although the theoretical perspectives of the disciplines have evolved 
historically and are chronicled in survey courses on the history of 
their respective fields, in methods courses on research (qualitative 
and quantitative) and on instruction, and in the respective academic 
journals, far less attention is devoted to the study of the methods 
of transmission of knowledge within the disciplines. Transmission 
and appropriation of knowledge are two defining operations of 
education. There are Important philosophical and psychological 
assumptions attached to the termd "transmission", "appropriation", 
and "knowledge" which require careful examination for education, as a 
discipline, to achieve a coherent theoretical perspective. 
Constructivism is one recent attempt to provide a philosophical 
pedagogy which affects classroom instruction, teacher training, 
curriculum development, and education research. Constructivism also 
qviestions the methods and goals of the various academic disciplines 
as well as redefining the social roles and responsibilities of 
teachers and students. 
Philosophically, constructivism advocates an epistemology which 
views knowledge as belief, and asserts that truth cannot be absolute. 
With respect to the sciences, major advocates of this persuasion ate 
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Karl Popper (1963), Thomas Kuhn (1962), and Paul Feyerabend (1975). 
In mathematics, the constructivist position is characterized by the 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1956), Imre Lakatos (1976), and Morris 
Kline (1980). These writers advance the thesis that knowledge in 
mathematics and science is a product of history and culture. The 
scientific process is manifest in the dialogue between people 
committed to the rationalization of a world they will not and cannot 
know in any absolute sense. Given the dialectical characterization 
of knowledge, the constructivist must reevaluate the function of 
teacher as transmitter and student as appropriator. Knowledge can no 
longer be the medium of exchange from the former to the latter. 
Instead, knowledge must be constructed from human mentation through 
the active communication between people with equal authority in their 
claims to truth. 
The importance of epistemology in education is apparent in the 
classroom, in the educational research laboratory, and in the 
academic disciplines of math and science. An epistemology of truths- 
as-facts generally produces students who view learning as memorizing 
facts rather than as a search for relationships between concepts. 
This is an epistemology antithetical to the goals of "critical 
thinking" and "higher order thinking" which are so recently acclaimed 
the most needed and deficient skills of American youth (Resnick, 
1986). Cognitive process researchers studying problem-solving and 
conceptual development in mathematics and physics are beginning to 
acknowledge the epistemological assumptions inherent in the very 
concepts they study with their subjects (Vergnaud, 1983; Kaput, 1979; 
Minstrell, 1984). Within the sciences, constructivism critiques the 
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"inductive habit of thought" which is the hallmark of scientific 
method. A school of mathematicians calling themselves 
Constructivists criticize the Platonic epistemology they see as 
prevalent, though generally not acknowledged by most mathematicians. 
Even "logical truths" such as the principle of contradiction (a 
statement cannot be both true and false) are questioned by 
mathematical constructivists. 
Many constructivist arguments stem from the problem of 
philosophical skepticism. Since the time of the Pre-Socratics, 
philosophers have struggled with questions about the veridity of the 
senses, of logic and of mental models as conduits of or correlates to 
reality. A contemporary group of philosophers known as Radical 
Constructivists reject even the possibility of this correlation. 
But constructivism is not nihilism. The aim of this 
epistemology is not to destroy for the sake of destruction, but to 
expose the myth of reality so that attention may be focused on the 
social and psychological processes of individuals together defining 
not one world, but many worlds - the worlds individually 
constructed. 
A pioneer in this endeavor is Jean Piaget (1970,1971) who 
attempted to answer the epistemological question: "What do we know 
and how do we know it?" with a careful analysis of the intellectual 
development of the human child. His conclusions support the thesis 
of constructivism generally. They also direct educators toward a 
practical pedagogy which has as its highest value the individual's 
capacity to construct knowledge and to accept responsibility for 
those constructions. 
The Role of Epistemology in Education 
2 1 
Epistemology in the Classroom 
In an article about examsmanship in the liberal arts, William 
Perry (1963) distinguished two opposing epistemologies with 
ramifications for education in the liberal arts and in the sciences. 
While appearing somewhat apocryphal, the following anecdote, as 
recounted by Perry, will serve to illustrate these two 
epistemologies, and so is allotted some space. 
A student at Harvard took an exam in a course he was not 
enrolled in, and on a topic which he was almost completely unfamiliar 
with. He succeeded in his attempt to fool the system with an expert 
display of Mbull". Having made several inferences based on the title 
of the course (social anthropology), the titles of the books 
mentioned, and conjectures about the authors' ethnic background (from 
their names), the student patched together an essay for which he 
earned an A-r. Inferring that the author of the text was an 
anthropologist studying his own culture or a culture similar to his 
own, [Geoffrey Gorer, author of The American People], the student 
elaborated on his conjectures about the methodological difficulties 
facing the scientist. This he did with no facts! A colleague of 
his, who attended class all term, had studied hard, memorizing many 
facts, earned a grade of 'C'. The 'A-' student admitted to having 
written "just a lot of bull”, while the 'C' student was outraged. 
Perry insists that the grading indeed was not fair. The 
student who was awarded a grade of 'C' for having only recounted 
facts should have Instead been given an ■»•. The other grade stands 
as marked. His reasoning for this judgement rests on the assumption 
that these two students typified two epistemologies which may be 
characterized with the following definitions: 
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cow (pure): facts, no matter how relevant, without relevancies 
bull (pure): relevancies, no matter how relevant, without facts 
Allowing the tongue-in-cheek quality of his definitions, Perry 
makes an important observation about the role of epistemology in 
education. An appreciation for a theoretical perspective, and for 
the problems associated with developing and using one, demonstrates a 
far greater understanding of an academic discipline than does a mere 
recitation of facts. Perry (1970) conjectured that students 
developed progressively more sophisticated epistemologies. They 
advance from the naive epistemology of learning, as typified by the 
memorization of facts, toward a "higher level" epistemology which 
views facts as constructions which stem from theories which are 
themselves constructions. Students in the early stages of 
intellectual development criticize their teachers' theorizing in the 
following manner: 
If teachers would stick more to the facts and do less 
theorizing, one could get more out of their classes... A 
certain amount of theory is good, but it should not be 
dominant... The facts are what's there. And I think 
that should be_ the main thing. (Perry, 1970, p. 67) 
DiSessa (1985) makes a similar distinction in the sciences, 
particularly from the study of students in college physics courses. 
Two epistemologies with radically different implications are 
identified in their respective adherents. One prevalent epistemology 
is described by DiSessa: "[there is a] traditional view that learning 
physics is acquiring new knowledge specifically located in the laws, 
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principles, and equations of textbooks, understood essentially on the 
surface level of knowing those principles by name and statement, and 
those equations by the letter" (DiSessa, 1985, p. 4). This 
description is typical of students he refers to as "results men". 
Learning, for these students, consists in the match of problem to 
equation to produce an answer. The student must substitute the facts 
(data) given in the problem statement, into the proper variables in 
the appropriate equation (also considered a fact). He then performs 
the indicated algebraic and arithmetic operations (more facts) to 
produce a correct answer which is true by virtue of all the above 
facts - and if by chance it is an odd-numbered problem, the answer 
may be verified in the back of the book. 
Another epistemology, more rare, but certainly more powerful, 
understands physics as a way to view the world. In this case, the 
student realizes that in order to "get the point" his intuitions must 
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be substantially reorganized. This is an epistemology in search of 
conceptual understanding rather than just facts and answers. 
Clearly, epistemology plays a crucial role in the classroom. 
It will determine not only what students believe they are learning, 
but also how they must proceed to learn it. The types of questions 
teachers ask and the concepts they hope to teach will affect their 
students’ epistemologies in ways which may foster or suppress 
conceptual understanding. 
Epistemology in Education Research 
It is the task of education researchers to identify the 
s needed to understand concepts as well as to 
cognitive processe 
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identify cognitively important concepts. As may be expected, 
researchers must also be sensitive to their own epistemological 
perspectives. 
Researchers in mathematics and science education have recently 
addressed the problem of identifying epistemologies in student 
subjects and in the methods and contents of cognitive studies. 
Vergnaud's (1983) attempt to define and analyze a mathematical 
concept illustrates his concern for explicating the epistemologies 
implicit in the researcher's work. For example, many mathematical 
concepts, particularly geometrical concepts, involve both physical 
and mathematical constructions. Volume is such a concept. Children, 
aged 5 to 11 years, can distinguish the relative sizes of volumes. 
They demonstrate an understanding sufficient to compare two volumes, 
to approximate a volume, to coordinate unit systems, and so on. They 
can compare volumes by considering lengths and areas, and they can 
evaluate one volume by combining information about lengths, areas, 
angles, etc. All of these skills involve what Vernaud calls a 
"unidimensional conception of volume” - volume as quantity. However, 
these same children, and also adolescents, demonstrate little 
understanding of volume defined as a product of measures, as in a 
straight parallelepiped: 
V = L x W x H 
A "tridimensional conception of volume" requires an 
understanding that length, width and height are independent 
variables, and that change in volume is proportional to a change in 
one of those variables when the other two are held constant. 
be studied concretely, i.e. empirically, as a Although volumes may 
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unidimensional concept, the peculiarly mathematical tridimensional 
concept of volume requires a different epistemology. Carpenter 
(1983) also found evidence in his own research in children's 
understanding of addition and subtraction to corroborate the thesis 
that the researcher must examine his own mathematical 
conceptualizations to effectively study the students'. 
An important epistemological task for mathematics education 
research is defining what is meant by the term "mathematics concept." 
Vernaud suggests that a concept consists of a triplet of three sets: 
Concept - (S, I, L ) 
S: set of situations that make the concept meaningful; 
the referent 
Is set of invariants that constitute the concept 
(different properties, different levels); the 
signifled. 
L: set of symbolic representations that can be used to 
represent these properties and the situations; the 
signifier. (1983, p. 19) 
In the previous example, the referents are any of the 
particular, concrete instances of volume that may be experienced: 
cones, cups, boxes, spherical balls, cylindrical straws, etc. The 
unidimensional, conservation properties of volume were much discussed 
by Piaget, and will not be recounted here. 
The tridimensional properties of volume represent a different 
level of conceptualization. Some symbolic signifiers for the 
tridimensional conception o£ volume are the symbolic representations: 
parallelepiped: 
♦ 
sphere: 
prism: 
cylinder: 
V - L x W xH 
V - 4/3 irr 3 
V - 1/2 b h 1 
V - r2 h u . 
By identifying the triplet of sets which define a concept, the 
researcher makes explicit the epistemology contained in the concept. 
Cognitive scientists studying physics education have identified 
student epistemologies which are at variance with the epistemology of 
physicists. Student beliefs about the way the physical world works 
is often due to preconceptions which bear remarkable similarity to 
Aristotelian physics. Even the most elementary distinction between 
the positions and velocities of two objects is problematic. 
Minstrell (1984) reports that 50 % of high school physics students 
believed that when two objects are at the same position, they have 
the same speed. Students also have difficulty distinguishing between 
the physicist's conceptions of acceleration, average velocity, 
instantaneous velocity and change in velocity. (McDermott and 
Trowbridge, 1980). 
The study of 'naive physics' has uncovered a number of Pre- 
Newtonian conceptualizations, revealing a physical epistemology 
similar to Aristotle's. Aristotelian notions are still quite 
prevalent in our society. There are common beliefs that heavy 
objects fall proportionally faster than lighter ones, and that 
objects require constant force for continued motion. Furthermore, 
there is much evidence that these conceptions are resistant to the 
benefits of instruction (Clement, 1982; McClosky, Green and 
the physicist's conceptualizations 
Caramazza, 1980). Simply telling 
is not sufficient for the student to discard a strongly held 
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intuitive belief. Frequently, students memorize definitions and 
operations by rote in order to pass exams. However, when asked for 
qualitative responses to conceptual physics questions, students 
exhibit the same misconceptions they had prior to instruction. 
Researchers in this field concur that for instruction to succeed, 
students must first be permitted to articulate their naive 
epistemologies, re-evaluate them in the light of new evidence and 
arguments, and finally construct a new epistemology that more closely 
resembles the physicist's. 
The method of instruction of the scientist and the 
mathematician is further complicated by a mathematical symbol system 
which cloaks the actual epistemology of invention of concepts. 
Typically, students are introduced to new concepts via formalisms 
which deny the initial cognitive processes responsible for the 
creation of the concepts. Kaput (1979) argues that many symbolic 
representations in mathematics are filled with anthropomorphisms and 
physical metaphors which are "disacknowledged” by mathematicians. He 
cites an important example from calculus. The symbol for the concept 
of a limit reflects the underlying formative conceptualization of the 
discipline. This fundamental concept is symbolized with a motion 
metaphor, an arrow: 
lim f(x) = L 
x -> a 
is to be read: "As x moves towards a , 
relationship is sometimes written as: 
f(x) moves toward L." This 
# 
x -> a I f(x) -> L 
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Mathematicians seldom draw attention to this motion metaphor in their 
presentation of calculus. Instead, the metaphor has been replaced 
with the logical formalism of the familiar 6 - e proof. According 
to Kaput: 
... the attempt to wring out from the calculus its 
motion-content was: 
1. historically very irrelevant to the stupendous success 
of calculus, 
2. historically very difficult to achieve, and 
3. is today disastrous in the teaching of calculus. 
(1979, p. 215) 
Most cognitive process researchers advocate that the cognitive 
processes responsible for the initial invention of concepts be 
reconstructed anew by education researchers and by students. While 
the reconstruction can never be identical to the initial 
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conceptualization, the similarities will surely become manifest, and 
new insights may also occur. 
For the constructivist, there can be no purely distilled 
knowledge that stands true and perfect. Knowledge is a human 
construction, and learning is a creative activity. Any presentation 
of education which misses this epistemology is dishonest and 
destructive. Kaput states: 
Our failure to acknowledge the acts of knowing and 
learning is analogous to the Victorian attitude toward 
sex. One cannot develop mathematical conceptions without 
engaging in the torrid act of learning. There is no such 
thing as immaculate conception! (1979, p. 290) 
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Epistemology in Math and Science: Faith and Skepticism 
For more than 2000 years, philosophers have struggled with 
problems in epistemology. Many of the difficulties discussed in 
antiquity are still debated by philosophers of mathematics and 
science. The debate is focused around the investigation of what 
humans can and cannot know. There are arguments for absolute faith 
in the veridity of human knowledge against the assertions of 
skepticism - that truth is either beyond human thought or 
manufactured temporally by each individual thinker. This last 
conjecture is closest to a constructivist position, while the 
position of faith is closer to the beliefs of most mathematicians and 
scientists throughout history. 
Segal suggests that the language and logic of Western culture 
reflects a "wish for reality". The dimensions of this wish are four¬ 
fold : 
1) We wish reality to exist independently of us. 
2) We wish reality to be discoverable; to reveal itself to us. 
3) We wish that the workings of reality be lawful so that we 
can predict and control reality. 
4) We wish for certainty; we wish that what we have discovered 
about reality is true. (Segal, 1986, p. 3) 
The first of these observations is characteristic of Platonic 
philosophy. Plato's thesis requires that truths exist somewhere in 
the universe for humans to discover. In the dialogue, Meno, Plato 
argued for the absolute nature of truth by means of a geometrical 
demonstration. Euclid's geometry had been the greatest evidence for 
this hypothesis for more than 2000 years. The postulates (axioms) 
were considered self-evident and true beyond any doubt. The theorems 
which followed by logical construction were also considered 
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absolutely true. Mathematicians believed they were discovering 
truth. Davis and Hersh (1981) state that at least 65% of working 
mathematicians are Platonists who believe that mathematical knowledge 
is discovered and not invented. There is the additional implication 
that there exist more mathematical truths "out there" to be 
discovered. 
Few mathematicians believe that their discoveries are made 
through empirical observations. Plato doubted the reliability of the 
senses completely, maintaining that truth was accessible to reason 
only. This rationalist position has been the bulwark of mathematical 
philosophy. Scientists, on the other hand, need the senses for their 
empirical observations. They assume that the objects they measure 
also exist independently of themselves as observers. Using 
mathematics and inference they also purport to discover reality. In 
both math and science, faith is crucial; faith in reason and faith in 
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the senses. Historically, the faith is shaken. 
Long before the advent of Non-Euclidian geometry and quantum 
mechanics, an attack on the verities of reason appeared in the form 
of a paradox. In the 6th century B.C., the Cretan, Epimenidies, 
questioned the Aristotelian fundamental assumption that a statement 
is either true, or it is not true, i.e. false. He asked for a 
logical analysis of the following statement: 
I am from the island of Crete, and all Cretans are liars. 
This paradoxical statement raises doubts about the status of 
the entire logical program. It surfaced again in the 19th century to 
undermine a rationalist proposal to place arithmetic on firmer ground 
than previously had been thought possible. Given several basic 
assumptions about sets, Gottlob Frege developed a logically 
consistent arithmetic, with all the desired properties and 
operations, and without recourse to a postulate which requires the 
existence of numbers. As a logical system, it was to arithmetic what 
Euclid's Principles was to geometry. By the time his work, The 
Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic, had gone to press, Bertrand Russell 
wrote to him indicating a paradox in Frege's set theory. The paradox 
arises with a problem in self-inclusive sets. Russell asked Frege to 
consider: "the set of all sets which do not contain themselves as an 
element". The statement is paradoxical in that it seems impossible 
to determine whether the set is itself an element of the set it 
defines. Frege had no solution to the paradox, and Russell's 
solution in effect disallows self-inclusive sets. The similarity of 
this paradox to that of Epimenidies did not escape Russell, even if a 
clear solution did. 
Subsequent attempts to place mathematics on firm 
epistemological ground failed for very similar reasons. Having 
abandoned the Platonic assumptions implicit in Euclidian geometry, 
mathematicians like Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Hilbert, Godel and 
others, attempted to provide a foundation for mathematics in 
formalized logic. In a paper entitled "On Formally Undecidable 
Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems", Godel 
(1931) proposed his Incompleteness Theorem. This theorem dealt a 
fatal blow to the epistemological gainsaying of all widely accepted 
axiomatic systems. He successfully argued that any formal theory 
which is consistent, and which may include a theory of whole numbers, 
must be incomplete. By assigning numbers (Godel numbers) to numbers, 
operators, equal signs, letters, and other symbols, Godel was able to 
show that there exist meaningful statements in number theory that are 
neither provable nor not provable. Kline's description of Godel's 
theorem is remarkably similar to the liar's paradox: 
...Godel showed how to construct an arithmetical assertion G 
that says, in the verbal meta-mathematical language, that the 
statement with Godel numbers m, say is not provable. But G, as 
a sequence of symbols has the Godel number m. Thus, G says of 
itself that it is not provable. But if the entire arithmetical 
assertion G is provable, it asserts that it is not provable, 
and if G is not provable it affirms just that and so is not 
provable. However, since the arithmetical assertion is either 
provable or not provable, the formal system to which the 
arithmetical assertion belongs, if consistent, is incomplete. 
(Kline, 1980, p. 262) 
Simply stated, Godel considered the self referential statement, "This 
statement is not provable." The paradox is nearly identical to the 
Liar's Paradox. 
Not all attacks on Platonic Rationalism stem from this one 
paradox. There are laws in mathematics, albeit analytical laws, 
which may be doubted for very different reasons. In 1908, the Dutch 
mathematician, Brouwer, presented a counterexample to the "law of 
trichotomy" which ushered in a new school of mathematics called 
"Constructivism". The law of trichotomy is not only intuitively 
appealing, it also plays a fundamental role in calculus and analysis. 
The law states that every real number is either zero, positive or 
negative. The proof of this law requires another fundamental law in 
mathematics, the law of the excluded middle, which asserts that a 
statement is either true or false. Both laws are inappropriate to an 
analysis of Brouwer's counterexample and therefore unacceptable in 
constructivist proofs. 
Brouwer's counterexample may be derived from any real number 
whose decimal expansion is infinite. Any irrational or 
transcendental number will serve as an example. Brouwer considered 
the number pi. Using the algorithms for decimal expansion of tt , he 
postulated a second number II. This new number is generated by the 
same rule used to expand n, and is identical to n to some arbitrary 
degree of precision; say for example, to the first billion decimal 
places. To this rule another arbitrary rule may be added: expand TI 
until a row of say 100 successive zeroes is reached or until the 
desired precision for II is reached, whichever comes first. If in the 
expansion, a row of 100 zeroes is reached and starts on the nth 
digit, then terminate the expansion with the following rule: If n is 
odd, let n terminate in its nth digit. If n is even, let IT have a 1 
in the n+1 digit, and then terminate. According to the law of 
trichotomy, any real number must be positive, negative or zero. Both 
n and II are real numbers, and their difference, tt - n - Q, is also a 
real number. But unless the expansion of n has within it a string of 
100 zeroes, the sign of Q cannot be determined. The statement, "in 
the expansion of tt there nowhere appears a row of 100 successive 
zeroes," cannot be proved or disproved until such time that it is 
calculated. This example illustrates the time dependent and 
subjective character of mathematical truth. (Davis and Hersh, 1981). 
Soon after philosophers of mathematics had reached their crisis 
in foundations, the philosophers of science brought about a 
foundations crisis of their own. The inductive method of science, 
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which relies on inferential reasoning, has been attacked for being an 
ineffective epistemology for logical reasons (Popper, 1963), for 
historical reasons (Kuhn, 1962) and for pedagogical and 
methodological reasons (Feyerabend, 1970). 
Scientific method is characterized by induction - generalized 
statements about accumulated observations. D'Amour described five 
tenets of inductivist science: 
1. Science begins with a solid base of "brute facts", basic 
statements that are justified by observation. 
2. These basic statements are logically prior to and 
independent of the theories inferred from them. 
3. Inferences from such statements are made in accordance with 
an ideal calculus - for example, the probability calculus. 
4. Making inferences in accordance with an ideal calculus 
assures the attainment of the primary aim of science, 
namely, reliable theories. 
5. Science arrives at theories of increased reliability in a 
step-by-step fashion; the scientific method is cumulative. 
(1979, p. 184) 
The first two of these tenets were criticized in the work of 
science historian Thomas Kuhn (1962) who argued that facts are theory 
dependent. His analysis of the history of science describes not a 
cumulative process [note tacit assumption #5], but a process of 
revolution and subsequent revolution. Each successful revolution 
entrenches itself with its theories, methods, instrumentation and 
data. It becomes a paradigm from which all accepted practitioners 
draw guidance and recognition. A successful revolution replaces the 
previous paradigm only when all of the old practitioners either die 
or retire. Each new paradigm describes the type of observations 
which may be accepted as data. According to Kuhn: 
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. . . paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world 
of their research-engagement differently. In so far as 
their only recourse to that world is through what they 
see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution, 
scientists are responding to a different world. 
(1962, p. Ill) 
D'Amour's tacit assumptions 3 and 4 have been attacked by the 
critical fallibist" program of Karl Popper (1963) which questions 
the logical validity of inferential science. In a continuation of 
the arguments advanced by the 17th century philosopher, David Hume, 
Popper advanced a new theory of scientific theory construction which 
avoids the logical problems of inductive reasoning. 
Hume argued that no inductive argument could provide a 
sufficient confirmation of a scientific theory. The following 
logical argument is typical of inductive science (Garrison, 1986): 
Premise 1: If the hypothesis is true, then some specific 
empirical-experimental observation is also 
true (i.e. may be observed as predicted). 
Premise 2: The predicted result is observed 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is true. 
Note that in propositional logic, the statement "A implies B" 
is logically dissimilar to the statement ''B implies A". If in the 
statement "A implies B", B is true, nothing at all may be concluded 
about A. 
This problem of verification (verificationism) was addressed by 
Popper (1963) in his reformulation of scientific method. Asserting 
that "there is neither a psychological nor a logical induction", 
Popper proceeds by stating, "Only the falsity of the theory can be 
inferred from empirical evidence and this inference is a purely 
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deductive one” (Popper, 1963, pp. 54-55). The only logically valid 
theory construction is that which relies on the logic of modus 
tollens - the logic of refutation. The following argument 
illustrates modus tollens applied to scientific theory refutation: 
Premise 1: If the hypothesis is true, then some specific 
empirical/ experimental observation is also 
true (i.e. may be observed as predicted). 
Premise 2: The predicted result is not observed. 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is not true. 
The legitimate method of science, according to Popper, requires 
that science must be deductive instead of inductive. Science is a 
continuing series of conjectures and refutations. Popper writes: 
”... there is no more rational procedure than the method of trial and 
error - of conjecture and refutation: of boldly proposing theories; 
of trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting 
them tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful" (Popper, 
1963, p. 51). 
Imre Lakatos (1976) extended Popper's philosophy to 
mathematics. In his book, Proofs and Refutations, he recreated in 
dialogue form, the history of the mathematical proofs of Descartes' 
(1635) theorem of polyhedra which states: 
V - E + F =■ 2 
for all polyhedra where: 
V = Number of Vertices 
E - Number of Edges 
F = Number of Faces 
The dialogue, supported with historical documentation, illustrates 
the simultaneous search for proofs and counterexamples to the proofs. 
The formalistic interpretation of truth as the result of an unbroken 
and unbreakable chain of logical reasoning from assumptions to 
conclusions is credibly undermined. For Lakatos, proof is 
explanation, justification, elaboration and persuasion; not to 
achieve truth but to gather credibility. 
The method of science and mathematical discovery by refutation 
is not without adversaries. Besides dogmatists who adhere to 
Platonic forms* to formalist-logical systems and to inductive 
science, there is yet another attack from those who are closer in 
sympathy to the Critical Fallibilists, but more radical. Paul 
Feyerabend (1978) opposes all methodologies. His thesis is that 
theory and fact have historically been "pushed" into relation. In 
practice, scientists believe what they want to believe regardless of 
confirmation or refutation. Feyerabend states that within the 
confines of methodological rules, no science is possible. According 
to Feyerabend: 
...science as we know it can exist only if we ... revise 
our methodology, now admitting counterinduction in 
addition to admitting unsupported hypotheses. The right 
method must not contain any rules that make us choose 
between theories on the basis of falsification. Rather, 
its rules must enable us to choose between theories which 
we have already tested and which are falsified. (1978, 
p. 65-66). 
To argue skepticism beyond Feyerabend, one would have to doubt 
not only the methods of rationalizing experience, but also doubt 
experience itself. Radical Constructivism is an epistemology which 
doubts the possibility of correlating human experience of the world 
with the objective world. Without this correlation there can be no 
proof of objective reality - that is, reality apart from the 
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individual's mental construction. The argument advanced by the 
Radical Constructivist is essentially the paradox of self-referential 
statements evident in the paradox of the Cretan Liar. This paradox 
surfaces with the logical analysis of any self-referential statement. 
The judgement of the veridity of a mental model is unacceptable from 
a self-referential frame. There is no authority to evaluate the 
match between mental model and external reality. Therefore, there 
can be no certainty in our mental representation of the world. The 
consequence of the paradox of self-referential statements is the 
basis for an epistemological perspective called "philosophical 
skepticism." The argument of "philosophical skepticism" is a 
fundamental principle of Radical Constructivism. It is stated 
concisely by Von Glasersfeld: 
If experience is the only contact a knower can have with 
the world, there is no way of comparing the products of 
experience with the reality from which whatever messages 
we receive are supposed to emanate. The question, how 
veridical the acquired knowledge might be, can therefore 
not be answered. To answer it, one would have to compare 
what one knows with what exists in the "real" world - and 
to do that one would have to know what "exists". The 
paradox, then, is this: to assess the truth of your 
knowledge you would have to know what you come to know 
before you come to know it. (1983, p. 47). 
This apparently nihilistic aspect of constructivism is not its 
only characteristic. It is, however, the starting point for an 
epistemology which values above all human thought and actions and the 
moral responsibility which is commensurate. 
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Piaget's Constructivist Epistemology 
Piaget was perhaps the first constructivist who after 
criticizing all attempts to establish formalized theories of 
knowledge advanced the position that the only valid study of 
epistemology should come from psychology. 
Most modern epistemologies are formalistic systems which 
attempt to prove either that language or logic is primary. For 
Piaget, the debate is unresolvable through analytical formalisms. 
The position that logic is a product of linguistic convention is 
argued by the Logical Positivists. In deriving logic and mathematics 
from general rules in the use of language, i.e. general syntax, 
general semantics or general pragmatics, the positivists argue that 
language precedes logic. Proponents of Chomsky's "deep structure" 
argue the contrary position that language is based on logic, i.e. 
reason, which is innate. Both epistemological schools rely on 
formalized logical programs to substantiate their claims. 
Piaget (1970) objects to a strictly formalized study of 
knowledge for 3 reasons. (1) No single logic is adequate to the task 
of formalizing the construction of human knowledge. The development 
of many logics Is inevitable, as has occurred, and considering the 
diversity of these many logics, no synthesis appears possible to 
establish a "single value basis for knowledge." (2) Godel's Theorem 
proves the limitations of formalization. Any system which is 
consistent, and which contains the operations of arithmetic, cannot 
prove its own consistency. Piaget is prompted by the Incompleteness 
Theorem to ask "what does logic formalize!" (3) Historically, most 
attempts of epistemologists to explain knowledge appear in the 
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philosophy of science. Piaget would agree with Feyerabend in his 
observation that knowledge in the sciences is not purely formal. 
Indeed, there are other aspects to it. 
Having argued against the formalized search for absolute truth, 
Piaget prefers to think of knowledge as a continuum which varies from 
lesser to greater validity. The task of the episteraologist is to 
search for a link between a model of the construction of knowledge 
and the judgement of the validity of knowledge. The investigation 
may proceed using one or several of three proposed models: the 
historico-critical approach, the psychogenetic approach and the 
biological approach. The biological approach is the least relevant 
to the topic of this chapter, and so will be excluded from this 
study. 
The historico-critical approach is essentially the method of 
historical analysis of intellectual historians in mathematics and 
science. Kuhn (1957), Feyerabend (1975), Lakatos (1976), and Kline 
(1980), all employed this method for their respective analyses. 
Piaget's use of the historical approach is somewhat different from 
the others. His view of history supposes a direction and a 
development quite similar to his developmental theory of intellectual 
growth in the human child. The following example illustrates his 
prej udice. 
Boutroux's description of the history of mathematics was 
analyzed by Piaget as a history in three stages: 
Level 1: This is the contemplative period of Greek 
mathematics. Mathematicians are unconscious of operations as 
activities performed by the subject (person). Instead, 
operations are viewed as features of the mathematical 
"objects". According to Piaget, this epistemology is 
characterized by a refusal to accept algebra. 
Level 2: Operations become conscious. This is manifest in the 
growth of algebra, analytic geometry, calculus, etc. 
Level 3: This level is marked by the search for foundations. 
It is characterized by the conscious construction of structures 
as manifest in the theory of groups and the work of Frege, 
Whitehead, Russell, and Hilbert. 
The levels progress from the concrete to the abstract in 
stages. It is a conception of history that is not marked by 
revolutionary paradigm shifts a la Kuhn, nor is it the random process 
of idiosyncratic persuasion that Feyerabend reads from history. 
Although Piaget acknowledges the importance of historical analyses in 
the constructivist epistemological program, he is far from his fellow 
constructivists in the substance of his attempts in this field. 
But Piaget is not convinced that the historico-critical 
approach is sufficient for a thorough epistemological study. It is 
not enough to only examine history for an understanding of the 
validity of knowledge. According to Piaget, epistemological theories 
cannot be experimentally verified. (According to Popper, no theory 
can be experimentally verified. It may be possible, however, to 
refute such theories.) Piaget also points to the additional 
limitations of the historico-critical approach. Pre-historic 
epistemology may be assumed, but is unknowable from a historical 
perspective. His most powerful criticism of the historical approach 
stems from his observation that history is universally adult history. 
There are few histories of children. Piaget states that an 
understanding of adult cognitive structures is impossible without an 
understanding of their development: "The child explains the man as 
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well and often better than the man explains the child" (Piaget, 
1967, p. IX). 
Piaget's most important contribution to epistemology comes from 
his psychogenetic approach. From the study of the development of 
knowledge in the human child a constructivist theory of epistemology 
emerges. 
All theorists make certain methodological assumptions; so too 
does Piaget. His first assumption is that behavior contains 
knowledge. Inferences about the internal structures of the mind are 
possible and necessary for a proper study of the psychogenesis of 
knowledge. This assumption leads Piaget to the logical assumption 
that there is a dichotomy in the operational definition of knowledge. 
In knowledge one can distinguish form and content. "Content is the 
observable manifestation of events to which knowledge is directed. 
Some synonyms are: facts, information, and stimuli. Form is the 
unobservable internal structure. It is the mental representation 
that, though not observed, may be inferred from the observation of 
content. Some terms for form used synonymously by Piaget are 
"general framework", structure, meaning, understanding, and essence. 
Inferences about the development of knowledge require observations of 
change in the forms of knowledge. This is Piaget's final 
methodological assumption. While forms are unobservable, the charge 
in forms is observable. Formative change is the reflection of 
development which defines the making of intelligence. Because these 
changes of form are observable, the study of change is amenable to 
For this reason, Piaget feels justified in 
controlled observation. 
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his claim to having established a scientific epistemology and not 
merely a philosophical one. 
Piaget's Constructivist Epistemology requires a dynamic 
interpretation of the development of knowledge. A recursive cycle of 
observations, operations, comparisons and evaluations occur with 
constant self-regulation. Says Piaget: "I think that human 
knowledge is essentially active. To know is to assimilate reality 
into systems of transformations. To know is to transform reality in 
order to understand how a certain state is brought about...” (Piaget, 
1970, p. 15). 
The following diagram will serve as a focus for a discussion of 
Piaget's model of the psychological process of the "transformation of 
reality." The diagram is due to Hans Furth, whose paper appears in 
Silverman. 
Developmental feedback (DF) as source of structural growth. 
FIGURE 1. Silverman, 1980, p. 9 
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Briefly, the stages of development of transformation occur 
through the following processes: (1) Assimilation means incorporation 
into an existing system. Biologically, assimilation consists of the 
intake of substances (food or energy) from the environment with the 
goal of continued survival of the living system. Psychologically, 
assimilation consists of the integration of objects, empirical or 
mental, into schemes of actions. (2) Structures are the totality of 
transformations. "In cognitive structures," writes Rita Vuyk, "the 
elements forming the content of the structure are perceptions, 
memories, concepts, operations, structures or "any object whatsoever" 
in mathematics and logic. The relations between the elements giving 
the form to the structure can be spatio-temporal, causal, 
implicative, etc" (Vuyk, 1981, p. 54). (3) Accommodation is the 
outgoing process of applying general schemes to particular contents. 
If an object cannot be assimilated, it may be either ignored by the 
subject or accommodated in the sense that the structure may change so 
that assimilation is possible. This inter-relationship between 
assimilation and accommodation is also responsible for the 
construction of new sub-structures. Vuyk translates Piaget (1978) 
from The Development of Thought: "every assimilatory scheme has to 
accommodate to the elements it assimilates, that is, to change as a 
function of the characteristics, but without losing its continuity 
[i.e. its closure as a cycle of independent processes] nor its former 
powers of assimilation” (Vuyk, 1981, p. 66). This recursive cycle 
of knowledge formation Involves "feedback” which is both self- 
referential and self-monitored. The self-referential characteristic 
of Piaget's theory stems from psychological investigations that are 
the result of an empirical study of children's behavior. As such, it 
is not merely the result of formalistic philosophy. The self¬ 
monitoring aspect of his theory is evident in all mental processes 
though it may not be conscious. When this process is conscious it is 
referred to as "reflexive-abstraction"; a concept bearing many 
similarities to the more recent psychological investigation of 
"metacognition". This topic will be expanded in the following 
chapter. 
As "systems of transformations" is the key concept in Piaget's 
psychogenetic epistemology, further elaboration is in order. Another 
term, used synonymously for "systems of transformations", is 
"operations". Piaget describes operations as actions which are: 
1. internalized - carried out in thought as well as possibly 
being executed materially. 
2. reversible 
a) reversible by inversion or negation; example: 
+ A - A - 0 
b) reversible by reciprocity as in the reversibility of 
order; example: A ■ B is equivalent to B * A 
3. invariant in the sense that something is conserved; 
example: 
5 + l= 4 + 2=*3 + 3in that the sums are invariant. 
4. Related to a system of operations. No operation exists 
alone. Every operation is related to a system of 
operations called a structure. This feature is similar to 
Vernaud's (1983) description of concepts appearing m 
fields (conceptual fields) rather than as isolated and 
individual mental constructions. 
46 
Employing the psychogenetic method to a study of epistemology, 
Piaget hypothesizes the psychogenesis of logico-mathematical 
structures from the coordination of actions which occur prior to the 
development of language. The child at the sensory motor stage of its 
development (typically less than one year) gives evidence of 
developing pre-operational understandings that will later become 
operations. The most fundamental of these pre-operational schemes 
form the basis for logico-mathematical thought which requires: 1) 
the logic of inclusion, 2) the logic of order, and 3) the logic of 
correspondence. These principles are the basis for logical thinking. 
For Piaget, actions precede all epistemology. The coordination 
of actions provides the material and impetus for the development of 
logical structures. An infant may be observed to use a stick to move 
an object. The scheme, "use the stick to move the object," involves 
at least two subschemes: hand/stick and stick/object. The scheme 
includes the subschemes. This is evidence of a working knowledge-in¬ 
action which uses a type of logic of inclusion. Also evidenced in 
this example is the logic of order. The causal connection implies 
that the infant understands the order in which the actions must occur 
for the object to be moved. 
The logic of correspondence requires the understanding of one 
to-one correspondence as demonstrated in counting. Assigning a 
number to each object, knowing not to double count the objects, and 
when to stop counting, requires the logic of correspondence. Piaget 
observes that infants exhibit this logic during imitation When an 
infant imitates a model, he knows that the model corresponds to his 
imitation - even if he imitates himself when repeating an action. 
In addition to these logico-mathematical principles, infants at 
the sensory-motor stage exhibit behavior that is evidence for the 
formation of proto-operations. At least two essential 
characteristics of operations are observed at the formative stage; 
conservation and reversibility. The recognition of the permanence of 
objects is a form of conservation which appears in most infants at 
the end of the first year. A 7 to 8 month infant, who witnesses an 
object being placed behind a screen, behaves as though the object no 
longer exists once it is removed from sight. However, by the time a 
child is 1 year, not only does the screen get pushed aside to get at 
the object, but if the object is placed in a box behind a large 
chair, the child will still locate the object. Reversibility is 
exhibited in detour behavior; a movement in one direction can be 
cancelled by a movement in another direction. According to Piaget, 
2-year-olds and chimpanzees understand that a point in space can be 
reached through a number of different routes. 
From the many cognitively rich observations of children 
answering questions from ingenious problem tasks, Piaget has 
developed a persuasive argument for a genetic epistemology. 
Knowledge is constructed through actions in a cycle of assimilation 
and accommodation to pre-existent structures. Since knowledge is not 
absolute, it must be a relative measure of an organism's ability to 
adapt to its environment. It appears that Piaget s method 
psychogenetic analysis is one very useful means to link the relative 
of knowledge to the subjective internal model of reality. 
validity 
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Implications for Education 
The following points summarize some contributions that a 
constructivist epistemology has to offer educators. 
1) Epistemology matters in the classroom. A student's 
epistemology shapes the attitude toward, and conceptions 
of, both the content and process of learning. It 
determines whether the student is a rote memorizer or a 
conceptualizer. Furthermore, the teacher's epistemology 
has direct bearing on the classroom he or she creates and 
on the epistemologies of the students. 
2) Concepts and their symbolic representations contain hidden 
epistemologies which must be elucidated by education 
researchers and then communicated to educators and to 
students. A description of the historical and cognitive 
genesis of concepts would contribute greatly to conceptual 
understanding. 
3) The academic disciplines are steeped in epistemological 
assumptions which their practitioners should acknowledge. 
Assumptions about the truth-value of authoritative 
knowledge are open to question from a number of 
perspectives. 
4) All knowledge is ultimately self-referential and all self- 
referential knowledge is relative — not absolute. It is 
constructed individually. Consequently, students need 
individual attention. 
5) The construction of knowledge is subject to a psychogenetic 
study of the change in knowledge structures in humans in 
the course of their development. Cognitive scientists 
would benefit from developmental studies of children and 
adolescents. 
6) Actions contain knowledge. Many logical structures may be 
traced to goal-oriented actions. Knowledge, therefore, is 
fundamentally active and dynamic. Conceptual learning, as 
opposed to factual memorizing, is best facilitated with 
the type of goal-oriented actions required in problem¬ 
solving . 
7) There being no absolute knowledge, responsibility for the 
construction of knowledge lies ultimately with the 
learner. The teacher may facilitate this process by 
providing conceptual problems, and actively engaging in a 
dialogue in which both student and teacher learn. In this 
manner, individuals may reach at least a temporary 
consensus as to whether their knowledge has become more 
valid. 
CHAPTER III 
METACOGNITION IN MATH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 
In the past fifteen years, educators and education researchers 
have increasingly emphasised the importance of studying cognitive 
processes for effective education in mathematics and science. This 
may be characterized as a shift away from an epistemology which 
treats knowledge as a compilation and categorization of facts toward 
the view that knowledge is the conscious construction of meaning. In 
short, instead of teaching students what to think, they must be 
taught how to think. (Lochhead & Clement, 1979). The following sub¬ 
tasks are necessary prerequisites for a legitimate realization of the 
stated objective: 
1. The thought processes ,of accomplished learners and problem 
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solvers must be analyzed to document effective skills and 
strategies. 
2. The thought processes of novice problem solvers must also 
be studied to discover which skills may be missing or inhibited 
and for which reasons. 
3. Implications must be drawn from steps 1 and 2 to facilitate 
an effective educational pedagogy which transforms novice 
thinkers into expert thinkers. 
Among the many cognitive processes observed in expert problem 
solvers, attention has recently focused on a type of cognition termed 
"metacognition". As the etymology of the word suggests, 
metacognitions are thoughts about thought, knowledge about one's own 
cognitions. Metacognition is also referred to as beliefs about 
ourselves as cogitators, and about cognitions themselves. 
Metacognitive thought is evaluative (cognitive) of ongoing thought 
processes as well as of the abilities of the thinker and the task at 
hand. As will be argued in this chapter, metacognition is not simply 
more cognitive processing, such as selecting and organizing data, 
using inductive and deductive reasoning to form hypotheses, searching 
for and constructing relevant concepts, heuristics and algorithms, 
representing quantitative relationships, etc. Instead, metacognition 
provides a qualitatively different framework than the cognitive 
frameworks usually employed in the study of learning. 
While several educational researchers (Flavell 1976; Lesh, 
1982; Silver, 1984; Schoenfeld, 1985) have offered taxonomies of 
metacognitive skills distinct from the cognitive processes normally 
ascribed to problem solving, two of these taxonomies appear most 
useful. Flavell's taxonomy examines metacognition with respect to 
person, task and strategy variables, while Schoenfeld divides 
metacognitions into belief systems and control systems. This chapte 
attempts to join these two taxonomies to offer a more encompassing 
conceptualization of metacognition; a conceptualization with 
important pedagogical implications. 
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Metacognition and Mathematics 
Although the literature in the psychology of mathematics 
learning has dealt mainly with the cognitive processes intrinsic to 
mathematical performance, much attention has recently shifted to the 
importance of metacognition (Lesh, 1982; Silver, 1982; Garofalo and 
Lester, 1985; Schoenfeld, 1985). Research into the cognitive 
processes involved in mathematical problem solving has been greatly 
influenced by Polya's (1957) four-phase model which does not 
explicitly mention metacognition. His model examines a multitude of 
problem-solving heuristics attached to each of the four phases: 
understanding, planning, carrying out the plan, and looking back. 
While this heuristics paradigm has served the research community well 
for many years, it is insufficient to an adequate analysis of 
problem-solving behaviors which involve rational number concepts, 
early number concepts and geometry concepts (Lesh and Landau, 1983). 
Another consequence of the influence of Polya's paradigm is the great 
amount of research which has focused on instructional treatments 
which train students to memorize task-specific and general heuristics 
in an attempt to improve their problem solving. Lester (1985) 
suggests that many of these instructional attempts have failed 
because the development of heuristic skills was overemphasized with 
little or no attention given to the managerial skills necessary for 
the proper selection of those same heuristics. 
Historically, research into metacognitive processes follows 
cognitive processes research, although one could argue that both may 
be classified as cognitive. Lesh (1983) suggests that, 
psychologically speaking, metacognitions and cognitions are distinct 
but occur together through parallel processing involved in most types 
of problem solving. Cognitions involved in the solution of a problem 
are simultaneously monitored by metacognitions. 
Cognitive processes consist of the mental structures, concepts, 
and heuristics that are thought during the attempted solution of a 
particular problem: the problem-at-hand. These ideas may occur as 
analogies, memories of similar or previously solved problems, 
algorithms, images, verbal patterns, and any of a myriad of symbolic 
representations. 
Metacognitive thought consists of thoughts about the cognitive 
processes in working memory. Generally, such thoughts are 
reflections about current ideas with their possible rejection or 
affirmation. Such thinking may evaluate the efficacy of a particular 
line of thought, heuristic or algorithm. Sometimes the reflections 
may consist of memories of having had difficulty with a problem 
similar to the one under consideration. The belief that one can or 
cannot solve such problems or even learn the necessary skills to do 
so, is yet another reflection about one's cognitive processes. 
The cognitive processes which build conceptual and procedural 
models in problem-solving are distinct from thought which monitors 
and evaluates these processes and from the beliefs which bear 
directly on these processes. Metacognition is, by definition, 
cognition about cognitive processes. According to Flavell. 
Metacognition refers to one's knowledge ^^gn®elated 
own cognitive properties of 
informat ion*or data. Metacognition refers, among other 
i-hines to the active monitoring and conseque 
regulation and orchestration of these processes in 
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relation to the cognitive objects on which they bear, 
usually in the service of some concrete goal or 
objective. (1976, p. 232) 
From Flavell's description, two distinct aspects of 
metacognition arise: (1) previous knowledge of cognitive processes, 
their products and the beliefs which relate to such processes, and 
(2) the monitoring and control of the cognitive processes themselves. 
Flavell and Wellman (1977) further refined a taxonomy for 
metacognition in their study of memory performance. They identified 
three major variables: "Person Variables," which are performance¬ 
relevant characteristics of the information processor; "Task 
Variables." which are performance-relevant characteristics of the 
memory task or problem; and "Strategy Variables" which are the 
potential solution procedures. According to Flavell, these variables 
are interrelated. 
Although this taxonomy was developed for the analysis of meta¬ 
memory [see Flavell (1978) for a thorough review of relevant memory 
research] it has proven useful to mathematics education researchers 
in their attempts to understand the function of metacognition in 
mathematics problem solving (Lester, 1985; Garofalo and Lester, 
1985). As will be shown, both "person" and "task" variables fall 
largely under the more general rubric of "belief systems" a la 
Schoenfeld (1983), while the "strategy" variables refer to the need 
for management and control in the solution of mathematics problems. 
Belief Systems in Person and Task Variables 
Person Variables 
With regard to mathematics, much has been written about the 
affective factors which influence mathematical performance (Clement, 
Narode, Rosnick, 1981; Feneraa E., & Sherman, J. 1977; Tobias, 1978; 
Bassarear, 1986). Most of these factors   motivation, anxiety, 
attitude and past experience - reflect the learner's self-image as 
a mathematics problem solver. Many affective factors may be 
described as, or traced from, students' beliefs about themselves as 
problem solvers and learners. Their beliefs may vary in accuracy and 
effect. A student who believes he is not good at computation may 
deliberately work more carefully and accurately than a student who 
believes she is proficient at computation and works too quickly to 
assure accuracy. The beliefs which underlie subsequent behavior (and 
the unobserved cognitive activity necessary to produce the behavior) 
are referred to as metacognitions. As a thought which is reflective 
of a cognitive ability, it may influence the quantity and quality of 
cognitive activity. The following example of a person variable 
metacognition illustrates the power that beliefs exert over the 
cognitive abilities of many students. Schoenfeld's (1985) conjecture 
that one reason for the failure of many students to use mathematical 
argumentation (proofs) has to do with the prevalent belief that only 
''geniuses" can think mathematically: 
Only geniuses are capable of discovering or creating 
mathematics. First corollary. If you forget something, 
too bad. After all, you’re not a genius, y . 
be able to derive it on your own. Second corolla y. 
Accept procedures at face value and don t try to 
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understand why they work. After all, they are derived 
knowledge passed on 'from above'. 
(Schoenfeld, 1985, p. 372) 
This belief, about the abilities of the problem solver in comparison 
to the perceived ability of the mathematician, illustrates the rather 
negative perception which many students have of themselves as 
mathematics problem solvers. Given the above stifling metacognition, 
a student's cognitive processes may never have the opportunity to 
engage in learning for fear of failure. 
Lester and Garofalo (1982) have found further evidence of 
person variables in their study of third and fifth graders: 
* Both third and fifth graders believe that proficiency 
at computation depends almost entirely on the amount 
of time spent practicing computation. 
* Fifth graders thought that their teachers can make a 
difference in their ability to perform computation, 
while third graders think their teacher makes no 
impact on this skill. 
* Both third and fifth graders believe they should take 
their time performing computations, otherwise they 
are likely to make mistakes. 
As mentioned earlier, there is considerable overlap between the 
different variables. The first observation reflects the students' 
belief about a specific task - computation. It also reflects a 
belief about the students' ability in computation solely as a result 
of time spent practicing the skill. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
all three observations illustrate beliefs about the person as knower, 
which have direct impact on an area of mathematical skills 
instruction - computation. 
Task Variables 
According to Flavell, another set of variables which are 
considered to be metacognitive are task variables. These are beliefs 
about a particular task which affect the form of cognitive processes 
brought to bear on the task. Memory research indicates that beliefs 
regarding certain tasks, such as memorizing a short story, elicit 
different strategies in subjects. Some subjects attempt to memorize 
verbatim while others choose to paraphrase while relating the gist of 
the story. [Flavell, J. & Wellman, H., 1977]. Garofalo and Lester 
(1982) advocate the usefulness of the categorization of task 
variables when applied to metacognitive beliefs about specific 
mathematical tasks. For example, they found that both third and 
fifth grade students believed that math word problems are more 
difficult than computation problems. The same students also believe 
that solutions of verbal problems depend largely on the selection of 
a "key word” which would suggest the one necessary arithmetic 
operation necessary for the solution. It has been suggested that 
this common metacognition is probably a result of syntactic matching 
of words to mathematical operations which is prevalent 
algebra textbooks. (Rosnick, 1980). 
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The role of "key words" has been corroborated in studies of 
college students. Although the students were proficient with 
algebraic symbol manipulation, they experienced major difficulties 
solving simple algebra word problems which involve the translation 
from words to equations (Clement, 1982) and from equations to words 
(Lochhead, 1980). The following is an example of a problem whose 
"key word" solution leads to a "reversed" equation. From Clement, 
(1982): 
Using the letters 'S' for the number of students and 'P' 
for the number of professors, write an equation which 
states the following relationship: 
At a certain university, there are six times as many 
students as there are professors. 
The typical wrong answer is 6S - P. Approximately 37X of 
college freshmen in a calculus course gave some version of this 
reversed equation [the correct equation is S - 6P.] One among 
several of Clement's conjectures for the frequent occurrence of the 
reversal error states that students perform a direct word-to-syrabol 
match. The words "times" and "are" serve as key words which get 
translated respectively as "multiply" and "equals". Thus: 
6 x S = P 
6 times Students are (the) Professors 
Many students interpret their reversed equation saying "For every six 
students there is one professor," and they can draw a picture to 
illustrate this relationship. As Clement (1982) and Rosnick (1981) 
point out, although students exhibit a semantic understanding of the 
given relationship, they nevertheless have deep misconceptions about 
the meaning of variables, the role of coefficients, and about the 
meaning of the equal sign. 
In their emphasis on the role of conceptual frameworks, the 
researchers may have overlooked the presence of a confounding 
metacognitive task variable, the belief in the key word strategy. 
Further analysis of this example will serve to distinguish between 
cognitive and raetacognitive activity. 
The protocols of students explaining their reversed equation 
indicate the following cognitive misconceptions: 
1) Students misinterpret the letters 'S' and 'P' as 
labels for "a student" and "a professor" rather than as 
variables symbolizing a quantity of students and a 
quantity of professors. 
2) Coefficients are misinterpreted as adjectival 
modifiers as when '6S' represents six students and (1)P 
represents one professor. (note that most subjects 
remark that. "In algebra, the "1" is implied."1 This 
misconception misses the implied operation of 
multiplication in the use of coefficients. 
3) The equal sign has no relationship to numerical 
equality. Instead, it is used as a conjunctive in the 
sense that one group, 
the students, "goes with" another 
group, the professors. 
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Clement and Rosnick suggest that algebra translation tasks in 
general, and reversal errors in particular, may be improved with 
instructional emphasis on the above concepts coupled with an 
operational interpretation of mathematical functions, as in 
generating tables of data from the hypothesized equation and checking 
it with a semantic understanding of the qualitative relationship 
between variables. 
The observations listed above are correctly termed 
"misconceptions" which are improper conceptual models which serve as 
elements in the broader context of performing a mathematics 
translation task. In Piagetian terms, they are structures upon which 
operations and transformations are executed in the cognitive 
processes of problem solving. This cognitive activity is 
characterized as a direct manipulation of conceptual models which are 
elements of a larger task. 
Metacognitive activity is inferred from the observation that 
students who make the reversal error often do so from a belief that 
translation tasks from math word problems may be solved using a key 
word matching strategy. The students' judgement is not merely an 
overly generalized classification of a type of math problem; rather, 
the judgement stems from their knowledge of previous learning tasks, 
i.e. knowledge about their knowledge of a task. 
While it would be useful to know the causal interaction between 
metacognitive and conceptual-cognitive activity, no formal studies 
have as yet examined the phenomena. With regard to the above 
example, one may hypothesize that the metacognitive belief in the 
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generalizability of the key word strategy may lead to misconceptions 
of variables, coefficients and equality. The difficulty may lie in 
textbooks which stress the key word matching heuristic while devoting 
little or no attention to the development of these critically 
important conceptual elements. Consider the following examples from 
three popular introductory mathematics texts: 
From Keedy & Bittinger (1985, p. 135): 
Example It A 6-ft board is cut into two pieces, one 
twice as long as the other. How long are the pieces? 
FIGURE 2. Six-foot board problem 
The picture can help in translating. Here is one way to 
do it: 
Length of one piece plus length of other is 6 
x + 2x 6 
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From Beavers (1985, p. 271): 
Example: The enrollment of a college in Pennsylvania 
increased from 25,000 to 28,000. The increase is what 
percentage of the original enrollment? 
KEY PHRASE The is 
increase 
what of 
percent 
the original 
enrollment? 
3,000 % x 25,000 
28,000 
- 25,000 
3,000 increase 
From: Whimbey & Lochhead, (1981), p. 320. 
17. Paul's income equals three times Jeff's income 
P - 3 x J 
or 
P - 3J 
Given the algebra and word problem solving experiences of most 
students there can be little doubt as to the source of metacognitive 
beliefs. It may be easier for them to adapt conceptualizations of 
variables, coefficients, etc. to their chosen heuristic than it is 
for them to change their beliefs about their prior knowledge. This 
may account for some of the resiliency of misconceptions in the 
presence of instruction. 
Not all misconceptions are concommitant with metacognitions. A 
substantial literature of misconceptions in physics reveal widespread 
physical belief systems which are reminiscent of Aristotelian 
physics. Minstrell and Stimpson (1966) have documented the belief 
among high school students that a force Is necessary to keep an 
object in motion because things have a -natural tendency” to be at 
rest. Lochhead (1983) reported that 80% to 90% of college physics 
students believe that a projectile thrown upward will have a positive 
acceleration for awhile, will stop for awhile, and then will have a 
negative acceleration. Trowbridge and McDermott (1980) found that 
students confuse the rate of change of a quantity with the quantity 
itself. Clement (1982) has indicated that a number of misconceptions 
in physics are extremely resilient and resistant to classroom 
instruction. His recent efforts (Clement, 1986) have been geared 
toward developing "bridging techniques", via analogies, to overcome 
certain kinesthetic beliefs about forces which lead students astray 
in physics problem solving. For example, the mistaken belief that a 
table exerts no upward force on a book resting on it is related to 
the students' experiences of a force being a visible push or pull as 
evident in a compressed spring which pushes up on a hand that pushes 
down on it. If the student can make the analogy of the compressed 
spring fit the situation of the book on the table, the initial 
mistaken belief may be overcome. Because these physical beliefs are 
about the "way the world works" rather than about objects of 
cognition, they are properly termed misconceptions, and not 
metacognitions. Only when the physical belief becomes a conscious 
thought on which the thinker reflects, can we say that metacognition 
plays a role. 
Not all beliefs about tasks are detrimental. The following 
task variables. Identified by Silver (1982), have also been shown to 
have an important effect on problem solving in mathematics: 
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* The belief that there is usually more than one way to solve 
a problem 
* The belief that two very different methods of solution can 
have the same correct results. 
* The belief that there exists a most concise method in 
solving or presenting the solution to a problem. 
These are just a few of the beliefs which can aid a student in 
learning mathematics and in solving problems. 
Strategy Variables; Metacognition as Monitoring and Control 
The instruction of heuristics and algorithms in mathematics is 
rendered useless if it is not accompanied by the metacognitive skills 
needed to select, implement and evaluate these strategies. Stated 
another way, the question which motivates the study of metacognition 
in mathematics and science is: what are the psychological processes 
that will enable students to use ideas, that they in fact have but 
cannot or do not use?. 
To illustrate, Schoenfeld (1983) reported on the reasoning 
processes of a dozen pairs of students as they worked the following 
problem: 
You are given two intersecting straight lines and a point 
P on one of them, as in the figure below. Show how to 
construct, with straightedge and compass, a circle 
is tangent to both lines and that has the point P as its 
point of tangency to one of them. 
(see Fig. 3 on following page) 
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FIGURE 3. Problem from Schoenfeld (1983) 
The subjects were college freshmen. Some had one semester of 
calculus and all had high school geometry. Not one of the twelve 
pairs of students managed to solve the problem, and all pairs 
proceeded by trial and error. Only one pair attempted to justify 
their solution mathematically, although all were satisfied with their 
solutions. What was most disturbing to Schoenfeld was that although 
the students failed to solve the problem, they had all the 
prerequisite knowledge for the necessary mathematical argumentation. 
Reflecting on the phenomenon in a later paper, Schoenfeld wrote: 
After they finished the problem session, I asked them to 
show that the points of tangency on the circle were 
equidistant from the vertex angle - points that the 
students had conjectured and relied upon without proof. 
All pairs managed to do so, usually within 5 minutes. 
Thus, they had the means to solve the problem easily 
within their reach, but did not call upon them. They did 
not even think to call upon them! (1985, p. 371) 
Mathematical knowledge and conceptual understanding are not 
enough to insure that students will know how and when to use such 
knowledge. Getting an idea into a student's head is insufficient. 
The student must also learn which ideas are most appropriate and when 
to use them. Similarly, Lesh wrote of his own research, "... our 
/ 
goal is to identify processes, skills and understanding that will 
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enable average ability students to use ideas that they do have, but 
which may be based on unstable conceptual models” (Lesh, 1982). 
Lesh's theory of metacognition will be treated later. For now, 
consider some of the primary features of monitoring and control which 
are the main descriptors of metacognition. 
One of the clearest descriptions of the monitor and control 
features of metacognition comes from the fields of information 
processing and artificial intelligence. In the parlance of these 
fields, these skills are referred to as the "executive". The 
following elucidation of the role of the "executive" comes from 
Brown: 
(1) Predict the system's capacity limitations; (2) be 
aware of its repertoire of heuristic routines, and their 
appropriate domain of utility; (3) identify and 
characterize the problem at hand; (4) plan and schedule 
appropriate problem-solving activities; (5) monitor and 
supervise the effectiveness of these routines it calls 
into service; and (6) dynamically evaluate these 
operations in the face of success or failure so that 
termination of strategic activities can be strategically 
timed. These forms of executive decision making are 
perhaps the crux of efficient problem solving because the 
use of an appropriate piece of knowledge or routine o 
obtain that knowledge at the right time and in the ngh 
place is the essence of knowledge. (1978, p. 182) 
While much of the metacognition research, especially the early 
research, was in the area of memory and retrieval, almost all of the 
data is in the form of clinical interviews. This feature seems 
predominant in the literature on problem solving [Clement (1984), 
Lesh (1984), Schoenfeld (1983, 1985)]. 
The parsing of protocols is considered the single most useful 
tool for metacognition research. While methods have been developed 
for this analysis as a short-term goal, the long-term goal is to 
search for a correlation between problem-solving success and 
metacognitive activity (Hart & Schultz, 1985). The following 
analysis of a clinical interview is offered as one example of the 
type of data and analysis central to the research. Although the 
interview was conducted with the purpose of identifying the cognitive 
structures employed in the solution of a computer programming 
problem, it nevertheless offers insight into the self-monitoring 
activities of an undergraduate engineering major from an introductory 
computer programming course. The question used is due to John 
Clement, who is also the interviewer. 
1 I: If you could write a program to represent that statement, uh, 
using the letters, I guess, — C and E —, just read the 
statement out loud. 
2 S: Ok — there are eight times as many people in China as there 
are in England, um, the program would, um, — so the 
equation (writes 6C ■ then puts an "X" next to it). (Writes 
8C - E) Number this one — (puts 2 next to 8C - E and 1 
next to 6C «). Ok? Um, the same — the program structure 
is exactly the same as the last one — um — (pause) (Draws 
brackets and writes): 
Header 
Decl 
Statements 
READ 
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It appears as though writing an equation to represent the given 
relationship is a heuristic used prior to actually writing the 
program. Even this strategy is subject to inspection and correction 
as the student changes his initial expression. "6C to "8C - E." 
This mistaken equation represents an error in translation tasks which 
is common and non-trivial (Clement, 1986) The subject continues with 
the realization that the problem is not well-defined in that he does 
not know which is the input and which is the output variable. 
3 S: There's a part of the problem that is not stated here in the 
sense that, we should just realize that, if you are not 
given whether you are gonna input the number of people in 
England or the people in China, Ok, so what I would do is 
then write a program which would deal with both. 
4 I: Well, let's just do one — why don't we say that we will input 
the number of people in China, OK. 
5 S: (writes:) READ (C) 
E - C/8.0 
WRITE (E) 
STOP 
END 
6 I: Ok, and how did you know how to write each of those lines? 
7 S: Um, this one, (points to READ («] I know you have to input 
given the factor of an eighth used for the number of people 
in China, um, we have to calculate E, um (pause) 
mistake in the equation, um — 
realize I made a 
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8 I: What are you looking at? 
9 S: This one is wrong, um [points to 8C « E (Eq. 2)] — I should - 
The student confidently writes a program that contains the 
correct but reversed equation from the one he originally wrote. Not 
until he verbalized his solution did he become aware of his error. 
Further requests for cognitive information from the interviewer will 
prompt the student to describe his thoughts retrospectively. 
10 Is How can you tell it's wrong? What did you just think of 
there? 
11 S: Well, I realized that I wrote it right in the program and 
it's different than the one I wrote up there, so that I 
would read, oh, I would change it. (Put an X next to 8C 
E.) 
12 I: Ok — that's interesting — what convinces you that the 
program is right? 
13 S: The fact that I know there's more people in China than there 
are in England and in the equation the E would end up being 
8 times greater than the C, which is not true, Ok. [Writes 
E - C/8] 
u I: ...in the second line of the program, what were you thinking 
in order to write the second line there, when you wrote it? 
(Pause) Do you remember? 
15 Si Just that E had to be a smaller number than C. 
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The subject identified the key qualitative understanding which 
made his solution possible — namely that there are more people in 
China than there are in England. He next affirms his qualitative 
understanding and attempts to unravel the reasons for his mistake by 
formulating a theory as to why "somebody would make that error". 
16 I: You're pretty sure that's what you were thinking when you 
wrote it? Yeah? Ok. 
17 S: In fact I think that this (points to 8C - E) was in my head in 
that form (points to E - C/8) and it just got written down 
that way — wrong — I don't think I ever had it 
conceptually that E was bigger than C — just that it got 
written wrong because I didn't even think about rewriting it 
(points to line 2 in program) — I just thought of the way 
to write it, yeah. 
18 I; So when you first read the problem before you wrote equation 2 
there, you immediately realized there were more people in 
China? (Nods) But this is confusing — a lot of people do 
this, that's why we're interested - but when you write down 
8C „ E _ „hat do you think you are working from there, urn, 
when you make that error? 
19 S: Hmm — I don't know why somebody would make that error, urn, in 
terras of — except that maybe, you're thinking like, um — 
you are conceptualizing that C is 8 times larger than E, um, 
and so you associate the 8 and the C somehow in your mind 
perhaps, but, ok, I think the knowledge that C is 8 times 
larger than E is like, I didn't have any trouble 
conceptualizing that, it's just getting it written down 
accurately, right. 
This student exhibited many metacognitive skills: 
interpretation of the problem and the relationships within, selection 
of heuristics, re-examination of previous work, resolution of 
conflicting ideas, further qualitative assessment of the problem to 
check his solution, and an explanation of his error in the form of a 
general metacognitive theory about errors of that type, which was not 
unlike the theories of Clement, Lochhead, & Soloway (1980). 
These researchers attempted to ascertain why a programming 
context decreased the reversal errors frequently found in the 
translation of English sentences into mathematical equations. Of the 
five hypotheses generated three involve the cognitive features of 
computer programming: (1) unambiguous semantics, (2) explicitness of 
syntax, (3) active input/output transformation. The remaining two 
hypotheses appear metacognitive in aspect: (4) the practice of 
debugging programs, (5) decomposing a problem into explicit steps. 
This study indicates that certain metacognitive skills are common 
features of training in computer programming while they are not as 
common in typical algebra courses. 
Even in problems which contain no mathematics whatsoever, 
Clement (1984) concluded that engaging in a cycle of conjecture, 
evaluation and self-correction ia a basic problem-solving skill which 
serves as a prerequisite for more advanced problem solving in 
mathematics and science. Perhaps the most telling feature of 
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clinical interviews analyzed from the perspective of metacognitive 
processes is the absence of those processes in failed problem 
solutions. [Schoenfeld (1985), Lesh (1985)] 
Lesh (1983) sees in his analysis of problem-solving protocols 
two levels of cognition. First-order cognition is the construction 
and coordination of conceptual models with which the problem solver 
makes sense of his world. Lesh's definition of such conceptual 
models consists of four independent components: 
(a) within-idea systems: organization and relational systems 
imposed on the environment by the thinker. 
(b) between-idea systems: relationships between ideas. 
(c) representational systems: symbol systems with networks of 
translation and transformation between representations. 
(d) systems of modeling processes which contribute to both the 
development and usability of the first three components of 
the model. 
According to Lesh, metacognition is second-order cognition 
which treats as its object of cognition all of the above components 
of the problem solver's conceptual model. He argues that solutions 
to problems are "constructed by gradually refining, integrating and 
adapting unstable systems" (i.e., poorly coordinated conceptual 
models). From this perspective the most important metacognitive 
events occur at "reorganization" points when a redirection occurs in 
a solution path. Furthermore, Lesh interprets the absence of 
activity (eg., planning, monitoring, assessing) m the 
metacognitive 
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solution attempt as one important probable cause for failure in 
problem solving. 
However, Lesh does not wish to imply that constant and 
continuous metacognition will aid the problem solver in all contexts. 
Unstable conceptual models are most debilitating at precisely the 
points of reorganization at which metacognition comes into play. 
Lesh's protocols indicate that success can be facilitated by 
explicitly avoiding paying too much attention to process and detail. 
For this reason, he hypothesizes two orders of metacognition: first- 
order metacognition; monitoring, planning and assessing conceptual 
model components, and second-order metacognition which treats as its 
object the features and uses of first-order metacognitions. An 
example of second-order metacognition would be a conscious decision 
to allow an incubation period to permit a "settling time' for ideas 
to stabilize. Another example, with an opposing perspective but with 
the same goal, is the conscious decision to engage in "brainstorming 
which encourages the creation and sharing of ideas without concurrent 
evaluation. It appears that expert problem solvers demonstrate the 
ability to select from among a host of metacognitive strategies those 
which appear most useful at the time. 
Developing a "Metacoenitive Orientation" 
While the long-term goal in metacognition research is to show a 
correlation between problem-solving success and the attendant 
metacognitive activity, there is yet much uncertainty as to the 
success of the endeavor. Several studies indicate that the amount o£ 
metacognitive activity is not necessarily a predictor of problem 
solving success. Hart and Schultz (1985) found that expert 
mathematics problem solvers may demonstrate little metacognitive 
activity and yet achieve a quick and correct solution to a problem 
which a novice problem solver could not do correctly although 
extensive metacognitions were evident. Simon and Simon (1978) report 
similar findings with expert and novice physics problem solvers. 
Furthermore, contrary to Flavell, some memory researchers found that 
even good students know very little about mnemonic techniques that 
they may or may not use to better retain information studied. 
(Dansereau, D. et al, 1975) 
Nevertheless, the metacognition paradigm remains useful. Hart 
and Schultz (1985) conjectured that the specific problem asked of 
expert problem solvers must be challenging enough so that it is in 
fact a problem for them. It is assumed that a truly challenging 
problem requires demonstrated metacognitive activity for its 
solution. The implication here is that simple problems can be solved 
with little evidence of metacognition due to the speed with which the 
solution is attained. Similarly, Silver, Branca and Adams stated: 
It may be that the metacognitive behaviors of experts 
become so integrated into problem-solving routines that 
they become difficult to observe, or it may be that the 
metacognitive analyses are only needed at certain points 
in the development of expertise. Once a sufficient level 
of expertise has been generated, the metacognitive 
aspects of thinking assume a secondary role, with 
technique and execution assuming priority. (1980, p. 
stage 
Although problems with the research have surfaced at this early 
in its development, there are yet some very compelling reasons 
to continue with the program: 
1. Attention is focused on an aspect of problem solving which 
appears differentially in expert and novice problem solvers. 
2. Cognitive process research is further delineated into areas 
whose research methodologies may differ. The number of 
researchers in the field may also increase as specialties 
develop. 
3. Many educational pedagogies [Whimbey & Lochhead, 1980; 
Belmont, Butterfield and Ferretti, 1982; Novak & Gowin, 1984; 
Confrey, 1984] have integrated metacognitive skills training 
into the curriculum on the assumption that such skills are 
useful or even necessary for learning. 
Perhaps the most significant pedagogical contribution for the 
development of metacognitive skills is the instilling of an awareness 
that one needs to take conscious, planful action when learning 
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mathematics and science, and in problem solving. While Flavell 
(1981) considers such an awareness to be related to metacognitions 
relevent to task variables, Taylor (1983) argues convicingly that 
awareness is prerequisite to the development of metacognitive 
knowledge. She contends that the process of becoming 
"metacognitively aware", while problematic in its analysis, is most 
likely learned when it is encountered in others. Conversely, if the 
awareness process is seldom encountered, children may exhibit little 
evidence of having a metacognitive awareness. According to Taylor: 
The contention here is that metacognition skills, 
especially those related to school learning, may 
be difficult to develop because the strategy invo.^® . 
in successful task performance is usually not avaUahle 
to the child either through observation or direct 
instruction. We can't readily observe what people do to 
help themselves remember, nor do children frequently 
encounter adult efforts to make these strategic processes 
explicit to them. (1983, p. 272) 
Taylor argues for what she terms a "metacognitive orientation", where 
the teacher models metacognitive behavior and devises activities for 
students to exhibit metacognition themselves. Some of the activities 
she suggests are: ask students to estimate their performance on a 
task, check their performance against their predictions, keep records 
of the accuracy of their predictions, compare a variety of study 
strategies, compare their actual performances to their estimates and 
to an externally set level of adequate performance. These activities 
are general so that they may be applied to any curriculum, thus 
accomplishing two goals: helping students to learn curriculum and 
also to learn metacognitive skills relevent to learning strategies, 
to various kinds of tasks and about themselves as learners. 
The pair problem solving method of Whimbey and Lochhead (1980) 
attempts to foster metacognitive activity as a continuing process in 
the solution of problems. Fashioned after the clinical Interviews of 
Piaget, pair problem solving requires the problem solver to read and 
solve a problem aloud to a listener. The listener may stop the 
solver at any time to ask for clarification if he or she did not 
understand a step in the solution. At no time should the listener 
take over the solution of the problem or suggest ways to solve the 
problem. By keeping the thinking process verbal the solver also 
listens to him/herself and monitors a 
solution with all reasons, dead ends, 
of the reasoning process is 
long with the listener, the 
conjectures, doubts, etc. 
intended to manifest in the 
The 
richness 
ensuing interview. By exchanging roles, students are expected to 
learn not only how to solve problems but also how to communicate 
their ideas effectively to a listener. Furthermore, they practice 
activities designed to teach how to listen and ask questions that 
will clarify for themselves someone else's ideas. 
As indicated above, metacognitive skills need not be yet 
another curricular item. By teaching content and concepts through 
pair problem solving metacognitive awareness is modelled on a daily 
basis, and students develop a metacognitive orientation towards each 
learning task. The role of the teacher is more that of a facilitator 
rather than a lecturer. Occasionally the teacher may solve a problem 
aloud, sometimes spontaneously, while the students ask questions to 
clarify their understanding of their teacher's thought processes. 
More often, the teacher listens to student solutions and asks 
questions to clarify his/her understanding of the student's ideas. 
In many cases both the student and the teacher learn from the 
interaction, and while content knowledge may elude the student's long 
term memory, the metacognitive orientation may remain. 
CHAPTER IV 
PEDAGOGY FOR CONSTRUCTIVIST REMEDIAL MATHEMATICS 
Pedagogy is Art and Science 
Pedagogy is broadly defined as "the art or science of 
teaching." (Webster's, 1983) The theory of instruction presented 
here draws on both science and art. The scientific approach most 
utilized in this study may be termed the Cognitive Science approach 
(Schoenfeld, 1987). It is distinguished from other approaches which 
also attempt to understand the mechanisms of mathematics learning and 
instruction; approaches such as Associationism (Thorndike, 1922), 
Behaviorism (Skinner, 1958), Gestaltism (Wertheimer, 1959), and 
Structualism (Bruner, 1960). Each of these approaches has had 
adherents who developed mathematics curricula consistent with, and in 
some cases, as a test of, their respective psychological frameworks. 
\ 
Constructivism has been described in a previous chapter as a 
philosophical and epistemological position. Constructivism also has 
pedagogical implications which arise as a result of research into the 
cognitive processes of people solving problems. Cognitive processes 
research in the field of mathematics learning will serve as the 
psychology research paradigm from which a Constructivist pedagogy is 
developed. The pedagogy will develop the theoretical basis for a 
method of classroom instruction and for the design of remedial 
college mathematics curriculum (texts and tests). 
Less objective, though no less important, is the art of 
teaching. Foundational to the art of teaching are the educational 
values which mold the classroom environment, direct content and 
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curricula, influence teacher/student interaction, and generally 
characterize the most formative social institution after family: the 
school. 
With regard to mathematics, art is apparent in the aesthetic 
sensibilities and preferences of those for whom knowledge and 
understanding of mathematics brings genuine pleasure (Davis & Hersh, 
1981). Mathematicians often speak of the beauty of a certain theorem 
or proof. Many marvel at the internal consistency of the discipline 
and delight in the discovery of pattern and regularity. Some are 
awed by an almost mystical sense of having glimpsed what they believe 
to be eternal truths, while others are struck with the seeming 
complementarity of physical events and the mathematical models which 
describe and attempt to explain them. Aesthetics may influence the 
content of a mathematics curriculum as much as educational research. 
Teachers often value a curriculum which excites and motivates them 
first and foremost (Nickerson, in press). This observation may prove 
an aid or a hindrance to the implementation o£ curriculum designed to 
motivate students with very different mathematical histories than 
their teachers, as is usually the case for students in remedial 
mathematics classes. 
Art is also apparent in the thousands of subtle and non- 
quantifiable interactions between a teacher and her students. 
Concern, loyalty, and trust are important bonds between student and 
teacher, yet they are apparent only in some instances and not in 
others; a phenomenon difficult to explain. In fact, it may be easier 
to achieve these bonds than to describe how to achie 
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Another important instructional art is the art of good 
listening and good questioning. As will be described later, these 
qualities are paramount for constructivist teaching (Confrey, 1984; 
Lochhead, 1985). Knowing what a student is thinking based on what 
she is saying takes training and practice, to be sure. It also 
requires a "sympathetic ear"- an openness on the part of the 
listener; a characteristic closer to counselling than to scientific 
inquiry, yet both counselling and inquiry. Questioning is also an 
art. Experience and training can aid in establishing a repertoire of 
instructionally effective lines of questions (Butts, 1980; Brown and 
Walter, 1983; Schoenfeld, 1983), but the art of questioning lies also 
in its spontaneity. A good question connects with the student's most 
recent thought in a way which gives new meaning to the thought. The 
question may also give relevance to an entire line of thought. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the question is asked; the tone of 
voice, the volume of one's voice, bodily gestures, proximity of the 
questioner to the student, the proximity of other students, and the 
wait-time allowed for response (Rowe, 1969), all impact on the type 
of response received. As with good listening, good questioning may 
be encouraged with training and experience, but the talent and art 
which are evident in the listening and questioning episode cannot be 
overlooked or quantified. 
Also Important for the type of instruction advocated here is 
the art and science of classroom management (Heiman, et. al., 1987). 
The cooperative classroom, about to be described, requires constant 
attention from the instructor. Placing students into successfully 
cooperative groups requires judgement based upon the students' case 
histories, and the subjective assessment of the compatibility of 
their personalities. Monitoring the classroom, keeping students on 
task, maintaining student interest and curiosity, encouraging and 
prodding students to succeed, and always being attentive to the 
frustration level of the class, are all skills which improve with 
training and experience (Schoenfeld, 1983). They are also skills 
which are, to some extent, idiosyncratic, and reflect art in 
instruction. 
Goals and Values of a Constructivist Pedagogy 
In an attempt not to confuse the essential with the 
subordinate, the list of goals, values, and theoretical perspectives 
is kept to a minimum. Two values, with their accompanying curricular 
goals and their theoretical perspectives are listed and described: 
1. Conceptual understanding which helps the student to cope 
with his chosen society is valuable. 
2. The intellectual autonomy of each individual student is the 
foremost human potential to be valued by educators, 
students, and the educational system. 
The following table indicates how these values are translated 
into goals and theoretical perspectives: 
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TABLE 1. Values, Goals, and Theoretical Perspectives 
Value Curricular Goal Theoretical Perspective 
Relevant Teach basic concepts Constructivist appeal 
Conceptual in arithmetic, to ideas which the 
Understanding simple plane geometry, 
and simple algebra 
translation tasks, 
in the context of 
applied word problems. 
student has before 
and during instruc¬ 
tion. 
Intellectual Empower the student Emphasis is on metacog- 
Autonomy through successful 
mathematical problem 
solving in the social 
context of student 
pairs and small groups. 
nitive processes of 
reflections about oneself 
the task-at-hand, and the 
strategy employed. 
Roots of Constructivism in Mathematics Curriculum Development: 
From Drill and Practice to Conceptual Understanding 
Teaching for conceptual understanding in mathematics is not a 
new idea. Largely a reaction to the method of drill and practice, a 
popular mode of mathematics instruction since about 1922, 
corresponding to the date of publication of Thorndike's (1922) The 
Psychology of Arithmetic, instruction for conceptual understanding 
has had many interpretations (Resnick and Ford, 1981; Hiebert and 
Lefevre, in press). It is instructive to examine some of these 
interpretations before attempting an exposition of the constructivist 
definition of conceptual understanding. As an idea, constructivism 
has both a social context and a place in intellectual history. 
Although the author acknowledges the importance of the influence of 
social factors on the ideas and institution of Constructivism, only 
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its position with respect to the history of the psychology of 
mathematics and the respective mathematics curricula which developed 
as a result of those psychological frameworks will be treated here. 
The Psychology of Drill and Practice; Connectionism, 
Associationism, and Behaviorism 
The early pioneering efforts in the psychology of mathematics 
were influenced most by the stimulus/response studies conducted on 
animals: cats, dogs, monkeys, and chickens. (Thorndike, 1913). 
Thorndike and his associates assumed that the "law of effect", which 
he observed in animals, may also be applied to human beings. 
According to this view, learning is defined as the creation of 
"connections" or "bonds" between a situation containing a stimulus 
and the response of a specific action. The predictability of a 
specific response depended solely on the strength of the bond between 
the experimental situation and the response. Furthermore, 
Thorndike's formulation of the law of effect took into account the 
importance of reinforcement as a way to strengthen or extinguish 
bonds: "When a modifiable connection between a situation and a 
response is made and is accompanied or followed by a satisfying state 
of affairs, that connection's strength is increased: When made and 
accompanied or followed by an annoying state of affairs, its strength 
is decreased" (Thorndike, 1913, p. 4). 
Thorndike (1924) proposed an arithmetic curriculum for children 
which applied the principles of associationism to classroom 
instruction. A typical exercise from his book [described in Resnick 
and Ford. 1981] required students to solve literally hundreds of 
problems with almost identical mathematical structure 
For example: 
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A "percentage race" required students to solve 100 problems in 10 
minutes. All of the problems were of the following forms: AX of B - 
C and C - AX of B, where A, B, and C alternate as unknowns for 
which a value must be calculated. By assigning students to teams, 
the competitive goal of winning a contest provided the reward which 
strengthened the desired bonds. Thorndike believed that, with enough 
practice, student success rates could become nearly perfect, from 995 
to 997 out of 1000 (Resnick and Ford, 1981). A comparison study 
(Jacobson, 1975) of drill and practice through paper and pencil 
exercises and through computer assisted instruction showed that both 
forms of instruction significantly improved children's scores on the 
Stanford Achievement Test. However, no amount of drill could 
significantly increase mastery beyond the 90-95X level. Though not 
quite at the level Thorndike thought possible, many educators would 
approve of the level of success afforded by this method of 
instruction. 
Some information-processing psychologists (Resnick and Ford, 
1981) maintain that the automaticity acquired through drill and 
practice reduces the load on short-term memory, thus allowing more 
"space" for the processing of other more complex information. The 
observation (Jacobson, 1975) that drill and practice for success on 
simple number facts are not predictive of success on more complicated 
algorithmic computations, does not deter adherents of information¬ 
processing. On the contrary, these theorists (Resnick and Ford, 
1981) maintain that drill on number facts alone is insufficient. 
Such drill must be accompanied with practice in basic computational 
skills involving simple algorithms. By automatizing computation by 
drawing on long-term memory storage, the limited space in working 
memory is free for higher-level problem-solving. 
Skinner's (1958) behaviorism is not unlike Thorndike's 
associationism and connectionism. According to Skinner the 
stimulus/response bond is manifest solely in observable behaviors. 
The interaction between the individual and the environment may be 
structured in a manner which would reinforce desired "behavioral 
objectives". The main features of behaviorist instruction are: 
repetition, reward, and a carefully sequenced series of limited tasks 
marked by small incremental changes in their level of complexity. 
The step by step process which leads students to demonstrate an 
ability is termed "programmed instruction". Pioneered by Gagne 
(1965), thinking skills were viewed as a series of stimulus/response 
connections which may increase in number and complexity. The 
arrangement and complexity of these skills characterize a "type of 
learning". It was assumed that each "type of learning" had a 
corresponding neurological analogue. 
Gagne (1965) identified eight learning types: 
Eight different classes of situation in which human 
beings learn have been distinguished, that is, eight 
sets of conditions under which changes in 
capabilities of the human learner are brought about. 
The implication is that there are eight corresponding 
kinds of changes in the nervous system which need to 
be identified and ultimately accounted for....In 
brief, the varieties of learning that can currently 
be distinguished are as follows: 
Type 1: Signal Learning. The individual learns 
to make a general, diffuse response to a signal. 
This is the classical conditioned response of Pavlov. 
Type 2: Stimulus-Response Learning. The learner 
acquires a precise response to a discriminated 
stimulus. What is learned is a connection or a 
discriminated operant, sometimes called an 
instrumental response. 
Type 3: Chaining. What is acquired is a chain of 
two or more stimulus-response connections. The 
conditions for such learning have been described by 
Skinner and others, notably Gilbert. 
Type 4: Verbal Association. Verbal association 
is the learning of chains that are verbal. 
Basically, the conditions resemble those for other 
(motor)chains. However, the presence of language in 
the human being makes this a special type because 
internal links may be selected from the individual's 
previously learned repertoire of language. 
Type 5: Discrimination Learning. The individual 
learns to make n different identifying responses to 
as many different stimuli, which may resemble each 
other in physical appearance to a greater or lesser 
degree. Although the learning of each stimulus- 
response connection is a simple type 2 occurrence, 
the connections tend to interfere with each other's 
retention. 
Type 6: Concept Learning. The learner acquires a 
capability of making a common response to a class of 
stimuli that may differ from each other widely in 
physical appearance. He is able to make a response 
that identifies an entire class of objects or events. 
Other concepts are acquired by definition, and 
consequently have the formal characteristics of 
rules. 
Type 7: Rule Learning. In simplest terms, a rule 
is a chain of two or more concepts. It functions to 
control behavior in the manner suggested by a 
verbalized rule of the form, "If A, then B", where A 
and B are previously learned concepts. However, it 
must be carefully distinguished from the mere verbal 
sequence, "If A, then B", which, of course, may also 
be learned as type 4. 
Type 8: Problem Solving. Problem solving is a 
kind of learning that requires the internal events 
usually called thinking. Two or more previously 
acquired rules are somehow combined to produce a new 
capability that can be shown to depend on a "higher 
order" rule. (Gagne, 1965, pp. 62-5) 
Unlike Thorndike, Gagne believed that all learning is not the 
same. Each of the above varieties of learning reflects a different 
level of intellection. Furthermore, the sequencing of levels 
reflects a hierarchy, with earlier learning types viewed as 
prerequisites for subsequent learning types. According to Gagne, 
The most important class of conditions that distinguishes one form 
of learning from another is the initial state of the learning - in 
other words, its prerequisites. The conditions for chaining, for 
example, require that the individual has previously learned stimulus- 
response connections available to him, so that they can be chained" 
(1965, p. 66). Much of Gagne's work is the attempt to establish 
prerequisite stimulus-response bonds for any higher-order task, 
usually involving chaining. Consequently, the mathematics curriculum 
is written from "learning hierarchies" which divide tasks into 
prerequisite subtasks, and the subtasks into yet smaller sub¬ 
subtasks, until the most basic S-R bonds are achieved. [An example 
of a learning hierarchy pertaining to the addition of integers is in 
Gagne, et al., 1962.] 
Learning Hierarchies 
At first, a learning hierarchy is a rational hypothesis about 
the sequencing of skills and concepts. It is usually founded upon 
its creator's experience as a learner and as a teacher, or based on 
features within the structure of the mathematics itself. As such, 
the hypotheses evident in the hierarchy may be tested for validity. 
The transfer from one task to a higher task is the fundamental aspect 
of hierarchical, or cumulative learning. Two empirical tests for the 
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validation of learning hierarchies are scaling studies and training 
studies. By measuring success on specific tasks and subtasks, 
scaling studies look for an arrangement of scores which approximate a 
Guttman scale (Guttman, 1944). The degree to which success on a 
higher level task is accompanied with success on subordinate tasks is 
a measure of validation of the hypothesized hierarchy. For example, 
a scaling validation study by Wang, Resnick and Boozer (1971) found 
that although children could be taught to read and identify numerals 
as a rote-memory task, better understanding of set size, as 
represented by numerals, is achieved through first practicing 
counting objects. As reported in Rosnick and Ford (1981), a follow¬ 
up study (Wang, 1973) found that some of the most widely believed 
instructional hierarchies were mistaken. Many educators, for 
instance, considered an understanding of "one-to-one correspondence" 
to be prerequisite to the skill of counting. In fact, this study 
showed that these abilities are independent of each other, and that, 
their order of instruction is insignificant. 
Training studies also provide a method for testing the validity 
of learning hierarchies. By treating the hierarchy as a guide for 
sequencing topics to be instructed, and then devising tests to 
determine the interrelatedness of skills taught from the hierarchy, 
evidence may be gathered to support or refute the hypothesized 
hierarchy. In one study (Gagne, et al., 1962), a skill and its 
prerequisite were tested in pairs to evaluate the causal relationship 
between them. Although there are reports (Gagne, et al., 1962) of 
97-100% agreement between test results and the hypothesized 
hierarchy, the pairing method of testing has been criticized (Resnick 
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and Ford, 1981) for containing too few items to allow for reliable 
results. Also, training all students with the same hierarchy left no 
students for comparison. Since all students received training in all 
skills in the same hierarchical order, there could be no test for the 
possibility that some subordinate tasks may not actually be 
subordinate. Training studies which instruct different groups of 
students using varied sequencing of topics (Uprichard, 1973), i.e. 
one group taught according to the order suggested by the hierarchy, 
and another group by the reverse order, may provide a more reliable 
test of the hierarchy's validity. 
The attempt to order instruction through small steps which have 
been thoughtfully sequenced, most apparent in programmed instruction, 
can provide a forum for educators to critically examine both the 
content of instruction, and their experiences teaching the content. 
As such, designing learning hierarchies can provide a framework for 
the development of curricula, lesson plans, and tests, both 
diagnostic and evaluative. Besides stimulating instructional design, 
learning hierarchies may be used to test understanding of mathematics 
topics. The State of Connecticut now asks prospective mathematics 
teachers to sequence a series of cards containing subskills within a 
larger topic; for example the skills necessary to solve linear 
equations with one unknown (Leinwand, 1987, personal communication). 
Clearly, the attempt to order instruction is an important pedagogical 
contribution, which, historically, is due mainly to the guiding 
efforts of behaviorist pedagogues. 
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Meaning in Mathematics: The Joining of Mathematical 
and Cognitive Structures 
The instructional method of drill and practice has been 
criticized for several reasons. Besides the contention that the 
repetitious character of instruction was dull and uninteresting, the 
main criticism of drill is that there is seldom an opportunity for 
the student to explore difficult concepts in a meaningful way. The 
typical method of instruction calls for 1) review of previous topics, 
2) description of a new topic, 3) individual desk work, 4) summary. 
By reducing learning to the transmission of ready-made knowledge, 
students gained skills in various algorithmic techniques. They are 
passive to the degree that they seldom work at a level of learning 
which requires thinking at the higher levels of Gagne's hierarchy of 
learning types. The behaviorist claim that their approach could be 
universally applied to a total curriculum has proved unfounded. 
According to Howson, et al. (1981), "Of Gagne's eight hierarchically 
related types of learning, only the three lowest could be formulated 
in strict behaviorist terms." Although learning hierarchies are 
still employed in the design of curricula, and to a greater extent 
for the development of computer assisted instruction, no 
comprehensive behaviorist-based mathematics curricula were produced 
subsequent to the major projects of the 1950's and I960's (University 
of Maryland Mathematics Project, the Greater Cleveland Mathematics 
Program of the Educational Research Council of America, and 
Individually Prescribed Instruction; in Lockard, 1963.) 
Gestalt Psychology: The Idea of Underlying Structure 
Behaviorism met with strong criticism from a school of 
psychology, largely outside of the United States and centered in 
Germany. Contrary to the behaviorists, Gestalt psychologists held 
that an organism's response to a situation could not by analyzed as 
the sum of responses to specific stimuli. Instead, they believed 
that the integrated structures and patterns which comprise experience 
cannot be reduced to less than the whole, nor summed to the whole. 
For the Gestaltists, learning implies understanding, and 
understanding requires creative activity on the part of the learner. 
Furthermore, memorization of facts and techniques does not 
demonstrate understanding. Even the discovery of relationships 
cannot alone account for understanding. [For an opposing view, see 
Nickerson, 1982.] Understanding is "structurization". According to 
the gestalt psychologist, Wertheimer, "To realize any relations, even 
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if they are correct, is not decisive; what is decisive is that they 
must be the relations structurally required in view of the whole, 
arising, conceived, used as parts in their function in the structure" 
(Wertheimer, 1959, p. 43). The following examples illustrate the 
gestaltist conception of meaningful understanding and of productive, 
rather than reproductive thinking. 
A story about young Gauss [perhaps apocryphal, as at least two 
versions of the story exist (Wertheimer, 1959; Resnick and Ford, 
1981)] provides one such example. According to one version (Resnick 
and Ford, 1981) Gauss, at the age of 10, was asked by his teacher to 
find the sum of the numbers 1 to 100. Hoping to keep young Gauss 
busy for a much longer time, the teacher was astounded that after 
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just a few minutes Gauss responded with the sum 5050. Instead of 
adding each of the numbers to the sum of numbers immediately 
preceding it, Gauss represented the problem in a manner which allowed 
him to generalize a solution which called for multiplication, instead 
of repeated addition. Wertheimer (1959) suggests the following 
visual representation to understand how Gauss arrived at his 
solution: 
3 4 97 98 99 
l 100 
FIGURE 4. Gauss problem 
Noticing that each of the pairs sum to 101, and that there are 50 
such pairs in the sequence, Gauss simply multiplied to achieve an 
answer. The solution is a visual "gestalt" for one version of 
Gauss's formula for finding the sum of an even-numbered series: 
n/2(n+l). For Wertheimer, Gauss's solution should not be understood 
solely as an act of genius. Rather, it is the product of independent 
and daring thought, and of viewing the "whole" problem. According to 
Wertheimer: 
On the basis of my experiences, I would say that the 
essential features in genuine solving are: 
not to be bound, blinded by habits; 
not merely to repeat slavishly what one has been 
taught; 
i 
not to proceed in a mechanized state of mind, 
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in a piecemeal attitude, 
with piecemeal attention, 
by piecemeal operations; 
but to look at the situation freely, open-mindedly, 
viewing the whole, 
trying to discover, to realize how the problem and 
the situation are related, 
trying to penetrate, to realize and to trace out 
the inner relation between form and task 
In the finest cases getting at the roots of the 
situation, illuminating and making transparent 
essential structural features of regular series, in 
spite of the difficulties. (1959, pp. 120-121) 
Two other examples illustrate Wertheimer's objection to the 
rote memorization of algorithms which he found widespread in drill 
and practice instruction. After observing a class of students being 
taught to calculate the area of a parallelogram, Wertheimer 
speculated that the students' success was due solely to the fact that 
the algorithm which they had memorized was connected to a particular 
representation, and in no way reflected a conceptual understanding 
for the reasons behind the algorithm. By altering the representation 
only slightly, he was able to demonstrate that the students lacked 
conceptual understanding. A simple rotation of the figure, whose 
area they already calculated, totally befuddled the students. 
Furthermore, the teacher defended his students, calling the new 
figure "queer". Apparently, the teacher who expects students to 
memorize solutions cannot justify problems whose form is different 
from those the students have memorized. Consequently, either 
students operate in a very restricted problem-space, or they develop 
ways to deal with problems other than by memorizing solution types. 
94 
Wertheimer suggests that conceptual understanding of the 
structures of mathematics would obviate the problems associated with 
rote learning. The second example, from his research, illustrates 
this type of understanding. Wertheimer (1959) asked students to 
solve the following problem: 
(274 + 274 + 274 + 274 + 274)/5 - ? 
He observed two different responses. Either students laboriously 
calculated the sum and then divided by 5, or they recognized that 
"what the denominator demands is already done in the numerator. 
Division by five was understood in its structural meaning, as 
demanding structurization of the amount of the numerator into five 
equal parts, which is already done" (Wertheimer, 1959, p. 130). 
While computational drill has benefits, it also has drawbacks. 
Wertheimer suggests that instead of repeated drill, conceptual 
understanding would improve with better questions. For example, he 
helped students to understand the structure of the above problem by 
simply accompanying it with the following: 
(272 + 272 + 272)/3 = ? and (273 + 273)/2 = ? etc. 
The pattern in the structure was more apparent once students could 
see several simpler examples of the same problem. 
Gestalt psychology has several important contributions to make 
to mathematics education. Foremost among these are: 1) 
demonstrating the power of "productive" thinking as compared to 
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reproductive thinking; 2) identifying the role of structure for 
understanding mathematics; 3) identifying questions and methods of 
questioning which evoke in students an understanding of specific 
mathematical structures. 
The distinction between productive and reproductive thought can 
be viewed as a dichotomy which arises chiefly as a reaction to the 
behaviorist method of drill and practice. An educational system 
which disallows human creativity is repugnant to educational 
theorists like Wertheimer. The reproduction of algorithms and number 
facts from memory develops habits of thought which are limited to the 
contents of long-term memory, and reflect the lowest level of 
mathematical thinking. The creative solution which Gauss offered to 
the problem of the sum of consecutive integers is an example of 
thinking which restructures the task by retreating from rote 
computation to a vantage point which permits an examination of the 
problem for apparent mathematical structure. For the gestaltists, it 
is the search for structure which characterizes mathematical 
thinking. Furthermore, gestalt psychology suggests that the search 
may be facilitated by asking students to solve problems which draw 
upon the pattern seeking propensities of the human mind. Wertheimer 
(1959) found that by asking students to solve problems involving 
shapes with structural similarities to parallelograms, though not 
themselves parallelograms, a broader understanding of the target 
concept was attained. Similarly, by asking more, and simpler, 
versions of the division problem [above], Wertheimer reports that all 
of the students identified the structure of division which not only 
simplified the solution process, but also provided insight into the 
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structure of the division algorithm; an algorithm which they had all 
mastered, but few understood. In all of his classroom interactions 
with students, Wertheimer (1959) commented that the discovery of 
pattern and structure was spontaneous and exciting for children. All 
that was necessary was that they be asked conceptual questions, and 
that they be allowed the opportunity to reflect and to discuss 
before, and often instead of performing computations. 
Another important tenet of gestalt psychology is that 
meaningful learning requires an active role for the learner. The 
identification of relationships and structure occurs through the 
attempt to reformulate a problem. The reformulation process involves 
a view of the whole problem; only then may pattern and structure be 
observed. 
The gestalt psychologist Katona (1940/1967), showed that the 
identification of structure served as a much more powerful aid for 
memorization than did practiced memorization. He asked subjects to 
memorize a series of numbers. For example: 
1491625364964 
Katona found that constraining the memorizer to remember the series 
in a particular fashion, eg. by reciting the numbers 149, 162, 152, 
etc., or by placing the numbers in a context such as "The gross 
national product of the United States last year was 
$14,916,253,649.64.", proved less efficient than simply allowing the 
memorizer to examine the series without special instruction. By 
permitting a "free discovery" period of examination, all of the 
subjects noticed the structure of the series and were able to recall 
the series without error one week later. Furthermore, they could 
generate subsequent numbers in the series. [The pattern is apparent 
in the series 1 4 9 16 25 36 49 64.] From these, and similar 
studies, Katona concluded: 
a) Learning by memorizing is a different process from 
learning by understanding; b) learning by understanding 
involves substantially the same process as does problem 
solving - the discovery of a principle; c) both problem 
solving and meaningful learning consist primarily in 
changing, or organizing, the material. The role of 
organization is to establish, discover, or understand an 
intrinsic relationship." (1940/1967, pp. 53-54) 
Educational Implications of Structuralism: Representations 
and Discovery Learning 
The principles of "discovery learning", and of conceptual 
understanding as the identification of structure, were heralded by 
two educational theorists. Referred to as structuralists, Bruner 
(1960,1964) and Dienes (1963, 1973) were to have an important impact 
on the direction of mathematics curriculum. Bruner's contribution 
lies chiefly with his recognition of the role of representations in 
the presentation of mathematics topics and problems, and with his 
attempt to coordinate the presentation with the intellectual 
capacities of the children who receive instruction. Dienes developed 
a pedagogy for mathematics instruction whose paradigm may be 
described as "mathematics as games". He elucidated a "discovery" 
model which advocated a sequence of instructional phases which 
connected the stages of play and games-playing, to increasing levels 
of abstraction; also linked to the intellectual capacities of the 
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child. Both researchers advocated active problem-solving, with 
problems whose representations progressed from the use of hands-on 
manipulatives to the abstract symbolism of mathematics. Besides 
enabling the child to develop an understanding of the structures of 
specific mathematics concepts, they also wished to promote the 
development of cognitive structures in the child which correspond to 
the structures of mathematics and of science. For the 
structuralists, the process of scientific and mathematical thinking 
was as important as the understanding of specific content structure. 
Drawing on the developmental psychology of Piaget, Bruner 
(1964) postulated three modes of representation which were to have 
direct bearing on the design of mathematics curricula. Roughly 
corresponding to the stages of intellectual development, as described 
by Piaget, Bruner described the modes as enactive, iconic, and 
symbolic. 
The enactive mode of representation is suggested by the 
sensorimotor stage of development. According to Piaget, this is the 
stage of development when the child interacts with the environment 
through various motor acts. Memory and communication are also 
embodied in physical and motor events. For example, a baby who has 
lost his rattle may shake an empty fist, thus demonstrating the 
memory of the rattle through the action associated with the object. 
Counting blocks is another example of an enactive mode of 
representation, to be distinguished from adding numerals written on a 
sheet of paper. The blocks can be physically manipulated, whereas 
the number signs cannot. 
99 
The iconic mode of representation is the "picturing" of events, 
objects, and relationships. The pictures may be mental, or they may 
be made actuai, as in a model or an illustration. They need not be 
accurate as to detail. For instance, an illustration of a bundle of 
sticks may be used to represent a grouping of ten, while a larger 
bundle may illustrate a grouping of 100, even though neither of the 
illustrations allow for the counting of so many sticks. The 
illustration serves as a model, an iconic representation, which 
facilitates the visualization of an idea. 
A more abstract mode of representation is the symbolic mode. 
Virtually all representations which bear no physical or visual 
similarity to a particular object, action, or idea, but do convey 
information, are symbolic. Language, spoken and written, is a 
symbolic representation. So too are the mathematical symbols for 
numbers, operations, and relationships. Graphs, tables of data, 
equations, and computer programming code, are examples of 
mathematical symbols. 
Bruner believes that virtually any concept could be taught so 
long as the instruction is tailored to the intellectual level of the 
child. "Any idea or problem or body of knowledge can be presented in 
a form simple enough so that any particular learner can understand it 
in a recognizable form" (Bruner, 1966, p. 44). The identification of 
the "recognizable form" was to determine the representation with 
which to introduce the concept, and was to be ascertained through 
cognitive processes research. 
The process of thinking mathematically was to be fostered by a 
"spiral curriculum". Mathematicians and psychologists, working 
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together, would design a curriculum which would expose students to 
mathematical concepts with representations and language which became 
progressively more abstract as students became more mature. Ideas 
which were taught concretely to younger students would be repeated in 
a more sophisticated presentation which better approximated the 
mathematician's understanding of the concept. One consequence of the 
spiral curriculum was that teachers were encouraged to expose their 
students to many concepts which would appear later in the spiral. 
The intellectual readiness of the student was at times subordinate to 
the curricular demands of instruction which relied on previous 
exposure to ideas. According to Bruner, "Teachers should look to the 
future and teach some concepts and understandings even if complete 
mastery cannot be expected" (Bruner, 1960, p. 70). This compromise 
of student readiness in favor of content may have contributed the 
most devastating blow to the effective implementation of the spiral 
curriculum in the New Math. 
Working closely with Bruner, the mathematician Zoltan P. 
Dienes, extended Bruner's ideas on the modes of representation by 
developing an instructional sequence which used physically 
manipulable materials specially designed to foster what he termed 
"discovery learning" (Dienes, 1960, 1963, 1967, 1973). Dienes (1973) 
described six stages in the discovery learning cycle. Through the 
active participation of the student, mathematical structures would be 
constructed out of the child's experience with structure-oriented 
raanipulatives. Briefly, the six stages may be characterized thus: 
1) an environment is created wherein the child experiences free play 
with games which embody mathematical structure. Dienes designed sets 
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of materials to be played with by the student: multibase arithmetic 
blocks (otherwise known as Dienes blocks) allowed concrete 
manipulations with cubes which embodied different base number 
systems, and could also be used to embody factoring principles, as 
for example in quadratic equations; attribute blocks (Dienes & 
Golding, 1971), which could be used to demonstrate principles of 
classification, logic and set theory; and Cuisenaire rods which are 
most frequently used to teach fractions and ratio concepts; 2) after 
a period of free play with the materials, students are encouraged to 
play specific games with rules designed to teach specific 
mathematical structures; 3) abstraction occurs through the 
spontaneous realization that two or more games, played with different 
embodiments [manipulatives], share the same structure, i.e. the same 
rules; 4) the students are asked to represent the abstraction and 
reflect upon both the structure and the representation. In this way, 
the concept is externalized, as with graphs, Venn diagrams, or other 
visualizations; 5) by describing the external representation the 
students invent a language of description for the representation and 
for the abstraction which the representation represents. The 
relative merits of one language over another are also discussed. 
According to Dienes, the description which the students eventually 
adapt will form the basis for a system of axioms and theorems; 6) 
finally, the methods of description of the rules become "rules for 
proving games", which is "the method by which we can reach any part 
of the possible description, given a first part as a starting point 
(Dienes, 1973, p. 9). Through these six stages, students are brought 
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from free play in a structured environment to constructing for 
themselves the "logico-raathematical rules" of formal mathematical 
proof. 
Structuralism Implemented: New Math/Formal Math 
American mathematics curriculum development of the 1960's and 
1970's, the period of the New Math, combined the 
structuralist/developmental ideas of Bruner and Dienes with the 
hierarchical learning theories of Gagne (Fey, 1978). It was soon 
apparent that what was emphasized in the curriculum corresponded 
closer to the mathematician's skills of formal deductive argument 
than to the child's natural and intuitive mathematical 
understandings. Led by Morris Kline (1973), critics of the New Math 
described it as being excessively abstract, with far too much stress 
placed on symbol manipulation skills and deductive argument. The 
mathematician's view of structure as formalisms was brought into 
question by psychologists who favored "good intuitive psychological 
structure, that is, an organized set of associations, propositions, 
or relations that allows the child to use and acquire mathematical 
knowledge efficiently and flexibly..." (Resnick and Ford, 1981, p. 
124). The original intent of the structuralists, to lead the student 
to construct mathematics through generalization of physical 
experiences, became subordinate to a curriculum which dealt mainly 
with abstraction taught through verbal description and drill and 
practice. According to Fey (1978), the use of discovery teaching 
strategies was practically non-existent, even though the New Math 
The Price, et. al. (1977) survey of elementary encouraged its use. 
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school mathematics instruction found that the most common method of 
instruction was short teacher explanation followed by extended 
student practice. 
One possible reason for this departure from the original intent 
of structualist theorists like Bruner and Dienes is that what arises 
from structualism is an epistemological problem termed the 
"structuralist mythology" (Byers, 1983). The problem may be traced 
to the Platonic view of the status of mental knowledge over and above 
experiential knowledge. According to Byers (1983), many mathematics 
educators believe that ultimate mathematical reality is embedded in 
abstract structures. For these educators, "specific examples are 
then often seen as being merely pale reflections of the world of 
structure - they have no intrinsic value in themselves" (Byers, 
1983, p. 32). A similar argument was advanced by Kaput, who declared 
that the act of "anthropomorphizing", projecting internal cognitive 
experience onto structure, and "metaphorizing", incorporating 
metaphors as "structure preserving mapping" (Kaput, 1979, p. 289), 
are fundamental processes in learning and inventing mathematics. He 
also argued that the predisposition of mathematicians to deny the 
role of these activities in favor of a "perfect knowledge" is 
"fundamentally dishonest and destructive" (Kaput, 1979, p. 290). 
The present critique of structualism is more a critique of 
structualism/formalism rather than of the structural/developmental 
approach that was advocated by Bruner and Dienes. The transformation 
of structualism into formalism was a historical transformation, which 
may be attributed both to the success of 19th century mathematics to 
use formal axiomatic organization to develop the rudiments of logical 
104 
foundations in mathematics (Kline, 1980), and to the lure of logico- 
hierarchical organization of the structures of mathematics into a 
curriculum heavy with formalisms. 
Piaget's Developmentalism: Cognitive Structures Constructed 
Although the initial attempts to teach students mathematical 
structures incorporated Piaget's developmental ideas in theory, in 
practice those ideas were never successfully implemented in the large 
mathematics curriculum projects of the 1960's and the 1970's (Howson, 
et. al., 1981), with one important exception: the Madison Project, 
directed by Robert Davis (Davis, 1964, 1965) [to be discussed in the 
section, Method of Constructivist Teaching]. 
Several factors contributed to the failure to implement 
Piaget's theories on a wide scale: 1) unlike Thorndike, Bruner, and 
Dienes, Piaget neither tested his educational theories through 
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curriculum development, nor was he interested in lending major 
assistance to educators who wished to accelerate the cognitive 
development of children either generally, to move students from 
concrete to formal operational thinking, or specifically, as in the 
area of mathematics (Elkind, 1970); 2) Piaget's theory of learning 
involves much more than the demarcation of stages of intellectual 
development. His biological model of the dynamics of the growth of 
cognitive structures is far more enigmatic than the behavioral 
objectives to which most American educators are accustomed to; 3) 
even when Piaget's theories are sufficiently understood in the 
academic sense, the main tenet, that knowledge is constructed 
that educators become clinical idiosyncratically, requires 
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interviewers and cognitive process researchers as well as curriculum 
specialists. Besides probing student conceptions with questions to 
elicit reflection on the part of the student and information for the 
teacher, instructors must also pose new questions which will aid the 
student in building knowledge structures which approximate those of 
the teacher. The dialogue which necessarily ensues involves 
spontaneity and mastery of the concepts of instruction, requirements 
for which few educators are prepared. 
A constructivist theory of education is a radical departure 
from most current and previous educational practice. The 
epistemology of constructivism and the concommitant view of learning, 
as initiated by Piaget and developed by his followers, constitutes a 
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense (Confrey, 1988). The Piagetian view 
that "to understand is to invent" (Piaget, 1974) has been interpreted 
to mean that all knowledge is invention. The further notion that 
knowledge is created through "reflective abstraction" requires the 
learner to self reflect on the objects of his/her cognition. 
Together these postulates, the epistemology of constructivism and the 
role of metacognition in learning, constitute the foundation upon 
which educational research programs and curriculum projects may be 
built. The description of the relevance of these two postulates for 
college remedial mathematics curriculum and pedagogy are central 
topics of discussion in this study. Although the importance of the 
role of paradigm to research is acknowledged (Kuhn, 1962), the issue 
of how to discern the implications for educational research is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
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Cognitive Structures and Learning 
Piaget's training as a biologist contributed to his view of the 
growth of human knowledge in a most fundamental way. Besides 
containing terms which approximate biological metaphor, terms like 
assimilation and accommodation, Piaget's view of the internal 
structures of knowledge as "organic", action-seeking, components of 
human cognition bear similarities to biological organisms which 
ingest, grow, communicate, mutate and reproduce. 
Initially, cognitive structures are the actions of the human 
infant. Actions are the primary functions of infants, and repeated 
actions are the rudiments of cognitive structures. The organization 
and control of actions are the stable ideas, mental constructs, 
schemes, which comprise cognitive structures. Notions of space, 
time, causality, objects outside of self, etc. are examples of stable 
ideas which organize and interpret sensory input. The act of 
transforming sensation is termed "assimilation". Structures cannot 
exist outside of a context of outward action and assimilation. 
Structures "reach out" for assimilatory experiences much as plants 
"reach" for sunlight or organisms reach for food. The function of 
structures is to organize and interpret experience, to ingest and to 
grow. For this reason cognitive assimilation is viewed as an 
aggressive activity. An example from Piaget is that of a child who 
possesses the scheme for "grasping", and who actively seeks objects 
to grasp. Structures initiate action as well as interpret sensory 
input. According to Clement, "A structure actively seeks to relate 
to aspects of the environment that provide a context for its 
functioning. Thus, we refer to the act of assimilation rather than 
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to a passive reception of information from the environment" (Clement, 
1977, p. 18). 
Structures also change and grow in response to conflict which 
arises from sensory input or from other structures. Conflict arises 
when a cognitive structure is confronted with sensory input which 
cannot be readily assimilated because of an apparent mismatch of 
input with previous organizational schemes. A period of conflict may 
also arise from the comparison of two or more cognitive structures, 
which, upon reflection, yield contradicting effects. Piaget termed 
this conflict, "disequilibrium". Many of Piaget's experiments with 
children use disequilibrating situations and questions to assess the 
scope and power of the child's conceptual understanding. 
Disequilibration may also be used to detect a student's willingness 
to accept or invent basic misconceptions in academic areas. The 
reflection which ensues upon disequilibration can cause a student to 
restructure a previously held concept to be closer to that of the 
teacher. 
This alteration of structures is termed "accommodation". 
Structures may adapt slightly in response to newly assimilated input, 
or they may radically alter in response to an awareness of a 
conflicting scheme or sensory input which require new organizing 
ideas. The cumulative alteration of cognitive structures is termed 
"cognitive development". 
There are important implications for mathematics instruction 
which stem both from Piaget's theory of the mechanisms of cognitive 
development, and from his method of researching cognitive structures. 
Foremost is Piaget’s emphasis on knowledge as understanding. In 
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order to empower a student to construct useful structures - 
structures which help to organize the experiential world - an 
educator must, in Groen and Kieran's terms, "facilitate the 
transition from observing one s own actions to thinking about them 
and thence to thinking about thinking...[and] to achieve some kind of 
satisfactory coordination between the logico-mathematical structures 
of the pupil and those of the teacher" (Groen and Kieran, 1983, p. 
368). Piagetian theory assumes that metacognitive reflection is 
necessary for cognitive development. 
Cognitive structures are not in themselves "pieces of 
knowledge". In fact, the Piagetian perspective is that all 
structures are inter-connected in such a manner as to allow the 
constant feedback among assimilatory experience and several cognitive 
structures. The integrity of any one structure is evaluated in the 
context of similar and competing structures as well as in response to 
sensory input. Knowledge is not comprised of individual structures 
which may be accessed in response to stimuli. Instead, conceptual 
knowledge may be thought of as "a connected web of knowledge, a 
network in which the linking relationships are as prominent as the 
discrete pieces of information" (Hiebert and Lefevre, in press, p.5). 
Features of Understanding: Procedural and Conceptual 
Knowledge in Mathematics 
Hiebert and Lefevre (in press) assert that the dichotomy 
between conceptual and procedural knowledge is not completely 
warranted. Procedural knowledge must be linked with conceptual 
knowledge if either form of knowledge is to be useful. Their 
analysis of procedural knowledge in mathematics distinguishes two 
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types of procedures that are necessary for relating the various 
mathematical structures. Both types of procedures are required for 
the communication of the "form" of mathematics as manifest in the 
formal language of symbol representation. The procedures involve 1) 
syntactic maneuvers on symbols, corresponding to Bruner's abstract 
mode of representation; and 2) operations on concrete objects, 
visual diagrams or "other entities" such as straightedge and compass 
constructions in geometry. This second type of procedure involves 
actions on representations similar to Bruner's enactive and iconic 
modes of representation. The rules and algorithms used to execute 
these procedures are inextricably connected to the concepts which 
these representations signify. Although procedures may be memorized 
and executed without conceptual understanding, the usefulness of such 
skills is dubious. One may also question the usefulness of 
conceptual knowledge if it is not accompanied with procedures which 
translate understanding into action. "In fact," write Hiebert and 
Lefevre, "although it is possible to consider procedures without 
concepts, it is not so easy to imagine conceptual knowledge that is 
not linked with some procedures. This is due, in part, to the fact 
that procedures translate conceptual knowledge into something 
observable. Without procedures to access and act upon the knowledge 
we would not know it was there" (Hiebert and Lefevre, in press, p. 
15). 
The inter-relatedness requirement for conceptual understanding 
is one of the main criteria which identifies a "powerful 
construction" in mathematics (Confrey, 1985). Confrey characterized 
powerful constructions as structures with: internal consistency, 
integration across several concepts, and convergence among different 
forms and representations. Confrey also states that there is a 
historic continuity in the development of powerful constructions, as 
well as a pragmatic efficiency of these structures to provide 
guidance in future learning and problem solving. The additional 
requirement, that a student be able to reflect upon and justify the 
construction, is in keeping with Piaget's observation that reflective 
abstraction is necessary for using existing structures to construct 
new ones. 
The main goal of a constructivist pedagogy in mathematics is to 
help the student to construct powerful constructions which the 
student will believe and commit to, and which are in agreement with 
expert opinion. To facilitate this, constructivist theory suggests 
that 1) students must actively engage their current knowledge in the 
solution of a problem or task; 2) students must communicate their 
current knowledge structures in actions, representations, and verbal 
reports, simultaneously relating one knowledge structure to another 
and to their immediate solution of the problem; 3) students must 
commit themselves to their solution and to their justification of the 
solution after testing their constructions with disequilibrating 
problems which arise from their own work, from questions posed by the 
teacher, or from other students, but always upon reflection on their 
own conflicting schemata. 
A Constructivist Approach to College Remedial Mathematics 
The following constructivist pedagogy is intended for use in 
The term "remedial” is, however, too college remedial mathematics. 
broad to leave unelaborated. The Basic Math 010L course, which uses 
the curriculum and method of instruction about to be described, is a 
course predominantly in remedial arithmetic. Students in the course 
demonstrate a need for learning skills, processes and abilities 
necessary for using mathematics in "everyday situations". Although 
many of these students indicate that they can perform some 
computations, they have difficulty making inferences, solving 
problems, and evaluating the reasonableness of results. With regard 
to various mathematics content, they have difficulty rounding off, 
drawing diagrams and graphs, attaching numbers to qualitative 
information, and organizing information into useful categories (e.g., 
lists or tables) (Lesh, 1985). There are varying reports regarding 
the ability of students to estimate quantities (Lesh, 1985; Mack, 
1988). [However, students in Math 010L appear to be able to estimate 
quantities better than they can distinguish the relative size of 
numbers.] 
The goal of the course is to enable students to construct 
powerful mathematical ideas which have utility for coping with 
subsequent college courses in mathematics, and the social and 
physical sciences, and for living in late 20th century American 
society. Skills which are required include the higher order thinking 
skills discussed above and in the introduction to this thesis. Also 
required are basic mathematics skills in the use of: fractions, 
decimals and percents, negative numbers, exponents, algebra as a 
mathematics language (including the ability to solve linear equations 
with one unknown quantity), ratio and proportion, and the two- and 
three-dimensional geometry of triangles, rectangles, circles and 
cylinders. 
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Elements of a Constructivist Curriculum 
The Text 
While many arithmetic and introductory algebra textbooks 
emphasize computation and symbol manipulation skills, few stress word 
problems and the critical thinking skills needed to solve them 
(Rosnick, 1981; Sigur, 1988). The word problems which such books 
include are usually at the end of a chapter, intended to demonstrate 
the usefulness of a particular algorithm. As discussed in chapter 3 
of this thesis, many word problems closely match the worked examples 
immediately preceding the problems. This organization of material 
limits the skills required for the solution of the word problems to 
simply identifying the proper solution type for a particular problem. 
As such, no more than rote memorization of solutions which 
approximate algorithms is necessary, thus precluding any need for 
conceptual understanding. Students learn to match problems to 
solution templates. Such activities may be characterized as 
exercises, not problem solving. While this approach is suitable for 
a behaviorist curriculum which strives for automaticity of 
stimulus/response bonds for specific objectives, it is inappropriate 
for the constructivist approach. 
A constructivist curriculum builds on the knowledge structures 
which students already possess, and forces students to adapt those 
structures and to construct new ones in the solution of problems 
which they may not have seen before. Consequently, the problems must 
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be written with a general appreciation of the capabilities of the * 
students. They must also be carefully sequenced so that concepts 
build smoothly, allowing for disequilibration, but mitigating against 
student feelings of frustration and inadequacy. 
Conceptual understanding of topics in Math 010L is developed by 
students cooperatively solving word problems in class and for 
homework. Procedural knowledge, such as adding and subtracting 
fractions, solving equations, converting fractions into decimals, 
etc., are described in the book, Developing Mathematical Skills 
(Whimbey and Lochhead, 1981), which all Math 010L students are 
expected to purchase. Individual chapters are assigned for reading, 
and short, 10-minute quizzes are administered in class to be sure 
students actually prepared for the daily topic. The book contains 
lucid description of algorithms, clearly worked examples, and many 
student exercises. English-speaking college students demonstrate 
little difficulty learning the procedures described therein. 
The Math 010L Workbook (Narode, et. al., 1986) [see Appendix A 
for table of contents] is a selection of word problems, and a few 
procedural-type problems, which students bring to each class. 
Instructors select problems for students to work in class and for 
homework. The classroom environment and method of instruction will 
be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter [Method of 
Instruction: Pair Problem Solving]. The following list of 
considerations for the development of the curriculum indicates some 
of the concerns the authors addressed when writing and assembling the 
problems in the Workbook. 
Language 
From a Piagetian perspective, language is important both for 
what it can do and for what it cannot do. Language cannot be the 
sole vehicle for the transmission of knowledge. Drawing on Piaget's 
theory that actions are primary and that language is a form of 
representation of structure, the presentation of concepts should not 
rely on verbal description. Problems which require students to 
represent situations and quantities with pictures and diagrams are 
preferred. Mental actions using these representations are more 
engaging and instructive than passive listening and reading of text. 
This is not to imply that listening or reading are entirely passive; 
they are activities. However, they limit the student to only one 
form of representation, the symbolic form of representation. The 
most common context for listening in school is the lecture, and the 
most common form of reading is the academic textbook. Both of these 
media are delivered by experts who reduce verbalization to a minimum 
of specialized terms which "unambiguously" render their subjects 
unintelligible to an uninitiated audience. 
This situation is exacerbated in mathematics, where theorems 
and proofs substitute for descriptions of the thought processes which 
led to the constructions presented. The "Ockham's Razor" approach to 
mathematics writing and lecturing is: the more terse the presentation 
the more "rigorous" the mathematics. Besides neglecting the 
cognitive processes of the students, thereby risking confusing them, 
the use of formal mathematical language can also confuse mathematics 
textbook writers and teachers who rely on these textbooks for their 
lectures. Byers critiqued two popular elementary school mathematics 
textbooks for their inappropriate use of mathematical formalisms: 
Even textbook writers develop peculiar ideas. Consider 
the following: (1) "The two basic operations from a 
mathematical viewpoint are addition and multiplication. 
In elementary mathematics both of these are undefined, 
but subtraction and division are defined" (Grossnickle 
and Reckzeh, 1973), and from another book (2) 
Multiplication, like addition is undefined" (Schminke, 
et al., 1973). What could these statements possibly 
mean? If addition and multiplication are not defined how 
do we manage to perform these operations? Does undefined 
mean that 2 + 3 is sometimes equal to 5 and sometimes 
equal to 8? The authors here are possibly 
misunderstanding a statement which is sometimes found in 
the formal definition of some algebraic structure (like a 
field, for example) to the effect that the operations are 
"undefined". This refers to the fact that one assumes 
that nothing is assumed to be known about these 
operations except that they obey the various field 
axioms. It does not mean that the addition of integers 
is undefined! (1983, p. 35) 
For language to be useful it should be understandable. 
Instructors should evaluate the level of comprehension and vocabulary 
which their students are capable of. The language of instruction 
should be non-formal and familiar. This is not to say that 
conversation should be conducted at the level which the student 
speaks, but at the level which the student understands. The 
instructor should converse in a clear and grammatically correct 
manner which strives for a high degree of verbal precision, but 
always in terms which the students addressed can understand as 
demonstrated by their responses. 
Language is extremely important for teaching students to 
reflect on their thoughts. Verbalization is the single most common 
manifestation of metacognitive activity. The main point in this 
observation is that the students must be doing the verbalizing. 
Metacognition requires self-reflection. Similarly, reflective 
abstraction, which according to Piaget is fundamental to mathematics 
learning, is a mental activity which can be verbalized, as in 
clinical interviews. Verbalization is the key to problem solving and 
metacognition in Math 010. 
Sequence 
The ordering of problems in the text is perhaps the most 
difficult task facing the curriculum developer. Problems should be 
sequenced with the level of student cognitive readiness as the 
foremost consideration. Cognitive readiness is at best a fuzzy 
approximation of student abilities. No doubt each student possesses 
some concepts and not others. Only the most carefully prepared tests 
could serve as indicators of mastery. The best indicator is the 
clinical interview, as pioneered by Piaget. However, practical 
decisions must be made, and are usually based on the prior teaching 
experiences of the authors, supplemented with relevant research where 
applicable. As the literature on hierarchical learning indicates, 
problems which require subskills should come after the prerequisite 
skills are taught. This idea is extended to concepts as well. But, 
where the criterion for decision making in most previous hierarchical 
learning has been analytical and apriori, based on mostly formalistic 
models of the structure of the mathematics, the criteria for the 
constructivist-based hierarchy depends on the assessment of the 
number and power of cognitive structures already present in the 
student. 
For example, a common analytical approach to the sequencing of 
instruction for learning about fractions asserts that addition and 
subtraction should precede multiplication of fractions. The logic of 
the decision follows the logic for teaching operations with integers; 
since multiplication is simply iterated addition, it makes sense to 
teach addition before multiplication. However, the algorithm for 
addition of fractions requires students to find common denominators, 
a skill which assumes multiplication, and in this case multiplication 
of fractions. It has been shown (Mack, 1988) that elementary 
students can estimate the addition of fractions prior to being able 
to operate on the addition of fractions algorithm. Furthermore, the 
students learned the algorithms for both multiplication and addition 
of fractions with greater understanding, speed and recall after their 
experiences with estimation. 
Another consideration in sequencing problems is the number of 
composite skills and concepts needed to solve a problem. Multi-step 
problems which require several arithmetical operations are generally 
more difficult than single-step problems, and so should follow them. 
Also, ill-structured problems should follow well-structured problems 
[this topic is treated more extensively below]. 
In consideration of Bruner's suggestion for a spiral 
curriculum, material may be sequenced in anticipation of future 
topics. Although a particular topic may not be instructed for 
several weeks or months, opportunities may arise to introduce the 
topic earlier in the context of different subject matter. For 
example, many students in college remedial mathematics have had much 
experience with rectangular geometric shapes. In Math 010, some of 
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the basic geometrical concepts regarding rectangles and circles are 
taught later in the semester. However, the fact that these shapes 
are already familiar to the students allows their use in problems 
written to teach fractions, thus serving a double purpose: teaching 
fractions while reviewing certain ideas in plane geometry (perimeter, 
area, diagonal, and introduction of terminology). 
Representations 
Representations are not only observable manifestations of 
cognitive structures, they are themselves cognitive structures. The 
relationship between a concept and its representation is symbiotic in 
the sense that concept and representation alter and support each 
other. Reflection on a representation often instructs the concept 
which is being represented. Reflection on a concept may cause the 
thinker to alter the representation of the concept. In Piagetian 
terms, assimilation and accommodation occur between a cognitive 
structure which initiates action through understanding and the 
representation of the cognitive structure which is the observable 
manifestation of understanding. However, since understanding depends 
not on one or the other but on their relationship to each other and 
to any other relevant input, and since both are simultaneously 
examined through reflection, then both are related cognitive 
structures. 
For example, a fraction may be represented variously as a ratio 
of two numbers (numerator and denominator); a position on a 
numberline; a number on a numberline; a segment of length on a 
numberline; a portion of area, volume, weight, or time; a rate, etc. 
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Each of these representations instruct the concept of fractions in a 
qualitatively different way. The power of any one representation 
cannot be determined analytically. Rather, the power of the 
construction lies in the ability of the student to use the 
construction successfully in a variety of contexts and problems. 
This skill is completely idiosyncratic to the student, and no 
authoritative judgement for the preference of one representation over 
another is warranted if the representation bears fruit. 
On the other hand, the "richness" of conceptual understanding 
is often indicated by the scope of application of that understanding, 
and by the ability of the knower to communicate the relatedness of a 
concept to other concepts and contexts. Theoretically, the number of 
representations one has to draw upon understandinRly is proportional 
to one's ability to use, facilitate, and communicate that 
understanding. The conceptual web of inter-related cognitive 
structures is strengthened with more, and more powerful, 
representations. 
This is not to imply that students should know all 
representations of a concept. Not only is this impossible, it is not 
practical or desirable. A powerful representation is a powerful 
construction, and students can be quite adept at using constructions 
they understand well. As long as the construction is correct from 
the point of view of authority, the student should be encouraged to 
use it. 
To illustrate, one student from the Math 010 class demonstrated 
a simple but powerful pictorial representation in the solution of a 
problem which would require several simultaneous equations if it were 
solved algebraically. The problem, Fractions X [Appendix C], is 
stated below: 
In a certain population 2/3 of all men are married 
but only 3/5 of all women are married. What fraction 
of the population is single? 
Without using (or knowing) algebra, the student drew the following 
picture and reasoned thus: 
Assuming that the men are married to the women, I can 
match them up. Let's let the men and women walk into 
a room. So, when every three men come in, two of 
them are married, and when five women walk in, three 
of them are married: 
M: 
W: 
But there is 
need another 
enter groups 
needs a mate 
one woman who needs to be matched, so I 
group of men. In fact, I'm going to 
of men and women until everybody who 
has one. 
M: 
W: 
A 
V V 
That does it. Now everyone is matched. There are 19 
people in the room and 7 of them are single so the 
fraction of the population that is single is 7/19. 
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As the author of the problem, I can attest to having been 
unable to generate any useful, non-algebraic representation for this 
problem. Several of ray colleagues met with similar difficulties. 
The picture solution described above was only one of several 
pictorial solutions which my students were able to generate. Other 
representations used shaded rectangular areas to represent the 
relative sizes of groups of men and women. Of note is the 
observation that because the problem appeared to require addition of 
fractions, many people responded by searching for common 
denominators. But this problem requires common numerators! Students 
who are accustomed to picture drawing and diagramming demonstrate a 
heuristic use of a representation which avoids this algorithmic trap. 
In addition to helping students solve problems without using 
algorithms, diagrams can serve as useful pedagogical tools to enable 
the teacher to help students to understand both how to develop an 
algorithm and how to use it (Simon, 1986; 1985b). Furthermore, 
diagramming can aid students in understanding fundamental concepts in 
algebra. By linking abstract algebraic symbols to concrete 
representations (concrete in the Piagetian sense, iconic in Bruner's 
sense), concepts of equality, variable, and coefficient may be 
rendered intelligible to students solving algebra word problems 
(Simon and Stimpson, 1988). 
That diagramming may serve as a bridge between understanding 
sufficient to construct a concrete representation and understanding 
required to represent quantitative relationships symbolically 
suggests that representations should be taught hierarchically (Simon, 
1985a). For the bridge to be successful it must be anchored to a 
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firm knowledge foundation. The anchor is the semantic understanding 
of the problem which the student demonstrates with a concrete 
representation which he/she describes and justifies. Features of the 
picture, and operations on features of the picture, are connected to 
symbols and operations in algebraic equations or arithmetic 
algorithms. Consequently the sequencing of representations should be 
from concrete to symbolic. Relating cognitive structures in this 
manner builds a stronger conceptual web, linking concepts to 
procedures, thereby contributing to cognitive development. 
Well-Structured and Ill-Structured Problems 
Simon (1973) distinguished between two different types of 
problems, the well-structured problem and the ill-structured problem. 
The well-structured problem is typical of most of the problems which 
students encounter in school, or a reader would find in a book of 
puzzles. The ill-structured problem is apparent in most of the 
problems faced in our daily lives, such as developing organizational 
schemes or complex decision-making as needed for financial planning. 
Well-structured problems exhibit the following characteristics: 
1) All pertinent information is included in the problem statement. 
Use of extraneous information is avoided. 2) The operators for 
finding a correct solution are clear. Either the problem occurs 
within a context which makes the rules clear; e.g., the problem 
follows a description of a method of solution for similar problems, 
or is accompanied with pictures and diagrams which indicate necessary 
operations, or the problem may actually state the necessary 
operations (although not necessarily their order of application) 
123 
needed. 3) There exist definite criteria for knowing when the 
problem is solved. In mathematics problems, the "checking" process, 
placing solutions into variables in an equation, is just one example. 
Usually the solution is unique. 
In contrast, ill-structured problems lack the characteristics 
which comprise the well-structured problem: 1) The problem 
statement may not contain enough information to solve the problem. 
Assumptions may be needed to proceed with a solution. Alternatively, 
the problem may contain too much information. Extraneous information 
may be included, although there may be no indication within the text 
of the problem which information is extraneous and which is 
necessary. Some problem statements may actually include 
contradictory information, leaving the decision as to which 
information to accept up to the problem solver. 2) There may be no 
specified rules for the solution of an ill-structured problem. Each 
step in the solution may be problematic. 3) The criteria for 
judging when a problem is solved are also ill-defined. The problem 
solver may have devised a satisfactory solution to a problem and yet 
be unaware that he/she has done so- Closure may be difficult or 
impossible to attain. 
Simon (1973) maintains that both well-structured and ill- 
structured problems require the same problem-solving processes, but 
that ill-structured problems demand a wider repertoire of processes. 
From an information-processing perspective, ill-structured problems 
require the same type of processing as well-structured problems, only 
more of it. A problem-solver may reinterpret the problem many times, 
Each shift in perspective demands that new 
searching for a solution. 
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solution paths be devised and explored. The problem-solver may need 
to solve several problems with the ill-structured problem, whereas 
with the well-structured problem they solve only one problem. 
Constructivists could agree with Simon's typography of problem 
structure, but would likely disagree with his analysis of the 
internal thought processes used in each problem solution. From the 
constructivist perspective, there is not simply more processing 
occuring with ill—structured problems. The constant monitoring of 
the solution process forces the problem-solver to compare and 
contrast different cognitive structures which may compete with one 
another for the commitment which comes with belief. The assimilation 
and accommodation which occur in the process is qualitatively 
different from the type of thinking needed to solve well-structured 
problems. An awareness that a problem may not be well-structured can 
in itself have a disequilibrating effect on students who are 
accustomed to solving only well-structured problems. 
A constructivist program for college remedial mathematics can 
benefit from both types of problems. Well-structured problems serve 
to build prerequisite skills. Generally, the language of the problem 
is simple, direct and unambiguous. Procedures are matched to 
concepts without interfering considerations about contradictory, 
excessive, or insufficient information. The increased likelihood of 
success supports a more positive self-image than most remedial 
mathematics students generally reflect. The well-structured problem 
can be used to introduce a concept, and when introducing a concept it 
is prudent to minimize the noise which can result from doubt, fear, 
and confusion. 
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However, the ill-structured problem can test conceptual 
understanding and metacognitive skills as well as many of the higher 
order thinking skills referred to earlier in this thesis. A student 
must read selectively from the problem. If information is needed, 
then the student must either ask for it or assume it. Either choice 
requires thought which is reflective of knowledge given and knowledge 
previously acquired. The presence of conflicting information must be 
discovered by the student, and dealt with in a manner which affords 
opportunity for solution. An ill—structured problem can evoke ideas 
in the student which conflict with one another. The disequilibration 
which can occur tests the power of a student's cognitive structures 
as few well-structured problems do. 
Misconceptions 
One of the most important concerns for the constructivist 
educator is the identification and discussion of misconceptions which 
their students demonstrate. Misconceptions are errors, but they are 
not merely errors in the sense that an error can be easily corrected 
once discovered. A misconception is a person's conceptualization of 
a problem or phenomenon that generally is reasonable to him or 
herself but at variance with the conceptualization of an "expert" in 
the field from which the problem came. 
The difference between a misconception and a "trivial" error is 
in the presence or absence of a cognitive structure. Not all 
cognitive structures contain all of the characteristics of Confrey s 
"powerful constructions". When a cognitive structure exhibits some 
of these characteristics and not others, such as agreement with 
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authority, the structure may be extremely difficult to alter. 
According to Confrey, "A misconception may possess some subset of the 
qualities of a powerful construction; that is, there may be present 
enough of these qualities to provide stability to the construct; but 
not enough to insure its power as a disciplinary construct. Because 
the student applies only a single criterion to his/her assessment, 
its correctness, the absence of other critical qualities goes 
unnoticed and the misconception is left robust and resistant" 
(Confrey, 1985, p. 9). Confrey's definition may be understated in 
that students often describe several criteria for a misconception, 
only one of them being that the misconception "works"; it has 
utility, at least in some limited sphere of application. 
Some of the earliest documented examples of alternative 
conceptions which exhibit several features of powerful constructions 
come from research in physics education. The extensive literature on 
misconceptions in physics [Dykstra and Schroeder, 1987, provide an 
extensive bibliography] indicates that students have alternate 
conceptions in many topics, some of which transfer to the field of 
mathematics. Among these are: distinguishing between length, area 
and volume; between mass, volume and density; and between impulse, 
work, force, momentum, energy, velocity, and acceleration. 
One very resilient misconception in dynamics (Lawson, et al., 
1980) is that a force is necessary for an object to maintain a 
constant velocity. This conception first surfaced in the writings of 
Aristotle. It may be a generalization from experience with objects 
under the influence of gravity and frictional forces. Although this 
conception conflicts with Newton's First Law, it is nevertheless 
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useful in most applications. It is consistent with other conceptions 
and misconceptions, e.g. misconceptions about acceleration (McDermott 
and Trowbridge, 1980), and it is widely held. This particular 
misconception has several qualities of a powerful construction: 
utility, consistency, and consensus. It is not surprising that many 
misconceptions in elementary mechanics remain with students even 
after instruction (Minstrell, 1984; Clement, 1982; McCloskey, et al., 
1980). 
Misconceptions also arise in mathematics; and, relevant to this 
thesis, in elementary college algebra. A common, and extensively 
researched misconception in algebra (Rosnick and Clement, 1980; 
Clement, Lochhead, and Monk, 1981; Clement, 1982; Rosnick, 1981; 
Soloway, Lochhead, and Clement, 1982), is the appearance of the 
"reversal error" which arises in algebra translation tasks. The 
error is illustrated with the solution to the following problem 
(Rosnick and Clement, 1980): 
Write an equation using the variables S and P to 
represent the following statement: There are six 
times as many students as professors at this 
university. Use S for the number of students and P 
for the number of professors. 
The researchers report that 37% of college engineering 
students, who already had completed one semester of calculus, 
answered incorrectly. Two-thirds of this group chose the answer 6S = 
P, where the variables are reversed from the correct equation, 6P = 
S. Variations on the problem statement which use pictures instead of 
words, changing the labels for the variables, changing the context of 
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the problem, and altering the ratio, had no positive effect on the 
success rate. 
However, in clinical interviews students demonstrate an 
understanding of the semantic structure of the problem. They know 
that there are more students than professors at the university. When 
asked to write a computer program which outputs one quantity when 
inputing the other, students succeed to a far greater extent, almost 
eliminating the reversal error which was so prevalent in their 
algebraic symbolization. 
In their analysis of the reversal misconception, Lochhead and 
Mestre recommend that instruction deliberately attempt to evoke the 
misconception in students and then teach to it through carefully 
constructed dialogue. Their suggested method is as follows: 
We now illustrate how to elicit conflict for the 6S - P 
case. Recall that we previously guided the classroom 
discussion so that the students agreed that there were 
more students than professors and further that when P = 
100, then S * 600; we now ask those students who wrote 6S 
■ P to check their equation by substituting S = 600 into 
6S * P appropriately and obtain P = 3600, and some will 
ignore the equation and answer the question as in step 
two, namely, state that if there are 600 students, there 
are 100 professors. In the former instance, it is easy 
to elicit conflict by pointing out the contradiction in 
their statements, namely that earlier (in step one) they 
stated that there were more students than professors and 
that (in step two) when S = 600, P ■ 100, so how can 
their equation say that there are more professors than 
students? In the latter instance, students are 
demonstrating that they are not substituting 
appropriately into the equation they wrote but rather 
cueing on the problem statement and their answers in 
steps one and two. In this event, we actually substitute 
S = 600 into 6S = P and show that P results in 3600, and 
again we have succeeded in eliciting conflict. 
(1988, p. 133) 
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According to the authors, the above dialogue serves to 
disequilibrate certain misconceptions regarding the meaning of 
variables, labels, equality, and the use of coefficients. However, 
while the dialogue may prove beneficial for some students, it may 
actually serve to reinforce the misconception in other students. 
A similar dialogue was attempted with a student in Math 010, 
who exhibited a reversed equation for a related problem, also 
designed to disequilibrate the student by drawing out the 
misconception. When asked to write an equation which relates the 
number of feet to the number of yards in any measure of length, the 
student, like most students in the class, responded with the reversed 
equation, 3F ■ Y. When asked if the equation could be used to 
calculate the number of feet given some number of yards, the student 
responded confidently that she was certain the equation would work. 
Suggesting that she calculate the number of feet in ten yards, she 
generated the following solution: 
My equation 3F - Y really means 3F * 1Y, because it's 
three feet for every one yard, but you don't have to 
write the one in algebra. It's implied, I guess. So 3F 
- Y if there is only one yard, but e have 10 yards, so I 
have to multiply the Y by 10 [writes: 3F * 1Y(10)] But 
I know that in algebra, what you do to one side of the 
equation, you have to do to the other side, otherwise 
they won't be equal. So I have to multiply the 3F by 10 
[writes: (10)3F - 1Y(10)]. So doing the multiplication, 
I get that 30 feet equals 10 yards [writes: 30F « 10Y]. 
That's right. The equation works. 
The student obviously understands the conversion of units 
concept for length, as she demonstrates in her check of her answer. 
The fact that she treats the letters as labels rather than variables, 
that equality is some measure of correspondence rather than numerical 
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equivalence, and that the coefficients are simultaneously modifiers 
as well as multipliers, indicates that the student has some very 
profound misconceptions. The tutorial which Lochhead and Mestre 
suggest would ameliorate the difficulties has instead only served to 
consolidate the misconception. Not only has the student's 
misconception proved useful, but in the metacognitive process of 
thinking aloud, certain cognitive structures were brought into 
agreement with each other. In this case, the cognitive structures 
for balancing equations support the cognitive structures which 
characterize the reversal misconception. This example only 
illustrates the resiliency of certain misconceptions, which makes 
their remediation extremely problematic. 
The above description in no way disproves the constructivist 
tenet that misconceptions must be uncovered, and dealt with 
effectively. The question arises, must the student unlearn the 
0 
mistaken notion before learning the correct one? Gagne thinks not: 
My interpretation of previous psychological research on 
"unlearning" is that it is a matter of extinction. This 
means that teachers would best ignore the incorrect 
performances and set about as directly as possible 
teaching the rules for correct ones. An unpreferable 
alternative is to make students fully aware of the nature 
of their incorrect rules before going on to teach the 
correct ones. It seems to me this is very likely a waste 
of time. (1983, p. 15) 
For Gagne, class-time would be better spent on repeated drill with 
"correct" methods. However, years of such drill and practice did not 
"extinguish" the reversal errors in algebra translation tasks. Nor 
did direct instruction in Newtonian physics eliminate basic 
misconceptions in dynamics. Expertise in computation and rote 
algorithmic manipulation is no guarantee of understanding in either 
mathematics or science. From a Piagetian perspective, the only way 
for individuals to alter a conceptual scheme is to do it for 
themselves. Piaget's constructivist theory of schema is summarized 
concisely by Von Glasersfeld: "Knowledge is never acquired 
passively, because novelty cannot be handled except through 
assimilation to a cognitive structure the experiencing subject 
already has. Indeed, the subject does not perceive an experience as 
novel until it generates a perturbation relative to some expected 
result. Only at that point the experience may lead to an 
accommodation and thus to a novel conceptual structure that re¬ 
establishes a relative equilibrium" (Von Glasersfeld, 1988, p. 19). 
The difficulty which teachers may experience when attempting to 
remediate certain misconceptions should not discourage them from 
trying. The only way for their students to develop understanding is 
if they can understand their own ideas first. Reflection on their 
own ideas can be initiated by introducing a "perturbation" which will 
either disequilibrate their idea so that they modify it, or 
alternatively, the perturbation may contribute additional 
assimilatory experience which will strengthen their conception, 
thereby making a more powerful construction. To this end, the 
deliberate inclusion of misconceptions can and should be used in a 
constructivist curriculum. 
As a final note on the importance of misconceptions for 
instruction, it has been reported that student misconceptions can 
become a source of mathematics anxiety (Clement, Narode, and Rosnick, 
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1981). The most distinguishing feature of a misconception, besides 
being mistaken, is that it can and often is entirely reasonable to 
the student who possesses it. While the student may relinquish 
ownership publicly for the sake of compliance, privately the student 
continues to maintain his or her own understanding. A student once 
remarked that she "accepted" what I had said in class, but that she 
didn't "believe" it. According to Confrey "To a constructivist, 
knowledge without belief is contradictory" (Confrey, 1985, p. 8). 
For students, acceptance is not learning, nor does acceptance remove 
the contradiction that they experience when they feel that they 
understand something which they are told they do not understand. If 
independent thinking is not only not encouraged, but admonished, then 
students will soon learn that they ought not to think. When memory 
fails, when authority is unavailable, when critical thinking is 
untrained and unreliable, fear and anxiety are likely consequences. 
Writing 
Writing presents an opportunity for a unique form of 
representation. Not only are cognitive structures represented with 
written symbols; the act of writing is itself a cognitive activity 
which requires problem-solving and metacognition (Fulwiler, 1982; 
Flower and Hayes, 1980; Bereiter, 1980). Perkins (1985) makes an 
argument for writing as presenting "an occasion for thinking . The 
view of writing as a linear progression of solving one problem after 
another is supplanted with the view that the process of writing 
requires parallel processing of many problems and considerations 
which are constantly mediated by reflection. Some of the tasks 
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involved are: identification of a central problem or theme, 
interpretation of the problem in light of previous knowledge, 
planning activities, generating activities, and organizing 
activities. The coordination of these activities requires constant 
looking back and re-coordination. The process of writing is dynamic. 
Even developmental schemes for acquiring proficiency in writing are 
subject to re-evaluation and reversal (Bereiter, 1980). 
Writing serves several purposes in the mathematics classroom 
(Nahrgang and Petersen, 1986; Johnson, 1983). Some of the uses of 
writing in mathematics are to: develop abilities to classify, define 
terms, summarize, decompose complex patterns, make inferences, 
generate hypotheses, and generate or identify mathematical 
procedures. Writing can serve to alter student beliefs about the 
nature of mathematics and about themselves as mathematicians (Bard 
College Institute for Writing and Thinking, 1985). 
Writing has been incorporated into programs which attempt to 
strengthen mathematical thinking skills in students with little 
confidence or expertise in mathematics (Mason, et al. 1982). By 
asking students to record their ideas on a problem as they occur, 
together with their goals and their feelings about what they are 
doing, students can begin to examine their own experiences and their 
development. Mason, Burton and Stacey (1982) developed a framework 
intended to help the student to develop a method of writing to think 
mathematically, and writing to proceed when stuck or confused. The 
framework, called RUBRIC, as in the medieval custom of writing 
important terms in red in the margins of books, is comprised of a 
methodology around four key words: STUCK!, AHA!, CHECK, and REFLECT. 
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Specific guidelines for the use of these words and the methods of 
writing based on them is provided by the authors: 
STUCK! 
Whenever you realize that you are stuck, write down 
STUCK! This will help you to proceed, by encouraging you 
to write down why you are stuck. For example: 
I do not understand... 
I do not know what to do about... 
I cannot see how to... 
I cannot see why... 
AHA! 
Whenever an idea comes to you or you think you see 
something, write it down. That way you will know later 
what the idea was. Very often people have a good idea, 
but lose it subsequently and cannot recall it. In any 
case, it feels good to write down AHA! Follow it with 
Try... 
Maybe... 
But why... 
CHECK 
Check any calculations or reasoning immediately. 
Check any insight on some examples (specializing). 
Check that your resolution does in fact resolve the 
original question. 
REFLECT 
When you have done all that you can or wish to, take time 
to reflect on what happened. Even if you do not feel 
that you got very far, it helps to write up what you have 
done so that you can return to it freshly and efficiently 
at some later date. It is also the case that the act of 
summarizing often releases the blockage. There are 
several things worth noting particularly: 
Write down the key ideas. 
Write down the key moments that stand out in your 
memory. 
Consider positively what you can learn from this 
experience. 
(Mason, et al. 1982, p. 18) 
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Interestingly, the authors of RUBRIC use the framework to describe 
mathematical problem solving for the reader. By modeling the 
framework with their own problem solving, the authors exhibit many of 
the frustrations and pitfalls which they anticipate their students 
may encounter when solving the same problem. This is a deliberate 
attempt by the authors to dispel the myth that mathematicians don't 
have to struggle with problems as other people do. It is meant to 
encourage students to develop their own abilities and to be more 
confident of themselves as problem solvers. 
A similar process, termed the "thought process protocol", is a 
clarification of thinking processes by "thinking aloud on paper" 
(Heiman, et al., 1987). Fashioned after the interview protocols in 
cognitive science research (Konold and Well, 1981), thought process 
protocols are the students' record of their thoughts as they occur 
while working on a problem. Some of the benefits of thought process 
protocols are: 
* Students begin to distinguish between what they know 
and what they need to learn. 
* Students start to recognize the steps in problem 
solving that they often skip over. 
* Students begin to value the importance of working 
through problems systematically. 
(Heiman, et al., 1987, p. 16) 
The goals of a constructivist mathematics program are better 
realized when students reflect on their own thoughts. The thought- 
process protocol is an ideal method for getting students to examine 
their thoughts and to reflect on them. Students may be encouraged to 
write their thoughts as they occur if they are not graded on style, 
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grammar, neatness, or (initially) correctness. No finished or 
revised copy is warranted or even desired. A thought-process 
protocol should contain all of the errors, wrong turns, and dead ends 
which usually accompany any spontaneous problem solving. 
Guidelines to the student, as to what the thought-process 
protocol is intended to do, and how it should be done, are included 
in Appendix B. Also included is a sample thought-process protocol on 
a problem from the Math 010 Workbook (Narode, et al. , 1985). 
Although the grammar and language have been corrected, an attempt was 
made to reproduce a thought process as accurately as possible. The 
example shown is an actual thought-process protocol produced by a 
student in the course. In the Math 010 course, a few problems from 
each topic area are accompanied with thought-process protocols. A 
student looking for an answer to a problem must read an entire 
protocol (often several pages) to see how someone else solves a 
problem. All thought-process protocols are concluded with the 
following warning: 
Note: This solution demonstrates one way to solve this 
problem. There are many other ways to also arrive at the 
correct answer. The specific operations used in the 
solution may not apply directly to other problems in this 
section. This problem solution is intended to be a model 
thought process protocol. It is not intended to be 
memorized for future quizzes, tests, etc. Each problem 
is unique and must be approached as such. 
Analysis of a Chapter of Math 010 Text: Fractions 
The Math 010 curriculum was written jointly by myself and Dr 
Deborah Schifter, currently with Mt. Holyoke College, and includes 
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supplemental material on problem solving by Dr. Jack Lochhead, of the 
University of Massachusetts. 
Schifter and Narode worked collaboratively in work sessions 
lasting two to five hours, three times a week for approximately nine 
months. During that time we conferred on the topics and concepts to 
be taught and on the methods we thought best to teach them. The 
separate features of the constructivist text listed above were 
explicitly addressed in our deliberations. Our goal was to write 
problems which not developed specific conceptual and heuristic 
objectives for students, and also to create problems which would 
engage their curiosity and challenge their abilities to reason and 
communicate. In our deliberations, we strove to write problems which 
would help students to develop an awareness that, (1) mathematics is 
necessary for understanding and coping with their world, and (2) they 
can succeed in using mathematics. 
The higher-order thinking skills discussed previously were 
generally only implicitly treated in the text, i.e., we knew when a 
particular problem would present difficulties to the student and why, 
and we discussed the benefits and hazards of including the problem in 
the text. However, we did not "keep score" as to the number or name 
of the higher-order skills addressed by the problems. Rather, we 
discussed in broad terms, and based on our teaching experiences, 
which problems were desirable for teaching critical thinking. 
Our deliberations about the conceptual and topical nature of 
our task were much more explicit. We often listed concepts to be 
taught and debated the appropriate order of their instruction. We 
discussed language, representations, misconceptions, structure (both 
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mathematical structure and problem structure), and we deliberately 
attempted to integrate problems which could be used to promote 
writing assignments. The following analysis of the chapter on 
fractions [Appendix C] is an attempt to recreate some of the 
discussion which ensued in the writing of that chapter. On 
reflection, it seems that this analysis would also prove useful to 
instructors using the text. In fact, much of the following analysis 
was initiated in weekly meetings, which I chaired, with instructors 
teaching Math 010, in preparation for their classes. 
Although problem statements will be reproduced within the text 
of the following analysis of the chapter on fractions, the 
introduction to the chapter and problem solutions will be omitted for 
reasons of space. However, the entire chapter is reproduced as it 
appears in the Workbook [Appendix C]. 
Introducing the Students to the Idea of Fractions 
Topic II, of the Workbook, entitled "Numbers And Their Uses," 
follows a brief chapter on "Problem Solving," and is the first 
treatment of arithmetic topics in the Math 010 course. The 
introduction to numbers is intended to afford the student an 
opportunity to "look ahead" at the topics of the course. Although 
Bruner's notion of a "spiral curriculum" is not entirely appropriate 
for a one-semester remedial course, the idea of exposing students to 
a variety of topics which they will subsequently learn at greater 
levels of conceptual sophistication is considered worthwhile. Not 
only are the topics declared, but the short definitions allow for the 
introduction of specific language and terms such as: integer, 
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fractions, decimals, percents, powers, hundredths, positive, 
negative, whole numbers, repeating decimal, nuraberline, and 
exponents. The introduction also serves to acquaint students with 
several representations: numberlines, fraction notations, negative 
numbers, the long-division algorithm, diagrams, and verbal 
descriptions of realistic situations such as dividing a cake. The 
introduction is not intended to teach either the concepts 
described or the meaning of the representations used to describe 
them. Rather, the introduction informs the student about what is 
going to be studied. It also refreshes knowledge of some terminology 
and representations which most, if not all, college students have at 
least seen before. 
Problems for Developing Conceptual Understanding of Fractions 
To begin, the student should be made aware of the fundamental 
idea of a fraction which he/she already possesses: that a fraction 
is a part of a whole. The first problem treats the idea by 
introducing a concrete representation in the context of a familiar 
situation. It asks the student to draw a picture of several pizzas 
which are supposedly eaten by different guests at a fictitious pizza 
party. The problem is reproduced below: 
FRACTIONS I 
Use pictorial representations to solve the following 
problems: 
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Tom, Sue and John went to a pizza party where 
pizzas were being delivered throughout the evening. (The 
pizzas were large, and each was sliced into twelve equal 
pieces.) 
a. At this party, Tom ate two slices of the first 
pizza, one slice from the second and three slices from 
the third. What fraction of a whole pizza did Tom eat 
that evening? 
Besides drawing a picture of the above problem situation, 
question 'a' introduces the notion of slicing a whole into equal 
pieces. The equal parts from different wholes are summed to a part 
of a whole which can then be described with different fraction names, 
(e.g. six-twelfths or one-half). This problem also illustrates one 
application of the common denominator and sum of numerators idea. 
The number of equal parts in one whole, and representationally their 
size, determines the denominator, while the number of slices eaten, 
independent from which pizza, determines the numerator. All 
assumptions about equality must be articulated by the students in 
response to questions posed in discussion by their teacher 
particularly the assumption that the wholes are themselves of equal 
size, weight, flavor, or any other criteria that the students wish to 
consider. 
b. That evening, Sue ate five pieces from the 
first pizza, six from the second, and two slices later 
on. What fraction of a whole pizza did Sue eat that 
evening? 
Extending the concept of a fraction being a part of a whole, 
the idea of a fraction being a part of a whole which is greater than 
the whole is introduced in 'b'. It is appropriate here for the 
instructor to ask students if they know the name of fractions whose 
numerators are larger than their denominators and if they know 
another name for such fractions. The terms "improper fraction" and 
"mixed number" should be discussed in brief. 
c. At one point in the evening, John shared a 
pizza equally with two other people. He then shared a 
second pizza equally with three other people. Later, he 
ate another slice. What fraction of a whole pizza did he 
eat that evening? 
By dividing whole pizzas among different people, problem 'c' 
requires students to discover equivalent fractions, i.e. that 1/3 of 
a pizza is the same size as 4/12 of a pizza and that 1/4 m 3/12. The 
further realization, that in order to add the various portions some 
common unit must be identified, motivates the need for developing the 
concept of common denominator. Both the term and connecting the 
concept to the diagram should accompany a brief discussion as to how 
one could determine a common denominator in this instance. 
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d. Five pizzas were totally eaten that evening, 
and each person ate at least one slice. What is the 
maximum number of people that could have attended the 
party, including all of the people in the three previous 
parts of this problem? 
Because some students will finish the first three parts of this 
problem much more quickly and easily than others, •d' is intended 
both to challenge the quick student and to force the student to 
reflect on previous work. This is an ill-structured problem in that 
it can generate more than one answer. Depending on how people were 
assigned to eating pizza from the previous parts of this problem, 
several answers are possible. A comparison of answers among students 
should generate considerable controversy. Moreover, students will 
begin to understand that they will be expected to answer ill- 
structured problems, and that such problems do not always lead to one 
"right" answer, even from their teacher. 
FRACTIONS II 
Bob took a trip in which he traveled by car, foot and 
bicycle. He rode in a car for two hours at an average 
speed of 48 miles per hour. He then walked 12 miles in 
three hours and bicycled the remainder of the 144 mile 
trip at an average speed of 12 miles per hour. 
Use line diagrams to answer the following questions. 
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*• What fracti°" of the time of the entire trip 
did he spend: 
a. in the car? 
b. on the bicycle? 
c. walking? 
2. What fraction of the distance of the entire 
trip did he travel: 
a. by car? 
b. by bicycle? 
c. by foot? 
Although Fractions II is placed in a familiar context and with 
a familiar conceptual construct (average speed), the juxtaposition of 
questions about time and distance forces students to build not just 
one picture of the trip but two related pictures. 
The use of the line diagram is yet another representation of 
fractions. A fraction can be viewed both as a line segment and as a 
point on a line. Furthermore, the same line segment can be used to 
represent two different fractions. The fraction of the time spent as 
illustrated with a particular line segment is different from the 
fraction of total distance traveled though they both may be 
represented with the same segment. The critical awareness is the 
need for identifying the whole when referring to any fraction. In 
this manner, the convention of the number line may be introduced in a 
context different than that first presented in the introduction to 
the chapter. The novelty of the different uses of a new 
representation and the solution of a multistep problem incorporates 
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manY problem solving skills and fractions concepts which make this 
problem more difficult than the first. 
The following problem uses fractions for the conversion of 
liquid and volume measurements between U.S. and metric units. It 
also introduces students to the concept that liquids occupy volume, 
and that volume is a three-dimensional construct. The problem 
introduces new terminology, such as "milli" and "centi", as well as 
linking this terminology to the decimal system and to two-dimensional 
representations of three-dimensional geometric ideas. Again, 
concepts of common denominators and equivalent fractions are applied 
and reinforced in a new context - the context of units conversion. 
It should be noted that the conversions were written without 
use of letter symbols and equal signs to avoid the common 
misconception that letters may be used interchangeably as labels and 
as variables. In this instance, the use of language is as important 
for what it does not state as for what it does state. 
FRACTIONS III 
U.S. liquid-volume measurements: 
1 gallon contains 4 quarts 
1 quart contains 2 pints 
1 pint contains 2 cups 
1 cup contains 8 fluid ounces 
Metric liquid-volume measurements: 
I liter contains 1000 cubic centimeters 
1 liter contains 100 centiliters 
1 centiliter contains 10 milliliters 
Use the above information to answer the following 
questions: 
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1. One ounce is what fraction of: 
a. a gallon? 
b. a quart? 
c. a pint? 
2. One cup is what part of: 
a. a gallon? 
b. a quart? 
3. One pint is what fraction of a gallon? 
4. One milliliter is what part of: 
a. a centiliter? 
b. a liter? 
c. a cubic centimeter? 
5. Draw a picture of a cubic centimeter. 
After instruction on the various definitions of fractions which 
are evoked in Fractions problems I, II, and III, the text introduces 
operations with fractions, specifically and in the order of 
multiplying, adding and subtracting, and finally dividing fractions. 
Fractions IV, 1, is an unusual and rather silly problem 
situation whose comic character generally lends levity to the 
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classroom. It is also a problem which requires several important 
problem solving and critical thinking skills. Parts 'a' through •d' 
are most easily solved by the students with the use of a box diagram. 
In this way multiplication of fractions is literally viewed as the 
dividing up of fractions much as multiplying wholes by fractions 
operationally requires the dividing of wholes into parts. Students, 
by this time, have developed some facility with diagramming and with 
recognizing which part and which whole they are operating on. All of 
the fractions may be calculated without reference to any specific 
dollar amount with the exception of part 'e'. The problem is 
reproduced in its entirety: 
FRACTIONS IV 
1. A man left two-thirds of his total fortune to his cat 
and asked that one-fourth of what the cat received should 
be used to teach it to talk. 
a. What fraction of the total fortune was used for 
teaching the cat to talk? 
b. After two-thirds of the fortune went to the 
cat, what fraction remained? 
c. The man left one-half of the remainder to his 
wife. What fraction of the total fortune did the wife 
receive? 
d. The wife spent one-fifth of what she received 
on a new Italian sports car. What fraction of the total 
fortune was spent on the car? 
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s. Using the information in the problem and your 
own knowledge of the world, estimate the cost of the 
cat's speech lessons. 
(Hint: First estimate the cost of an Italian 
sports car.) 
For those students able to work quickly through parts 'a' 
through 'd', part 'e' should pose a challenge. Even if the student 
had knowledge enough of the world to be able to estimate the cost of 
speech lessons for a cat, linking this to previous information in the 
problem is far from trivial. The intention of this problem, as 
indicated in the hint, is to provoke the student to estimate the cost 
of one familiar, or at least semi-familiar, item like the sports car, 
and then to use the estimate within the context of the problem 
statement to answer the question. To succeed within the bounds of 
the problem requires the student to construct the value of the whole 
from an estimate of one of the parts, and then to calculate the 
number of dollars needed for the cat's speech lessons. The final 
step in the problem generally involves the multiplication of 
fractions, but students solve the problem in a number of ways, 
including reference to their diagram. 
A problem which requires the division of fractions is 
illustrated in Fractions IV, 2. Although a pictorial representation 
is not explicitly requested, it helps both the student and the 
teacher enormously with this problem, and students should be 
encouraged to develop one. 
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FRACTIONS IV (continued) 
2. The Math 010 office purchases bottled drinking water. 
Mrs. Gazebo's Mountain Spring Water comes in containers 
that hold 6-3/4 liters. Two-thirds of the office 
container was drained last week to put out a fire in 
Ron's waste basket. 
a. How many liters of water are left in the 
bottle? 
b. How many 3/8 liter glasses can be filled with 
the water that remains in the jar? 
Part 'a' of this problem requires at least two steps for its 
solution. First the student must find the fraction of the tank which 
remains, then the number of liters must be calculated. The 
calculation of the number of liters remaining is accomplished through 
the multiplication of fractions. The novelty here is that one of the 
fractions is presented as a mixed number. While some students in 
fact find a solution using the mixed number, most students convert 
the number into an improper fraction and then use the algorithmic 
rule for multiplication of fractions. Answers are presented in both 
mixed number and improper fraction forms. 
Part 'b' is quite different from the previous questions asked 
in Fractions IV in that it is the first question which requires the 
operation of division rather than multiplication. Most students do 
not recognize this difference and proceed by multiplying two 
fractions of their choosing nevertheless. They usually need to be 
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questioned about the reasonableness of their answer, or they need to 
attempt to represent the situation in a picture to discover their 
error. While many students will correctly calculate the answer from 
carefully shading 3/8 liter representations in their picture, most 
can connect their operations on the diagram to the operation of 
division, but few can connect either of these operations with the 
algorithm for the division of fractions. 
The following problem involves a multi-step solution which 
requires using whole numbers and fractions with all of the arithmetic 
operations discussed previously. The problem is similar to a problem 
from the Problem Solving chapter of the Workbook [Appendix B], and 
can be solved similarly, with the use of diagrams. The context of 
this problem is intended to illustrate the importance of simple 
arithmetic in serious, realistic situations. 
FRACTIONS V 
A researcher at a medical school would like to test a 
hypothesis that a certain drug may be administered in 
smaller doses than originally prescribed. He has a vial 
which contains 235 doses, and each dose is two and one- 
half milliliters. How many new-size doses will he have 
if he reduces the dose to three-fifths of the original 
dose? 
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Another applied fractions problem concerns domestic budgets: 
FRACTIONS VI 
Use pictorial representations to solve the following 
problems: 
Typical expenses from my monthly income are: 
1/3 rent 
1/4 food 
1/6 phone and utilities 
a. How much of my monthly income does this account 
for? 
b. Last month, I spent as much money on 
entertainment as I did on rent. Assuming that my other 
expenses were the same as usual, how much of my monthly 
income did I withdraw from my savings account? 
c. What fraction of the savings account was 
withdrawn? 
In some respects all of the parts of this problem are ill- 
structured. Part 'a' is a straight-forward addition of fractions 
problem so long as the student interprets the phrase "how much" as 
meaning "what fraction". The reason for leaving the language of the 
problem statement vague is to provoke in the students a need to 
interpret language within the greater context of the problem 
situation and information given. 
Problem section 'b* uses the same device, and has the added 
feature of ill-structured problems that an assumption must be made by 
the student for the problem to be solved. The improper fractional 
solution must be interpreted to mean that more than one monthly 
income was spent in one month. This is possible only if one assumes 
that there is more money in the savings account than one monthly 
income. 
The most ill-structured problem in this set of problems is the 
question in section 'c1. The answer to problem section 'c' is that 
the fraction of the savings account which was withdrawn to satisfy 
the answer in 'b' cannot be determined. Knowing the fraction of the 
monthly income which must be withdrawn yields no information about 
the fraction of the savings account withdrawn unless the dollar 
amounts of monthly income and of the savings account are known. The 
problem is intended to evoke in the students just this realization. 
Fractions VII, 1, is an example of a multistep applied problem 
whose language is complicated, but whose solution is easily 
represented in a picture. 
FRACTIONS VII 
1. A birthday cake is to be shared. The children, who 
are allotted half a piece each, consume twice as much 
cake as the adults, who are allotted two pieces for each 
man and one piece for each woman. 3/45 of the adults are 
male, and he is cutting the cake. 
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How many children are at the party? 
Note: Everybody eats their share of the cake, and none 
remains. 
The second sentence of this problem is the longest sentence to 
this point in the Workbook. It must be analyzed in pieces, and then 
reorganized in such a fashion as to discern the relationship between 
the pieces as well as the differences between various clauses. For 
instance, many students confuse the part eaten by all the children 
and the part eaten by each child. There is another difficulty with 
language inherent in the sentence ”3/45 of the adults are male, and 
he is cutting the cake.” Students assume that the fraction '3/45' 
implies that there are 45 adults, three of whom are male. The phrase 
"and he is cutting the cake", serves to disequilibrate the students, 
and usually succeeds in provoking them to reduce the fraction to 
1/15. It is a "trick" which most students moan about, much as they 
would about a pun - the vocal response may be interpreted as a sign 
that the pun or "trick" is understood. Most often, students see the 
value of interpreting fractions within the greater context of the 
problem. The use of the ill-structured problem is deliberately 
intended to cause the students to become more reflective of their 
problem solving generally. 
A well-structured problem can also expose misconceptions and 
contusions, which while appearing to be related to the language used 
In the problems, may be traced to deeper misconceptions about the 
topic of instruction. The translation difficulties encountered with 
the Students and Professors Problem is an example of such a well 
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structured problem with language related misconceptions. The 
following problem illustrates a similarly well-structured problem 
which exposes deep-seated misconceptions about fractions through the 
use of a problematic phrase: 
FRACTIONS VII 
2. Four people share a pizza in the following way: Tom 
got a third and Mary got a third of the remainder while 
Dick and Harry shared equally what Tom and Mary did not 
get. 
What fraction of the whole pizza did Harry receive? 
The above problem presents a difficulty to students in their 
interpretation of the phrase "a third of the remainder". Many 
students interpret the problem to state that both Tom and Mary each 
received 1/3 of the whole. That Mary received only 1/3 of 2/3 (the 
part remaining), often goes unnoticed. Some students, when reading 
the problem aloud, often fail to read the words "of the remainder", 
literally reading past them to the next word in the sentence. 
However, even when asked to reread with special attention on this 
particular phrase, many students declare that the phrase makes no 
difference to the problem's solution. To these students a third of 
the whole is not distinguished from a third of the remainder. 
Furthermore, their pictorial representations of the pizza often 
reflect this misconception. Many students draw a circle or a 
rectangle, divided first into three equal pieces 
and labeled with Tom 
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and Mary each in one of the sections. This indicates that pictures 
do not in themselves obviate all conceptual difficulties with regard 
to fractions. Some guided discussion is also required. 
The collection of problems in Fractions VIII are designed to 
encourage students to draw pictures to aid them in the solution of 
the problems and also to help them visualize the various arithmetic 
operations performed with fractions. Fractions VIII, 1, combines 
ratio and fractions ideas without explicitly mentioning any 
fractions. 
FRACTIONS VIII 
1. A company of 266 persons consists of men, women and 
children. There are four times as many men as children, 
and twice as many women as children. How many of each 
were there? 
The above problem is similar to typical algebra word problems. 
Students in Math 010 do not yet know algebra well enough to be able 
to use it to answer this problem. However, a multi-step solution 
which uses a diagram helps students to realize that the most 
convenient unit for dividing the whole is the group of children. 
Once realized, the operations which are carried out in diagram form 
are an excellent predecessor to understanding the algebraic solution 
(Simon and Stimpson, 1988). While not yet instructing the students 
in algebra, the experience of symbolizing the problem with a diagram 
representing the relative sizes of groups based on a unit group 
(generally though not exclusively the group of children), and 
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incorporating the ratio information into the solution, are all useful 
tools for solving problems with or without algebra. 
The problem below, Fractions VIII, 2, is similar to the 
preceding problem. Instead of stating the total number in the whole 
and the ratio of the parts, Fractions VIII, 2, states the fraction of 
the whole constituted by each part and a number of individual units 
in the remaining fraction of the whole. The problem appears below: 
FRACTIONS VIII 
2. In Sarah's flower garden, one-third of the plants are 
marigolds, one-fourth are petunias, one eighth are 
zinnias, one twelfth are mums, and there are ten other 
plants each of a different variety. How many plants are 
there of each variety? 
A detailed solution to this problem is included in the Workbook 
(Appendix C) in the form of a thought-process protocol. The protocol 
is a seven-page reconstruction of a student's solution to the 
problem. Included are diagrams, self-posed questions, metacognitive 
musings and many qualifying statements, dead-ends, and self-corrected 
errors. The solution is an excellent model for effectively using 
diagrams, and for metacognition through writing. 
Fractions VIII, problems 3, 4, and 5, are intended to aid the 
students in their understanding of algorithmic operations with 
fractions by having students perform the operation on a diagram and 
then relate the diagram to the algorithm. 
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FRACTIONS VIII 
3. To convert 3-1/4 to an improper fraction, you 
multiply the 3 times the 4 and add 1 to get 13/4. Using 
pictures to illustrate, explain in words what you are 
doing when you "multiply 3 times 4 and add 1", and why 
this gives the correct result. 
4. Use pictures to show that 2/3 of 3/4 equals 1/2. 
5. Is it also true that 3/4 of 2/3 equals 1/2? 
Again, use pictures. 
The above problems are intended to demystify algorithms and to 
make concrete their operations. Students are expected to associate 
steps in an algorithm (changing a mixed number to an improper 
fraction in problem 3) with drawing lines in box diagrams. Problems 
4 and 5 reinforce picture drawing with yet another algorithm, 
multiplication of fractions, and also exhibits the commutative 
property of multiplication as it applies to fractions. 
FRACTIONS VIII 1/2, as may be inferred from the numeration, was 
inserted into the text in an attempt to persuade students to read the 
thought—process protocol. It is almost identical in form to 
Fractions VIII, 2, with the added feature of presenting the unit 
quantities in pairs rather than single units. Asking students to 
work Fractions VIII 1/2, and informing them of the similarity of this 
problem to the problem solved in the thought-process protocol, should 
provide incentive for reading the protocol solution and using the 
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solution as a model for thinking and for diagramming. The problem 
appears below: 
FRACTIONS VIII 1/2 
A limited number of tickets were available for a jazz 
concert. Ruth bought one-fourth of the tickets, David 
bought one-sixth, George bought two-ninths, and Linda 
bought one-twelfth of the tickets. The remaining 50 
pairs of tickets were bought by Nina. 
a. How many tickets did George buy? 
b. How many tickets were there altogether? 
Fractions IX is a well-structured problem, but difficult in 
that it incorporates a misconception which many students demonstrate. 
The problem asks students to consider a whole which is comprised of 
two distinct parts, and each part divided differently among people. 
Students often exhibit a specific misconception which is described 
after the problem statement below. 
FRACTIONS IX 
Use a pictorial representation to solve the following 
problem: 
The oil bill for a group house was for the months of 
January and February. Four people lived in the house 
fifth moved in on February 1st. during January, and a 
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Assuming that the same amount of heat was used each of 
* 
the two months, what fraction of the bill should each 
person pay? 
Note: The fifth person should not have to pay for 
January's heat. 
By dividing a single box diagram in half, and each half into fourths 
and fifths respectively, students determine that each person who 
lived in the house for both months should pay 1/4 + 1/5 of the total 
bill. The diagram below illustrates their misconception: 
The misconception lies in a confusion about which box 
constitutes the whole. Because the larger box is divided in half, 
each of the segments is actually one-half the fraction of the smaller 
box when referenced to the larger box. Consequently the 1/4 of 
January's portion of the heating bill is actually 1/8 of the total 
bill, and 1/5 of February's bill is 1/10 of the total heating bill. 
Quarters and fifths are visible in the diagram, whereas the fractions 
1/8 and 1/10 are not. 
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Fractions X is intended to offer a brief introduction to 
several geometric shapes, terms, and properties. Problem 1 
introduces the term and idea of perimeter. Problem 2 considers the 
ratio of the areas of two identical triangles. Problem 3 relates the 
areas of the triangles to the area of the square. Problem 4 is a 
simple sum of fractions. Students approximate the ratio of the 
diagonal to all of the sides and to one of the sides of a square in 
problems 5 and 6 respectively. Both of these problems are intended 
to illustrate that the diagonal is longer than one of the sides, and 
the solution to 6 is an improper fraction which teaches that a 
quantity can be more than 1 times larger than another quantity. The 
group of problems appears below: 
FRACTIONS X 
FIGURE 6. Triangles Problem 
1. In this square, one side is what fraction of the 
perimeter? 
2. The area of one triangle is what portion of the 
area of the square? 
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3. The area of both of the triangles is what 
portion of the are of the square? 
4. What fraction of the perimeter of the square are 
three of its sides? 
5. The diagonal is what fraction of the perimeter 
of the square? (You may approximate your answer.) 
6. The diagonal is what fraction of one of the 
sides of the square? (You may approximate your answer.) 
Fractions XI, 1, was discussed earlier in this chapter. It is 
an ill-defined problem in that certain assumptions are necessary for 
its solution even though they do not appear in the text of the 
problem. The problem also exposes the misconception that all 
problems which require the addition of fractions involve only finding 
a common denominator. The following problem also requires finding a 
common numerator. 
FRACTIONS XI 
1. In a certain population, two-thirds of all men are 
married, but only 3/5 of all the women are married. 
a. What fraction of the population is single? 
b. Are there more men or women? 
The assumption needed to answer this problem is that men are 
married to women, and that all of the spouses are in the population. 
It is this one-to-one correspondence which forces the numerators in 
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the fractions of married men and married women to be the same, i.e. 
common numerators. A common error, in student solutions to part 'a', 
involves adding the fractions 1/3, the fraction of single men, and 
2/5, the fraction of single women. Finding a common denominator and 
adding the numerator yields the solution that 11/15 of the population 
is single. Students generally notice that this fraction states that 
the majority of people in the population are single which is not 
consistent with the situation described in the problem. 
The question appearing in part ' b' is intended to provoke 
questions about assumptions, and to help the student initiate non¬ 
specific quantitative reasoning; that is, reasoning which gives a 
sense for the relative sizes of quantities rather than their specific 
numbers or fractional sizes. While it is a trivial question for 
anyone who has already solved part 'a', it can have the effect of 
stimulating a fruitful line of thought or a fresh attack on an 
otherwise confounding problem. 
Fractions XI, 2, is quite complicated. It was written to 
introduce the Venn Diagram, and is most easily approached using this 
method. In addition to providing a new representation for problems 
involving fractions, the problem also provides an introduction to the 
rudiments of set theory. 
FRACTIONS XI 
2. In a certain city, four-fifths of all homeowners are 
men, and 2/3 of all men who own homes are married. A 
full 3/5 of all men are property-less, even though half 
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of them are married. What fraction of all men are single 
homeowners? 
The above problem is ill-structured in that more information is 
given than is needed to solve the problem. Careful reading and 
monitoring is needed to filter the essential from the non-essential 
information. 
The final problem which appears in the chapter on fractions is 
a writing exercise which, though appearing at the end of the chapter, 
can be assigned earlier during instruction. The problem incorporates 
a peculiar misconception which the students are asked to expose in a 
400-word thought process protocol. The problem appears below: 
FRACTIONS PROTOCOL 
The following protocol was written by a student in 
response to the question below. It contains 
misconceptions which you should identify and clarify in 
your own 400-word protocol. 
Use a pictorial representation to answer the question: 
3 is what fraction of 9? 
"I'll start by representing the numbers with circles. 
3 - o o o 
-OOO oooooo 9 
I want a fraction so I'll put the three circles over the 
nine circles since I know that the three is less than the 
nine. 
3 O o o 
9 oOOOOOOOO 
Since I can cancel equal things on top and bottom, 
the picture looks like this: 
0>00'OOOOOO '0000(50 
I'm left with 6 on the bottom and nothing on the 
top, so the answer must be 0/6 which is the same as zero. 
, But that can't be, since I know the answer can't be 
zero. Looking back at what I did, I see that I forgot 
that when you cancel equal things, you get ones, not 
zeroes, so that the answer should be 1/6." 
By using misconceptions, attention may be focused on the concepts 
needed for reducing fractions. In particular, students should 
discuss the importance of finding common factors. The pictorial 
representation is an inappropriate over-simplification of the 
cancelling process. There is an additional misconception about the 
meaning of cancelling common factors as well as a rather meaningles 
treatment of the problematic zero, as discussed in this protocol. 
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All of these errors provide a forum for discussion and concept 
elucidation. 
Method of Instruction 
The method of instruction set forth in this chapter on 
constructivist pedagogy incorporates many ideas which either relate 
to or help to implement two key notions: constructivism; the idea 
that students must construct knowledge for themselves, and 
metacognition; that the vehicle for the construction of knowledge is 
self-reflection, or in Piagetian terms, reflective abstraction. 
The problems which students solve to develop conceptual 
understanding of mathematical content are not in themselves 
sufficient for learning. The various relationships between concepts 
and ideas which comprise the conceptual web are best discerned and 
integrated within a social context (Von Glasersfeld, 1988). Though 
knowledge is constructed individually, it is corroborated largely 
through consensus, and consensus-achieving is a social activity. 
The implication that education should be conducted in an 
interactive environment to facilitate learning has been supported by 
research. Cooperative learning, students working together in class, 
has been effective in aiding student understanding of texts 
(McDonald, et. al. , 1985; Spurlin, et. al., 1984; Ross and DiVesta, 
1976), and also for concept learning and problem solving in 
mathematics and science (Dees, 1985; Cohen, 1982; Sharan and Herts- 
Lazarowitz, 1980; Webb, 1978). 
The constructivist classroom is conducted almost entireiy 
within the context of group problem solving, with students in dyads 
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and in larger groups. Lecture is kept to a minimum. The teacher 
serves as a coach, moving from one student group to another, 
listening to their discussions, asking selected group members to 
summarize the group's solution path, and probing student solutions 
and conceptions with questions rather than answering questions. 
A student's answer is not acknowledged as either right or wrong. 
Instead, the instructor listens to the reasons for the answer and 
either agrees that the reasons make sense, asks for more elaboration, 
or asks more questions to help the student to think about the problem 
in a different way. Often instructors ask other students in the 
group to explain another student's solution and to comment on whether 
or not they agree with it and for what reasons. 
The following description of a "typical" student/teacher 
interaction is illustrative of the constructivist classroom 
environment and of the types of discussions which take place there. 
What a Constructivist Classroom Looks Like; 
The Case for Directed Anarchy 
Upon entering the constructivist classroom an observer would 
notice students seated haphazardly in small groups of two to four 
students, conversing and sometimes arguing with one another. The 
students may seem oblivious to their instructor and to the 
undergraduate teaching assistant, who may be difficult to locate 
insofar as that neither the instructor or the assistant is at the 
front of the class. Several students may be working together at the 
blackboard. In fact there may be more than one group of students 
working at the board simultaneously. The noise level in the room is 
such that the door to the hallway must remain closed so as not to 
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disturb other classes. Occasionally a hand goes up in the air, 
waving for the teacher's attention. There are loud exclamations of 
I got it! intermixed with groans of frustration. Every two or 
three minutes one of two instructors rises from his/her seat with one 
group of students to assist another group. The scene is active. It 
appears anarchic because no one person seems to be directing the 
activity. Actually the instructor continuously manages the classroom 
through constant and proximal observation, feedback, and when 
necessary, direction [see Appendix I for a record of a sample Math 
010 class. ]. 
Upon closer inspection, an observer may notice that some groups 
appear to be solving some problem, while other groups are comparing 
their solutions with one another, each arguing their respective 
solutions. Also, some groups quietly discuss their social plans for 
the evening or the intricacies of a current personal relationship - 
unfortunately for them, problem solving is sporadic and somewhat 
intrusive into their other agendas. 
The following protocol is a verbatim account of a small part of 
the solution process of three students [labeled A, B and C] who are 
working together on the problem below. The protocol is a brief 
illustration of the group problem solving process which actually 
transpired in the constructivist classroom, and which is typical of 
student interactions. 
Similar Rectangles Problem: The length to width ratio is 
three to two for each of the two rectangles. The length 
of the larger rectangle is in the ratio of seven to five 
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to that of the smaller one. What is the ratio of the 
areas of the two rectangles? 
The condensation and excerpting of a much larger transcript of 
a video tape requires some additional explanation. The first task 
the problem solvers set for themselves was to draw a picture of the 
rectangles from the information given. Much discussion revolved 
around the definition of ratio and proportion with respect to figures 
whose exact dimensions were not given. The notion that the ratio of 
the widths of similar rectangles must be proportional to the ratio of 
their respective lengths was developed in the following dialogue: 
082 
083 
084 
085 
086 
087 
088 
A: Or you're not gonna... I don't think that we have enough... 
I think that we may be able to benefit from the additional 
information of figuring out what is the ratio of the width 
of one side.. What is the width of [rectangle] number 1 to 
the width of [rectangle] number 2? 
B: Okay, maybe we can say the ratio. 
A: So 7 to 5, well maybe if this is 7 to 5 then this should be 
7 to 5 also. 
B: What should be 7 to 5? The width to the width? 
A: Yeah. 
B: Why? They're different. 
A: Because the whole...the ratios of the wholes are the same, 
then the ratios of the sides should be the same. 
C: Which means the ratio of the areas are going to be the same 089 
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090 A: And width to the width, that's it. The ratio of the width 
• 
would be 7 to 5. 
091 C: Oh that's where I'm wrong. 
092 A: What? So you know what I did it with?... Umm... 
093 C: I still think the area's still going to be 3 to 2. 
094 B: The area of the... 
095 C: The...I think it's all going to be proportional. You've got 
length and width on both sides... 
096 A: No look, when you multiply it, look how much bigger this is 
than that. 
097 B: But it still can be in the same... 
098 C: But it can still be equal the same factor. 
The success that student A had in defending the conjecture that 
the ratio between the lengths of similar rectangles is the same ratio 
as their widths motivates a similar conjecture by student C that the 
ratio of their areas must also be the same. Although an improper 
i 
extension of the original concept, it nevertheless has meaning and is 
convincing to student B. The discussion continues with the following 
diagram the students generated themselves: 
4.66 
7 
3.33 
5 
FIGURE 7. Student-generated diagram 
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165 A: 
166 B: 
167 A: 
168 B: 
169 A: 
170 B: 
171 C: 
172 A: 
173 C: 
174 A: 
175 C: 
Multiply these guys. So multiply it. 7 times 4.66, what 
does that equal? 
32.62 
And what's the other one? 
Wait a minute. 
Five times 3.3 is... 15.15 
16.65 
That looks kind of proportional to me though. 
Yeah well look, 16 times 2 is 32. 
Hum? 
Well, alright. So? 
I think that that's still proportional, doesn't that look 
proportional to you? 
The instructor, who until now has been circulating among 
students in the classroom, joins the group. Upon hearing the 
students' respective arguments, the instructor asks a student to 
verify her conviction that the areas are not proportional to the 
ratios of the lengths of the sides of the rectangles but to the 
product of the lengths of the sides. The instructor is denoted with 
the symbol "I", and is responding to student A's answer, that the 
ratios of the areas of the two rectangles is 2 to 1. 
198 I: But do you believe that though? Erica (student A) do you 
believe that the ratio between the areas is 2 to 1? 
199 A: Yeah. 
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200 Is Lance (student C)? 
201 C: Wait a second, I still don't see tha... 
202 A: That means that this, the area of this one is twice as big 
as the area of this, but even though, look, even though the 
sides... look how similar they could be and could you 
believe that...[student A redraws the lines of the 
rectangles] 
203 I: What do those two lines represent now? 
204 A: Look, this is the length and the length, this is the width 
and the width. And even though they could be only a little 
bit longer on each side it's like that quadratic thing... 
see this is actually look, look how much, you know what I'm 
saying? 
205 C: That still doesn't prove anything to me. I don't see that. 
This last response indicates that the students' discussion is 
not yet concluded. However the concepts of ratio, proportion, area, 
and quadratic relationships are all explored in the context of a 
dialogue which forces argument and counter argument. 
The group problem solving process forces students to articulate 
their ideas to one another in a manner which causes students to 
explore their own understandings. In their attempt to explain their 
solutions, and to defend against argument, students develop 
representations, analogies, extreme instances, contradictory 
evidence,, etc., all to express their understanding. All of these 
activities require that the conceptual web of understanding grow in 
lationships observed in the problem 
the number of meaningful re 
solver's own thought processes as well as in the thought processes of 
their listeners by appealing to ideas the listeners are willing to 
believe. 
The issue of belief is paramount, since correct answers are 
seldom, if ever, given by the teacher in a constructivist classroom 
(Confrey, 1985; Heiman, et. al., 1987). Confirmation of a correct 
answer is a signal to students that thinking may cease. The solution 
that student A gave in the above protocol was correct, even though 
the other students in the group did not agree. Had the instructor 
acknowledged that the answer was correct, student A would not have 
had to convince her classmates and to expand her own understanding in 
the process of convincing them. Instead, the instructor asked her to 
assess her own level of commitment to an answer which appears 
contradictory to the intuitions of the two other students [and 
additionally to the intuitions of most students who assume that all 
direct proportions are linear]. It is important to note that the 
students did not ask the teacher to either confirm or refute the 
solution given and argued. They believe that they are capable of 
understanding the problem themselves. The pedagogy of the 
Constructivist classroom maintains that through argument and 
explanation, students will prevail in solving problems presented to 
them. 
\ 
The Role of the Teacher 
The method of instruction in the Constructivist classroom is 
derived from a combination of managerial techniques and clinical 
interview methodology. While instructors are expected to organize 
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students and curriculum to teach an agenda for content and 
heuristics, they are also expected to encourage students to develop 
conceptual understanding through metacognitive reflection during 
problem solving. Guidelines are offered to assist teachers in these 
two aspects of instruction. The frameworks adopted here for the 
instruction of remedial mathematics owe much to Piaget's theory of 
cognitive development and to his clinical interview methodology for 
cognitive process research. 
Lesson Planning 
Piaget's theory [augmented by Bruner] that intellectual 
development occurs in stages that proceed from the cognition of the 
relationships between concrete objects and their iconic 
representations to the formal reasoning involved in the formation and 
interpretation of concepts suggests a developmental approach to 
instruction. The Madison Project (Davis, 1974) implemented a 
Piagetian developmental perspective in their design of paradigm 
lessons. These lessons presented children with concrete examples, 
sometimes in dramatic form, instead of telling children about some 
mathematical concept. Karplus (1974) also incorporated Piaget's 
developmental theories into a cycle of instruction which 
recapitulates intellectual development on a micro-instructional 
level. For Karplus each unit and each class should be designed to 
proceed from learning at the concrete level and proceed to more 
formal and abstract concepts, keeping the age and intellectual 
maturity of the student in mind. The "Learning Cycle" he advocated 
has three steps in the development of lesson plans. These steps are 
designed to facilitate concept acquisition and higher-order thinking. 
The three steps are interpreted for use in the college classroom as: 
1• Exploration. This first phase generally takes the form of a 
demonstration or experiment with accompanying questions that ask for 
a description of what is observed coupled with qualitative analysis 
from students. 
2. Invention. This step calls for the introduction of 
technical language that defines the analysis completed in the 
exploration. Formulas and algorithms may be derived and explicitly 
stated while constantly being connected to students' observations and 
conj ectures. 
3. Discovery. Finally, students need to apply the concepts 
outlined in the Invention stage of the lesson to fully understand the 
meaning of the concept and whatever formalism or algorithm was 
described. This phase almost always takes place within the context 
of problem solving on problems which are more challenging than the 
problems used in the exploration phase. 
An example of the Learning Cycle applied to remedial 
mathematics instruction follows: 
CONCEPT: THE MEANING OF VARIABLES 
Exploration — Using the letter S to equal the number of 
students and P to equal the number of professors, write an equation 
that represents the following statement: "There are 6 times as many 
students as professors at this university." 
After working in pairs, most students will offer the incorrect and 
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reverse equation 6S ■ P. They should be asked to state in their own 
words what the above equation says. Another question which could be 
asked of the students is: "Substitute a number for S, and use your 
equation to calculate the number of professors at the university. 
Does your equation work?" 
Invention — Define a variable as a quantity, a number. In 
this case, S is the number of students, and P is the number of 
professors. Using the students' reverse equation (6S - P), ask what 
it means to place the 6 next to the S. Note that this signals the 
multiplication of a number S times 6. Thus it says, "Multiply the 
number S times 6 to get the number of professors." Other questions 
which may be asked are: "Will 6S ■ P work?", "How can we rewrite the 
equation so that it does work?" Additionally, data tables may be 
introduced by asking students to generate pairs of numbers that 
illustrate the relationship in the original statement. Finally, get 
students to develop the correct equation 6P - S. 
Discovery — Ask students to work in pairs on the following 
two problems: 1) Using the letter S to equal the number of strudels 
ordered and C to equal the number of cheesecakes ordered, write an 
equation that represents the following statement: At a certain 
restaurant, for every four people who order cheesecake, five people 
order strudel. 2) Using the letter F to equal the number of feet in 
any measure of length and Y to equal the number of yards in the same 
measure of length, write an equation which relates F, the number of 
feet in a measure to Y, the number of yards in the same measure of 
length. 
1 7 5 
For homework, students should solve a problem which gives an 
equation with the variables defined but where the students are asked 
to write a sentence in English which expresses the relationship in 
the equation. Example: 
A - 7S 
where A = the number of assemblers in a factory and S - the number of 
solderers in the factory. 
Instructors should attempt to anticipate certain difficulties 
and misconceptions which they believe their students may exhibit. 
Doing so allows the teacher to incoporate these notions into the 
lesson. 
While several of the problems described in the sample Learning 
Cycle come from the Math 010 Workbook and from educational research 
mentioned previously, the teacher should feel free to construct new 
problems extemporaneously in response to instructional needs and 
students' demonstrated abilities. It is useful to have several 
challenging problems prepared for students who proceed more quickly 
than others. Problems which clarify an idea by simplifying a 
previous problem are much easier to develop than problems which go 
beyond the initial problem, especially when the new problem is needed 
post haste. 
The Math 010 Workbook is used in the course primarily for the 
selection of problems for written homework and for classwork. 
Additionally, students must complete background reading in the book 
Developing Mathematical Skills by Whimbey and Lochhead (1981). 
Although no written homework is assigned from the book, quizzes are 
that students have read a text, which is administered to assure 
written simply and at the level of middle school students. The text 
contains many simple algorithmic exercises and easy word problems. 
The allocation of class time is divided among four main 
activities, administrative, lecture/discussion, problem solving, and 
quiz taking. The following table of observed, ideal and estimated 
percents of class time allocated to these activities in the Math 010, 
and Oil classrooms illustrates the degree to which theory and 
practice are commensurate in the classroom (Konold, 1986): 
TABLE 2. Observed, Ideal, and Estimated Percents of Class Time 
Allocated to Class Activities (Konold, 1986, p. 17) 
Activity Observed Expert's 
Ideals 
Instructor's 
Ideals 
Instructor's 
Estimates 
Administrative 8.9 3.3 (1.25) 4.2 (2.33) 6.5 (2.20) 
Lecture/Discuss ion 14.7 17.3 (2.05) 18.7 (6.80) 16.0 (7.40) 
Problem Solving 56.1 71.7 (2.36) 65.1 (6.85) 57.7 (8.32) 
Quiz Taking 18.1 7.5 (0.41) 11.3 (2.05) 16.3 (3.59) 
Undefined 2.0 0 1.5 (1.69) 4.1 (3.51) 
As the table indicates, ideally instructors and experts feel 
that students should spend more time problem solving than they in 
fact do. By finding methods to streamline administrative and quiz 
taking activities, more time can be permitted for problem solving. 
Promoting Metacognition 
The pair problem solving method of Whimbey and Lochead (1982) 
borrows the model for clinical interviews used by Piaget in his 
research, and serves as the model for cooperative problem solving in 
the Math 010 classroom. The approach requires that one student solve 
a problem by reading it aloud to the other student (the listener) and 
verbalizing all thoughts on the problem as they occur. The problem 
solver does all the writing and all of the talking about the problem. 
Meanwhile, the listener must suspend solving the problem him/herself 
so that complete concentration and attention is devoted towards 
understanding the problem solver's solution. The problem solver is 
responsible for articulating all ideas as they occur, whereas the 
listener has a somewhat more difficult task. The following 
instructions to the listener were developed for students in the Math 
010 course: Listen carefully, ask the speaker to repeat statements 
if needed, or to slow down. Encourage vocalization, ask, "What are 
you thinking?" and "Can you explain what you are writing?" Ask for 
clarification, for example, "What do you mean", and "Can you say more 
about that?" Check for accuracy by asking, "Are you sure about that? 
Several warnings are offered in the form of "do nots", do not give 
hints, do not solve the problem yourself, do not tell the solver how 
to correct an error. 
By encouraging students to verbalize their thoughts, they are 
forced to examine their ideas as they communicate. They must 
evaluate those ideas in the light of another person's interpretation 
of what they are saying. Requests for clarification and repetition 
often help students to catch and correct their errors as well as 
helping to reinforce ideas that they may have held only tentatively. 
By exchanging roles of problem solver and listener, students have the 
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opportunity to learn the related skills of problem solving aloud and 
listening for meaning. 
Instructors are also expected to follow the clinical interview 
method of Piaget. By assuming the role of the listener, the 
instructor may promote metacognitive activity through the use of 
questioning strategies which require students to reflect on their 
thought processes. Four such strategies are (Confrey, 1985): 1) ask 
students to discuss their interpretation of the problem, 2) ask the 
students to describe precisely their methods of solution, 3) ask 
students to defend their answer and their solution, 4) ask students 
to retrace the steps in their solution so as to review the process 
they engaged in to solve the problem. According to Confrey (1988), 
the student/teacher interaction is characterized by the focus on 
language used by the student and by the teacher's acceptance of the 
student's vision of a solution path. 
In addition to listening to students, teachers should model 
expert problem solving for their students. Students rarely see 
adults solve problems, much less hear them solve problems aloud. By 
describing one's thought processes aloud, instructors demonstrate 
both the process of thinking aloud and their thought processes with 
all of the dead ends, mistakes, and corrections which characterize 
real problem solving. The importance of expert scaffolding has been 
shown in several studies (Vygotsky, 1978; Palincsar and Brown, 1984; 
Collins, et. al., in press). These studies indicate that children 
gradually learn a set of cognitive skills from experts (parent, 
teacher, master craftsman, etc.) by first observing tasks performed 
and explained repeatedly until they feel confident to attempt a task, 
first with help end then on their own. By providing feedback and 
support, the expert assists the novice in advancing toward cognitive 
competence. 
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF A PROGRAM FOR CONSTRUCTIVIST COLLEGE REMEDIAL 
MATHEMATICS 
The evaluation of the program for college remedial mathematics, 
which has been described in this dissertation, is conducted using an 
analysis of a testing instrument to measure student gain in 
mathematical skills and gender differences in the demonstration of 
those skills. 
An important objective measure of the program's success is 
provided through an analysis of a test designed to assess student 
competence and gain in the content of the Math 010 course. Because 
the course is designed to teach both the algorithmic skills involved 
in arithmetic and introductory algebra, and the higher-order thinking 
skills needed to use mathematics effectively, the test was designed 
to provide a reliable and valid measure of both types of skills. An 
analysis of the test items using classical test theory indicated that 
the higher-order-skills items, frequently "word problems", are 
statistically less reliable than the algorithmic, computational-type 
items. Consequently, a relatively hew test theory, item response 
theory, was employed to calculate specific test characteristics for 
each item. The results of this study were encouraging for the use of 
item response theory as an analytical tool to aid the test designer 
to include higher-order-skills problems and items which incorporate 
misconceptions. Without the inclusion of these types of items a 
valid test of conceptual understanding envisaged for students in a 
constructivist mathematics program would be highly(uniikely. 
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Due to the extensive research literature (Chipman, et al., 
1985) and widespread concern about gender gap in mathematics 
achievement, the test was analyzed for gender bias. A separate item 
analysis using the Mantel-Haenzel statistic, a chi-square statistic 
specially adapted to study bias, indicated that the test is 
significantly gender-bias free with the exception one item. A 
further analysis of test results, gain scores, and course grades was 
also conducted to research gender differences in the Math 010 course. 
Test Design 
The "Diagnostic Test" [Appendix D] of the Basic Math Program 
was designed to fulfill two evaluative tasks: 1) to determine the 
placement of students in either Math 010, the basic arithmetic course 
described in this dissertation, or in Math Oil, the second of two 
courses in the Basic Math sequence, which treats introductory 
algebra, linear and quadratic relationships and Cartesian graphs, and 
2) to serve as a pre-test and post-test to assess student gain and 
course success. As stated earlier, the test's primary utility for 
this dissertation is for measuring the effectiveness of the Math 010 
course as a treatment for correcting student mathematical 
deficiencies. 
Although useful for placement out of Math 010, the cut score 
was at first pragmatically determined by the number of spaces 
available to students in Math Oil classes. Only after several 
semesters did our experience allow us to judge cut scores on the 
basis of success in Math 011. The cut score was 16 correct for the 
semesters in which this study was conducted. Those students who 
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scored less than 16 correct out of 28 items were placed in Math 010. 
* 
An examination of the test [Appendix D] and the test statistics 
[Appendix E] will provide the reader with some understanding of the 
mathematical abilities of the population in this study. 
It should also be noted that approximately 45 days elapsed from 
the last math class taught and the administration of the posttest. 
Furthermore, although the same test was used for pre- and posttest, 
the test administrations were separated by over five months. 
Population Characteristics 
With the exception of the item analysis, the population for 
this study consisted of 101 students (35 males, 66 females) who 
enrolled in Math 010 in the Fall semester, 1986, and again in Math 
010, if they failed in the Fall, or in Math Oil, in the Spring 
semester, 1987. This represents a select group insofar as those 
students who either did well on a summer math placement test and went 
directly into precalculus instead of taking Math Oil, or for another 
reason chose not to take either of the courses in the Spring, and so 
were not available for taking the posttest. 
Validity of the Test 
Content Validity 
This author, together with five instructors of the Math 010 
course, submitted and analyzed a bank of items which were written to 
represent a comprehensive aggregate of the content skills emphasised 
in the course and necessary for entry to Math Oil. In addition to 
the algorithmic skills needed for arithmetic and elementary algebra, 
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the test designers wished to assess the students' abilities to use 
basic mathematical skills in the solution of word problems. Designed 
to evaluate higher order thinking skills, the test identifies a level 
of understanding sufficient to apply mathematics to a wide range of 
practical problems which involve quantitative reasoning. 
Although word problems are used as the vehicle for conceptual 
as well as algorithmic instruction, the exams in Math 010 are 
typically weighted approximately 60% algorithmic items and 40% word 
problems. Consequently, the Diagnostic Test consists of problem 
types in similar proportion to that of the exams in the 010 course. 
For research purposes, two 9-item subtests were identified within the 
28-item test. The subtest consisting of higher-order thinking type 
problems [HI] may be identified in the Diagnostic Test [Appendix D] 
as items numbered 9, 10, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25. The 
subtest consisting of algorithmic, manipulations type of problems 
[AL] may be identified as items 1, 4, 8, 11, 16, 18, 26, 27, and 28. 
Both subtests reflect a cross-section of the topics taught in Math 
010. 
Criterion Validity 
One obvious criterion which may be used to compare the 
Diagnostic Test is the final grade attained by students who completed 
the Math 010 course. The Diagnostic post-test total scores 
correlated highly (Pearson correlation coefficient, r = 0.58) 
[Appendix J] with final grades in the course. 
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TABLE 3. Scatterplot of grade vs. diagnostic posttest scores 
GRADE 
*2*65 2 4 2 
* 3 3 5 2 * 
* * 
**32** 22 
** 2*43*2 
* * * * * * A 
3 * * 2 * 
2 * 
10 15 
POST 
20 25 
The algorithmic-skill subtest post-test correlated with final 
grades only slightly less than the total test score (r = 0.44). The 
higher-order skills subtest post-test correlated least well with 
final grades (r = 0.38). While all of the above correlations are 
significant (correlations greater than 0.254 are significant at the 
0.01 level for a two-tailed test for significance for n-2 = 99 
degrees of freedom), this analysis indicates that the combination of 
critical thinking skills as demonstrated through problem solving and 
algorithmic skills correlate best with final grades in the Math 010 
course. However, the greater number of items reported in the total 
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test score may account for some of the difference in the correlations 
when compared to the two subtests. 
Predictive Validity 
Although the diagnostic post-test correlates highly with final 
grades, a measure of the utility of the test for prediction of 
performance in Math 010 may be determined by correlating pre-test 
scores with final grades. The pre-test total score correlates with 
grades to a far lesser degree than the post-test total test score 
(pre-test total test score with final grade r - 0.23). Although 
significant at the 0.02 level [Appendix J], this correlation means 
that these variables explain less than six percent of the variance in 
each other. Furthermore, neither of the two subtests showed any 
significant correlation with final grades (pre-HI with final grades r 
- 0.07, pre-AL with final grades r - 0.18). There is little evidence 
to suggest that the Diagnostic scores on the pre-test are good 
indicators of success in Math 010. 
Construct Validity 
The presence of a psychological construct, defined broadly as 
"quantitative reasoning", was assumed at the outset of this study. 
In fact, the assumption of "unidimensionality", i.e. the presence of 
only one trait, is essential for the item-response theory analysis of 
the test items. 
However, the distinction between algorithmic and higher-order 
skills appears more real than imagined. The fact that these two 
"subskills" have little correlation with each other on both the pre- 
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test and on the post-test (pre-HI with pre-AL r - 0.11, post-HI with 
post-AL r = 0.17) indicates that they may represent two separate and 
distinct traits. This observation will be discussed in greater 
detail in a subsequent section. 
TABLE 4 — Scatterplot of Posttest higher-order skills subtest 
vs. posttest algorithmic skills subtest 
POSTHI 
8 
6 
6 2 2 * 
4 6 4 * 
4 * 2 8 5 * 
2 2 ' 2 5 2 5 5 
2 * 2 2 5 8 4 
* 2 2 4 3 2 2 
0 5 2 
3 4 5 6 7 
POST-AL 
Test and Item Analysis: Reliability and Gender Bias 
Two issues assume central importance in the construction of a 
test to evaluate the constructivist program for remedial college 
and mathematics: reliability of the test and of the individual items, 
an analysis of the items in an attempt to locate gender bias. 
The reliability of the diagnostic test was profoundly affected 
by the presence of items which contain misconceptions which students, 
even good students, find compelling. Including these items in the 
test has the dual effect of contributing to the validity of a test 
which purports to measure higher-order thinking skills, but at the 
same time reducing the overall reliability of the test as measured by 
the degree of consistency of performance on each item with 
performance on the remainder of the items on the test (point biserial 
correlation). 
By incorporating item response theory into the item analysis, 
items which contain misconceptions were shown to be useful indicators 
of student abilities, thereby justifying their presence in the test. 
The results of this study yield the more general benefit of allowing 
constructors of multiple-choice standardized tests to incorporate 
misconceptions into item distractors, or write these into the stem 
(problem statement) itself. 
Standardized Testing for Misconceptions in Mathematics 
Overview 
For the past decade cognitive process researchers have measured 
the prevalence of misconceptions in math and science among groups of 
students. Often the measure is accomplished through the use of an 
open-ended or multiple-choice question administered singly or with 
few additional items. The data achieved is used to support 
hypotheses about the prevalence and resilience of one or several 
188 
misconceptions. As stated earlier, a misconception is a person's 
conceptualization of a problem or phenomenon that generally is 
reasonable to the person but at variance from the conceptualization 
of an "expert" in the field from which the problem came. Since the 
objective of the test item is to corroborate experiential 
observations in the classroom or surfaced misconceptions in clinical 
interviews, little if any analysis of reliability and validity has 
been conducted on the items themselves. One frequent complaint about 
items which evoke misconceptions is that they are "tricky". The 
intention of the item is not to trick the student, but to test for 
conceptual understanding by placing known misconceptions as options 
on the item. If the examinee's difficulty with the item results from 
an inadequate grasp of the concept which the item is testing, then 
the item and the "tricky" distractor have proven their usefulness. 
Research indicates that misconceptions are widespread and 
resistant to instruction, (Clement, 1982; Fredette, & Lochhead, 1980; 
Minstrell & Stimpson, 1986). The predominant view of misconceptions 
researchers is that misconceptions in the student must be addressed 
and overcome before a new and better understanding is attained. 
Misconceptions may be viewed as both a stumbling block for students 
and a signpost for the teacher. It follows that misconceptions ought 
to be incorporated into standardized tests which attempt to assess 
the level of understanding among examinees. 
This study examines some of the problems which arise from 
incorporating misconceptions into a standardized placement exam for 
the selection of students into a college remedial math course. Some 
observations concerning M.I.'s [misconception items) are: 
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* Items containing misconceptions [MI, misconception items] 
are more difficult than items which do not contain 
misconceptions. [Low p-values] 
* Mis correlate poorly with items which do not contain 
misconceptions. [Low item/total-test-score point 
biserial correlations] 
* In a multiple-choice MI the distractor which contains the 
misconception is often chosen more frequently than the 
correct answer even by students who are proficient with 
non-MIs. [Positive or near-zero distractor/total-test- 
score point biserial correlations on distractors with 
misconceptions] 
All of the measures listed above are reliability measures from 
classical test theory [CTT] and would suggest removal of the MI from 
the test or removal of the misconception-distractor from the item. 
An analysis of Mis using Item Response Theory [IRT] indicates 
that Mis are in fact useful items. Developed primarily by Lord 
(1952, 1953a, 1953b), IRT attempts to relate the likelihood of a 
correct response on an item to an individual's ability. Assuming 
that the test measures only one trait (unidimensionality), then the 
probability of a correct response to an item depends on two variables 
only: the item and the examinee. Quantitatively, the examinee is 
assigned one number (for ability) while the item is assigned one, two 
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or three numbers, (for discrimination, difficulty and pseudo-chance 
"guessing") depending upon the specific IRT model used. The present 
study uses a modified three-parameter logistic model which derives 
from the work of Birnbaum (1957, 1958a, 1958b, 1968) and Lord (1974). 
The following were observed: 
* Mis are difficult, but not much more difficult than non- 
MIs. 
* Mis discriminate well among examinees, especially at the 
high-end of abilities. 
* There appears to be less guessing on Mis than on non-MIs. 
While CTT is useful in the analysis of Mis, it is inadequate in 
that cognitively interesting and valid items may be discarded. IRT 
adds qualitatively different information to item analyses which 
contributes significantly to the selection and interpretation of Mis 
It is suggested that tests which incorporate misconceptions into 
items be analyzed with both CTT and IRT. 
Data Collection 
Because IRT analyses require n>600, the test sample of 101 
students was insufficient for this part of the study. Consequently, 
test results from two semesters were merged regardless of whether 
students took Math 010, Math Oil, both, or neither of the courses. 
The effect of a slightly more heterogeneous group (all students were 
diagnosed math weak) is not critical: CTT indices of reliability are 
raised, while IRT indices are unaffected. The data for this study 
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represents the test results of 618 freshmen who were diagnosed as 
math weak from a previous placement test. The Department of 
Mathematics and Statistics at the University of Massachusetts tests 
all incoming freshmen to ascertain their level of math ability. 
Those students who demonstrate a need for a remedial math course are 
then sent to the Basic Math Program of the Cognitive Processes 
Research Group [CPRG] for placement into either of two remedial 
courses. Math 010 is a remedial course in quantitative reasoning, 
which mainly teaches arithmetic. More specifically, the content of 
Math 010 is: fractions, decimals, percents, exponents, solving linear 
equations, simple applied geometry, and algebra translation tasks. 
The second level of the remedial program is a course entitled Math 
Oil, Introductory Algebra. Both courses stress conceptual 
understanding in addition to rote algorithmic computation and symbol 
manipulation. Story problems and problems which incorporate or 
elicit misconceptions are often used to foster and challenge the 
students' understandings. 
The CPRG diagnostic test is composed of 28 items which reflect 
all areas of course content for Math 010 [Appendix D]. All of the 
items are five-option multiple-choice items which are machine scored 
Several of the items contain common misconceptions which appear in 
research (Rosnick & Clement, 1980; Benander & Clement, 1985), and 
which six years of experience teaching the course indicates are 
prevalent among the 010 student population. The content of the 
placement exam is similar to a Math 010 final examination, although 
the format is quite different since the placement exam is the only 
exam in Math 010 which is multiple choice 
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Instructors administered the test on the first day of classes to 
all entering students in Math 010 and Math Oil, regardless of 
preregistration. Exactly forty minutes was allowed for testing. 
Instructors reported that virtually everyone had finished in the 
allotted time. 
The exam was administered to two separate groups in the Fall and 
Spring semesters. Measures were instituted to secure the exam to 
prevent cheating. Although the testing times differed, the test was 
identical both semesters, and since all of the students had been 
diagnosed math weak from a previous math department placement exam 
(composed mostly of items from the Mathematical Association of 
America item bank), it can be safely assumed that the two groups are 
similar in ability, and that test conditions for both groups were 
also similar. 
Data Analysis 
Two computer software packages were used in the analysis of the 
data. MERMAC (1971) uses Classical Test Theory (CTT) to analyze and 
report test and item statistics together with individual student 
response reports. LOGIST (1982) uses Item Response Theory (IRT) to 
analyze item parameters and individual student abilities. A more 
detailed description of these analyses follows. 
MERMAC 
A summary of test statistics, as reported by MERMAC, (Bussei et 
al, 1971) appears in Appendix E. The close match between the mean 
and median scores indicates a near symmetric distribution which was 
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also evident in the frequency distribution reported by MERMAC (not 
shown here). The average test difficulty, 
mean score 
Total # of Items " P - 0.43 
is low by comparison to most math ability tests which have p > 0.6. 
(Tinkelman, 1971), but is understandable with a remedial population. 
Low p-values also affect the overall test reliability. The optimum 
average item difficulty for a five-option multiple-choice test is 
about p-0.7 (Tinkelman, 1971). The error variance due to chance is 
decreased since less guessing occurs on easier items than on 
difficult ones. Consequently, the test reliability is increased. In 
fact, the diagnostic test reliability, calculated with the Kuder- 
Richardson Formula #20, is reported at 0.78, which is quite 
acceptable considering the few number of items and the homogeneity of 
the group. It should also be noted that items were not removed for 
being too difficult. [The phenomenon of removing difficult items is 
common to many standardized math tests (Leinwand, 1983)]. 
Eliminating difficult items could invalidate a test which attempts to 
ascertain conceptual understanding. 
MERMAC item analyses provide information in graphical and 
numerical formats. A dot graph of student groups distinguished by 
quintiles is plotted against the percent correct for each item. A 
clearly increasing shape indicates a relatively high correlation 
between that item and the rest of the test. 
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Item 1 Percent of correct response by fifths 
1st + * 
2nd + * 
3rd + * 
4th + a 
5th + * 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
FIGURE 8. Quintiles vs. percent correct 
One difficulty in interpreting these graphs comes from the fact 
that the quintiles are not at equal intervals in terms of score 
range. Students in the first quintile scored in the range between 17 
and 26 items correct while those in the fifth quintile scored between 
0 and 7 correct. The mid-three quintiles each had a range of only 
three items. This would of course be the case for any normally 
distributed test population. MERMAC mitigates this difficulty by 
providing a matrix of the number of responses made by each quintile 
to each item option and the number of omits for each item. The 
overall proportion of students selecting each of the distractors is 
also reported above the option/total test score point biserial [see 
Appendix G]. 
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Option/Total-Test-Score Point-Biserial Correlation 
X - X f 
rx - -- /_p. 
Sx 1 -iPi 
where: Xq - mean of X scores among examinees 
selecting option 0 
X - mean of X scores among all examinees 
Sx « standard deviation of all scores 
Pi - item difficulty 
When the option is the correct response (marked with 
parentheses), then the item/total-test-score point-biserial 
correlation is calculated. One would expect good items to have a 
positive correlation on the correct response and negative 
correlations for all of the distractors. The average item/test 
correlations for mathematics items is about 0.6, which is high when 
compared with the average, item-test correlation for social studies 
items which runs about 0.4 (Tinkelman, 1971). The present test has a 
comparatively low item-test correlation of 0.376, which occurs mainly 
because of the presence of Mi's, which have lower item-test 
correlations and positive distractor-test correlations. This 
phenomenon will be considered more thoroughly in the conclusion of 
this chapter. 
LOGIST 
The LOGIST computer program (Wingersky, 1983), reports item 
analyses on the basis of an Item Response Theory [IRT] test model. 
[For a thorough review of IRT, see Hambleton and Swaminathan (1985), 
and Hambleton (1983).] As mentioned earlier, IRT estimates the 
probability of a correct response to an item from an individual at 
any ability. The mathematical model used by the LOGIST program is 
the three-parameter logistic model which is a modification of the 
two-parameter logistic model developed by Birnbaura (1957). The 
three-parameter model is described by the function: 
Pi(0) = °i + (1_Ci) 
(1 * 1, 2, ..., n) 
1.7a.(0-b.) 
e ii 
r+"ei:rv5:v 
where: 
P^(0) - the probability that an examinee with ability level 0 
answers item i correctly; 
b^ - the item difficulty parameter which is the point on the 
ability scale where an examinee has a 
1 + C. 
l 
2 
probability of answering correctly. 
a 
i 
the item discrimination parameter. 
the pseudo-chance level parameter which represents the 
probability of low ability examinees correctly 
answering an item. 
The item characteristic curve [ICC] on the following page is a 
graphical representation of the result of LOGIST item parameters for 
item #20 on the placement test: 
Aim
pyocud
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ITEM -20 
FIGURE 9. Item-characteristic curve 
The ability scale is on an axis from negative infinity to positive 
infinity, and is standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. Theoretically the b-values can be any number, 
although b-values are generally in the range of -3 to 3. The lower 
asymptote indicates the level of guessing. On this particular item 
the c-parameter is just above 0.1. The fact that this is a five- 
option item implies that there was less guessing on this item than 
random probability would suggest. The b-parameter is about 2.2, 
which suggests that this is a relatively difficult item. The 
steepness of the curve is a measure of the discrimination of the 
i 
item. The position of the inflection point on the ability scale is 
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the b-value, which measures item difficulty, and indicates at which 
ability level the item is most discriminating. 
Fitting the Model to the Data 
After obtaining item parameters using LOGIST, a goodness of fit 
study (Hambleton and Murray, 1983) was conducted to evaluate the 
success of the three-parameter logistic model in predicting the 
observed data. A computer program prepared by Murray, Hambleton and 
Simon (1983) was used to conduct a residual analysis of the logistic 
test data. The program first divides the ability scale into 12 equal 
intervals between ability scores of -3.0 and 3.0, and then calculates 
the expected p-values at each ability level and for each item using 
the three parameters of the logistic model. Residuals are computed 
by subtracting these estimated p-values from the observed p-values. 
The average residual for the entire test is -0.018, which suggests 
that the model predicted a slightly easier test than was experienced 
by this group. The average absolute residual is 0.067. Both values 
indicate a relatively close fit of model to data. 
Since the program also computes these residuals for each item 
and ability level, further study indicates which items and abilities 
are best accounted for by the model. The weighted average residuals 
for all of the items appeared similar (within 0.05 of each other), 
and mostly <0.02 in absolute weighted average residuals, indicating 
that the model fit the individual items well. The smallest residuals 
appeared in the ability levels from -0.25 to 1.25. Apparently the 
model fits the data best at the ability levels which are slightly 
higher than average. This is useful since 
the test is being used to 
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measure minimum competency for placement. Students with low ability 
will certainly need the lower level remedial course, while students 
of very high ability will test into the higher level course. The 
difficult decisions will occur with students somewhere in the upper 
middle group - precisely the ability level best predicted by the 
model. 
Analysis Of Two Misconception Items 
To illustrate the problems associated with using Mis in a 
multiple-choice format two Mis were selected from the present test. 
Items #9 and #20 contain misconceptions within their distractor 
choices. The misconceptions in both items appear in previous 
research. 
Item #20 [see Appendix D] contains a misconception concerning 
the concept of variable (Rosnick, 1981). The misconception is 
referred to as the reversal error, since the most commonly chosen 
answer [even when not appearing in a multiple-choice format] involves 
an equation whose coefficients are reversed from the correct order. 
In item #20 the correct response is "d", 5C-W. However, only 19% of 
0 
the examinees responded correctly, while 46% selected distractor b , 
5W-C. Although the item/test point biserial is 0.26, which is about 
two-thirds of the average item/test point biserial, the 
distractor/test point biserial for option "b" is 0.04. The 
distractor with the misconception correlates positively with the rest 
of the test because it attracted so many (46%) of the high scoring 
examinees. These item statistics would suggest that to achieve 
higher test reliability the item or the distractor should be removed 
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from the test. But research suggests that misconceptions with the 
concept of variable are best diagnosed with precisely this type of 
item. Classical Test Theory can be viewed as placing a barrier 
between cognitive process assessment and standardized testing. 
Item Response Theory can aid the test constructor in analyzing 
a test incorporating Mis by providing another perspective on item 
characteristics. The graph appearing in Figure 9 illustrates an item 
characteristic curve for item #20. The slope of the line at the 
point of inflection is determined by the a-parameter, 1.05, which 
indicates a good discriminating item, especially among higher-ability 
examinees, as given by the b-parameter, 2.24. Although CTT indicates 
the relative difficulty of this item (low p-value), the low item/test 
point biserial would indicate that the item is a poor discriminator. 
IRT yields a very different interpretation. 
The lower asymptote is given by the c-pararaeter, and is 0.12, 
which indicates that the probability of the lower ability students 
getting the item correct (probably by guessing) is less than 0.2, the 
probability of a randomly chosen correct response. One hypothesis 
for this behavior is that the misconception-distractor is not only 
attractive to mid and higher ability students, it is also extremely 
attractive to low and lower ability students. An examination of the 
matrix of responses by quintiles in MERMAC confirms this hypothesis: 
50% of the examinees in the fourth quintile selected distractor "b", 
while 39% of the examinees in the fifth and lowest quintile, selected 
distractor "b". It should also be noted that the residual analysis 
of the logistic test data showed the compatability of model to 
empirical data higher for item #20 than most of the other items. The 
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average absolute residual for item #20 is 0.033, while the average 
for the test was 0.067. IRT can predict performance on this item for 
any ability examinee with a high degree of accuracy. Furthermore, 
the item is useful in that it discriminates well among examinees. 
Item #9 is a MI with similar item characteristics as item #20 
although the misconception is quite different. Item #9 [see Appendix 
D] contains a misconception in distractor "b" which identifies a 
part/whole confusion in fractions concepts, (Benander & Clement, 
1985). Instead of taking a "third of the remainder", many students 
simply take a third of the whole. Some students misread the problem 
by deleting the phrase "of the remainder" even after they've been 
asked to reread the problem for accuracy. Apparently the 
misconception is so strong as to cause the student to read 
information into, or in this case, out of, the problem. 
The CTT analysis is very similar to the analysis of item #20. 
Only 19X of the examinees scored item #9 correctly. The correlation 
with the rest of the test is 0.34, which is close to the average 
itera/test correlation. Distractor "b", which contains the 
misconception, attracted 47% of the examinees, and correlated near 
zero with the rest of the test (rpbi- -0.05). As in item #20, CTT 
analysis indicates that this item, or its misconception-distractor, 
should be removed from the test to improve the test's overall 
reliability. 
Again, as in item #20, the IRT parameters indicate that this 
item discriminates well (a = 1.797), especially among higher ability 
examinees (b - 1.81). There is also less guessing on this item (c 
0.11). According to IRT this item can remain in the test since it 
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contributes to the overall determination of examinee ability in an 
area that the test constructors wish to measure. 
The inclusion of Mis in standardized multiple-choice 
mathematics exams can aid in identifying students who have a weak or 
confused understanding of certain concepts. The use of Mis is 
problematic since the standard analysis of items using Classical Test 
Theory indicates that by discarding the item or the distractor 
containing the misconception the reliability of the test is improved. 
This is due to low p-values, low itera/test correlations and 
misconception-distractors which attract even the higher ability 
students. Unfortunately, discarding the MI would amount to a trade¬ 
off of validity for reliability. 
Item analyses using Item Response Theory can aid the test 
constructor enormously. Not only are Mis acceptable, but they are 
statistically good items. IRT indicates that Mis discriminate well 
among examinees, especially higher ability examinees. IRT also gives 
the probability of a correct response to an item for an examinee of 
any ability. The item-characteristic curves illustrate graphically 
how the different items differentiate among examinees of varying 
abilities. Perhaps most importantly the IRT item parameters are 
independent of the group tested, a characteristic that is not true of 
CTT statistics. 
It is suggested that test constructors of standardized 
mathematics tests incorporate misconceptions into their items to test 
for conceptual understanding and that both CTT and IRT are used in 
item analyses. 
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Analysis of Items for Gender Bias 
Much debate has occurred on the topic of test bias, its meaning 
(Flaugher, 1978), and in particular, its importance in interpreting 
observed differences in standardized tests among males and females 
(Dorans and Kulik, 1983). The history of gender differences on 
standardized tests of mathematics and science suggests that test 
items should somehow be evaluated for bias. 
At issue are the related objectives of test fairness and test 
validity. An item may be termed "unfair" if it somehow prevents a 
specific group from demonstrating knowledge and understanding which 
they in fact possess but which the item fails to reveal. The item is 
invalid if it does not effectively measure the trait for which it was 
designed. 
A gross over-simplification of the definition of bias is the 
assumption that any significant difference between groups is 
sufficient evidence for test bias. The recognition of differences in 
scores as measured in percent differences between groups on 
individual items as indicators of bias has gained legal precedent. 
The Golden Rule decision (Assembly Bill No. 4046, State of 
California) states that "in each content area of these tests, items 
for which the correct answer rates of Black, Hispanic, Asian, or 
American Indian descent and white examinees are not lower than 40 
percent and differ by no more than 15 percentage points shall be used 
to the extent that they are available." Though not specifically 
intended to deal with gender bias, the ruling clearly defines bias, 
legally, as simply the observed differences between groups on test 
items. 
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The implicit assumption of the Golden Rule procedure is that 
two comparison groups do not differ in competency with respect to the 
trait measured. This procedure makes no attempt to distinguish 
between differences in item performance which are caused by real 
group differences in knowledge or skill and those that are caused by 
irrelevant and interfering characteristics of the items as they 
appear. As Rogers stated, "Only when differences between groups on 
the dimension of interest are controlled can the influence of 
extraneous factors such as racial group membership [or gender] be 
isolated" (Rogers, 1987, p. 1). 
The dimension of interest must be identified within the 
framework of a suitable criterion. Once the criterion is 
established, a statistical analysis must be effected which calculates 
item bias due to group differences after differences on the criterion 
measure are accounted for. The notion of item bias is tied to the 
condition that when comparing two groups only "comparable members" 
may be compared. Even the term "bias" has been supplanted with the 
more recent term "differential item functioning", which describes the 
process of item comparison with individuals who are similar with 
respect to the criterion. 
Generally, the criterion of choice for test developers is the 
total score on the test itself. According to Holland and Thayer: 
Basic to all modern approaches to the study of dif 
[differential item functioning] is the notion of 
comparing only comparable members of F [focus group] an 
R [reference group] in attempting to identify items tha 
exhibit dif. Comparability means identity in those 
measured'Tharacteristics in which examinees may differ 
and that are strongly related to performance on the 
studied item. Important among the criteria used to 
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define comparability are (a) measures of the ability for 
which the item is designed, (b) schooling or other 
measures of relevant experience, and (c) membership in 
other groups. In practice, the matching criteria will 
usually include test scores since these are available, 
accurately measured, and usually measure the same ability 
as the studied item. (1986, p. 2) 
Using total test scores as a criterion to measure ability is 
problematic in that included in the test are the very items suspected 
of containing bias or dif. A careful analysis of any one particular 
item must take this feature into account. Consequently, a total test 
score may only be considered a fair criterion if all items suspected 
of bias are removed, and the isolated item newly evaluated using the 
"untainted" criterion of total test score on an unbiased test. 
The Mantel-Haenszel Procedure 
The procedure for identifying bias is prescribed through the 
use of the Mantel-Haenszel statistic (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959). 
Originally developed for medical research, the Mantel-Haenszel 
statistic is a chi-square statistic which is adapted for control of 
differences within a criterion. Modified by Holland (1986) for use 
in identifying dif in standardized tests for Educational Testing 
Service, Princeton, New Jersey, the procedure for using the Mantel- 
Haenszel statistic was employed in the present analysis of the 
Diagnostic Test. The procedure for identifying bias on the 
Diagnostic Test was as follows: 
* The results to the Diagnostic Test administered in 
January, 1987 were analyzed for this study. The reference 
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group consisted of 122 males, and the focal group 
consisted of 154 females. 
* Total scores on the 28-itera test were used as the initial 
criterion by which groups were classified according to 
ability. There were correspondingly 28 clusters, each 
comprised of those examinees who achieved the same total 
score on the test. 
* P-values (percent correct) for each item were calculated 
separately for the reference and focal groups. 
* A common odds-ratio for each item was then calculated by 
(1) examining each cluster to determine the odds that 
women and men answer the question correctly, (2) then 
calculate the ratio of the two odds, i.e. the odds that 
the men in that cluster will get the item correct divided 
by the odds that the women in that cluster will get the 
item correct, and finally, (3) calculate a weighted 
average over all clusters for that particular item. 
* The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistic was used to test 
the hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between groups on a particular item as may be indicated by 
the common odds-ratio. According to Holland and Thayer, 
"a test based on the MH-CHISQ is the uniformly most 
powerful unbiased test of HO versus HI" (1986, p. 8). 
With the total test score as criterion, items which appear 
to reject the null hypothesis with a significance at the 
0.01 level or less are flagged for removal from the test. 
207 
* Upon removal of the flagged items, the entire procedure is 
repeated using a new criterion of total score on a test 
which was rescored without those items. 
* Items flagged with the described controls are finally 
considered for permanent removal from the test, as they 
have been identified as being significantly differentially 
functioning with respect to gender. 
Results 
Only one of the 28 items was identified as gender biased in 
this study [a summary of results appears in Appendix F]. Men were 
four times more likely than women to succeed on item #26 of the 
Diagnostic Test. The item appears below: 
26) How many millions are in 1.8 billion? 
a. 18 b. 1,800 c. 18,000 d. 1.8 e. 0.18 
The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square (one degree of freedom) was 
calculated to be 20.34 on both computer runs, one with a total test- 
score criterion and another using a total test-score with item #26 
removed. This statistic indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis 
at a significance at the 0.001 level. Although no obvious gender 
bias characteristics are apparant in the item statement or in the 
distractors, bias is present nevertheless, and to a significant 
degree. 
However, this item was not removed from the test for reasons of 
content validity. Number sense is an important topic in Math 010. 
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It is given priority on all examinations in the course, and is 
considered a necessary prerequisite for success in courses from all 
disciplines as well as for success in subsequent mathematics courses. 
This author is at a loss for even the most tenuous of 
conjectures as to the source of the gender bias on this item. No 
doubt, more investigation is required. 
Test Results: Overall Gain, Conceptual and Algorithmic Gain, 
Gender Differentiated Gain 
A group of 101 students, 35 male and 66 female, were selected 
for this study. This group represents all students who satisfied 
the following three requirements: a) they all took the Math 010 
Diagnostic Test in the beginning of the Fall 1986 semester and 
scored less than 16 correct; b) they completed the Math 010 course 
that same semester; and c) though very few of the returning students 
failed Math 010 in the Fall, all of these students were retested on 
the Diagnostic in February, 1987. Those students who chose not to 
enroll in Math 010 or Math 011 in Spring 1987 were not available for 
this study. To this degree, the students are self-selected. 
Table 5 reports the data on both pre- and post-tests. The 
total test of 28 items was further differentiated into subtests for 
algorithmic skills type items and higher order thinking skills type 
items. Each subtest contained nine items. Grades were recorded 
numerically on a scale from zero to seven with the following 
associations: 7 - A, 6 - AB, 5 - B, 4 - BC, 3 - C, 2 - CD, 1 - D, 0 - 
F. Gender was coded male - 1. female - 2. The mean of 1.65 for the 
sex category aimply indicates that there were more women than men in 
this sample. 
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TABLE 5. Diagnostic Test Statistics 
Tot. Obs. = 101 SEX PRE/H.I. PRE/A1. PRETEST 
Number of Cases: 101 101 101 101 
Minimum: 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Maximum: 2.00 5.00 8.00 15.00 
Mean: 1.65 1.88 3.29 8.93 
Standard Deviation: 0.48 1.18 1.62 2.71 
Tot. Obs. = 101 GRADE POST/H.I. POST/AL. POSTTEST 
Number of Cases: 101 101 101 101 
Minimum: 0.00 0.00 2.00 7.00 
Maximum: 7.00 7.00 8.00 24.00 
Mean: 4.50 3.05 5.74 15.63 
Standard Deviation: 2.26 1.57 
t 
1.47 3.62 
An evaluation of the Math 010 course as a treatment for 
performance on the Diagnostic test indicates that the course was 
indeed beneficial. The mean gain on the Diagnostic test [28 items] 
from pre- to post-test scores is 6.703, with a standard deviation of 
3.46. A paired samples t-test with 100 degrees of freedom yields a 
t-value of 19.47. The gain is significant with a probability 
< 0.001. 
Significant gains occurred in the subtests as well. The mean 
gain in higher-order skills as measured by that subtest is 1.168 
from pre- to post-test. With a standard deviation of 1.715, and 100 
i 
degrees of freedom, the t-value is 6.846. The gain in higher-order 
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skills is also significant with a probability of accepting the null 
hypothesis < 0.001. The algorithmic skills subtest showed even 
greater gains from pre- to post-test. The mean difference is 2.455 
items, with a standard deviation of 1.825. The t-value is 13.522, 
again with 100 degrees of freedom, and with a significance < 0.001. 
Interestingly, the gains in higher-order skills and 
algorithmic skills were not equivalent. Students gain significantly 
more in their algorithmic skills than they do in critical thinking 
skills. The mean difference in their gain scores is 1.287. With a 
standard deviation of 2.447 and 100 degrees of freedom, the t-value 
of 5.287 indicates a significance < 0.001. This result implies that 
while the Math 010 course succeeds in improving both types of 
skills, it succeeds in teaching the algorithmic skills more than it 
succeeds in teaching the higher-order thinking skills. This 
observation will be discussed further in the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
An analysis of test results for gender differences indicates 
that while there were no significant gender differences among the 
sample at the beginning of the Math 010 course, there were 
significant differences by the end of the course. Though not 
reflected in their grades, women in the course scored significantly 
higher than the men on the post-test. They showed their greatest 
gains on the algorithmic skills subtest, where their gains 
outstripped the gains reported by the men. 
As may be seen from the statistics below, there was no 
significant gender difference evident on the pre-test; not in total 
scores nor in either of the subtests. 
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TABLE 6. Independent Samples T-Test (Pre-) 
Independent Samples T-Test on Pretest grouped by sex 
males mean - 9.09 SD - 2.57 
females mean = 8.85 SD - 2.80 
separate variances t = 0.428 DF - 74.8 prob - 0.67 
pooled variances t - 0.416 DF - 99 prob - 0.68 
Independent Samples T-Test on Preal grouped by sex 
males mean «* 3.46 SD - 1.63 
females mean = 3.20 SD = 1.61 
separate variances t - 0.766 DF - > 68.5 prob - 0.45 
pooled variances t = 0.769 DF = ■ 99 prob - 0.44 
Independent Samples T-Test on Prehi grouped bv sex 
males mean = 1.86 SD - 1.26 
females mean - 1.89 SD = 1.14 
separate variances t - 0.144 DF - 63.4 prob - 0.89 
pooled variances t - 0.149 DF - 99 prob = 0.88 
Analysis of the post-test indicates that women performed 
significantly better than men at the end of the Math 010 course. 
The mean score for women was 16.20, SD - 3.47, while the men had a 
mean score of 15.57, SD = 3.73. Both t-tests (separate variances 
t = 2.14, DF = 65.1, and pooled variances t = 2.19, DF = 99) attest 
to a significant difference between the two groups with a 
probability <0.04 (prob = 0.036 and prob = 0.031 respectively). 
However, no significant differences were observed on the post-test 
With regard to the subtests. Both groups attained similar mean 
scores, as can be seen from the data below: 
TABLE 7. Independent Samples T-Test (Post-) 
Independent Samples T-Test on Postal grouped by sex 
males mean - 5.40 SD - 1.44 
females mean - 5.92 SD - 1.46 
separate variances t - 1.73 DF - 70.3 prob - 0.09 
pooled variances t - 1.73 DF - 99 prob - 0.09 
Independent Samples T-Test on Posthi grouped by sex 
males mean = 3.11 SD - 1.89 
females mean = 3.02 SD - 1.39 
separate variances t = 0.2) DF - 53.9 prob = 0.79 
pooled variances t - 0.30 DF - 99 prob » 0.76 
As may be inferred from the results of the total post-test 
scores, women gained more than the men. In fact there is a 
significant difference in the gain scores of men and women. The 
following test for significance illustrates the degree to which men 
and women exhibit differential gain from pre-test to post-test. 
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TABLE 8. Independent Samples T-Test (Total Gain) 
• 
Independent Samples T-Test on total gain grouped by sex 
males mean gain - 5.49 SD - 3.34 
females mean gain = 7.35 SD = 3.37 
separate variances t - 2.66 DF - 70.0 prob = 0.01 
pooled variances t - 2.65 DF - 99 prob < 0.01 
It appears that most of the gain for the women comes from gain 
in algorithmic skills. While there is no significant differential 
in gains on the higher-order skills subtest between the two groups, 
there was a statistically significant difference on the algorithmic 
skills subtest. The relevant analyses are as follows: 
TABLE 9. Independent Samples T-Test (Differences) 
♦ 
Independent Samples T-Test on differences in gain scores on 
the a l£o rithmic skills subtest grouped by sex 
males mean gain - 1.94 SD » 1.86 
females mean gain * 2.73 SD = 1.76 
separate variances t = 2.05 DF - 66.1 prob = 0.04 
pooled variances t = 2.09 DF - 99 prob « 0.04 
Independent Samples T-Test on differences in gain scores on 
the higher-order skills subtest grouped by sex 
males mean gain = 1.26 SD = 1.95 
females mean gain =1.12 SD = 1.59 
separate variances t = 0.36 DF = 58.6 prob = 0.72 
i 
pooled variances t = 0.37 DF = 99 prob = 0.71 
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The gender differences reported here were not reflected in the 
students' grades. Although women in the Math 010 course received 
slightly higher grades than the men, the difference was not 
statistically significant. 
TABLE 10. Independent Samples T-Test (Grade) 
Independent Samples T-Test on grade grouped by sex 
males mean grade - 4.03 SD - 2.60 
females mean grade = 4.67 SD - 2.05 
separate variances t = 1.26 DF - 56.9 prob - 0.21 
pooled variances t = 1.36 DF - 99 prob - 0.18 
Conclusions 
The gains recorded by students on the Diagnostic Test support 
the hypothesis that the Math 010 course effectively teaches students 
to operate with algorithms to assist them in mathematical 
computation and algebraic symbol manipulation, and to apply their 
mathematical understanding to the solution of word problems. 
The greater gain on the Diagnostic test reported by women in 
the Math 010 course is not unusual for several reasons. As 
indicated in the test results, most of the gain which women achieved 
on the Diagnostic test came from the algorithmic-type items. The 
algorithmic skills sub-test correlated with the Diagnostic test more 
highly than the higher-order thinking skills sub-test, [preal with 
pretotal correlated 0.78, while prehi with pretotal correlated 0.38, 
postal with posttotal correlated 0.75, while posthi with posttotal 
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correlated 0.57]. The high correlation may be attributed to the 
fact that the Diagnostic test contained more algorithmic-type items 
than higher-order thinking skills items. Furthermore, since most 
mathematics instruction that students received prior to college 
consists of algorithmic computation, much of the gain with these 
types of items may be due to "refreshing” memory. 
But the above observations do not explain the gender 
difference in gain scores on the algorithmic skills subtest. To 
better understand the gender difference in algorithmic gain it is 
useful to trace the development of these skills in both sexes prior 
to college. According to two major national surveys of mathematics 
assessment, 13 year-old girls performed significantly better on 
computation than boys of the same age. The Women in Mathematics 
Survey (Fall, 1978) reports that girls scored 53.6% correct on the 
test of computation, while boys scored only 48.3% [significant at 
the 0.05 level]. The NAEP Second Mathematics Assessment (1977-78) 
reports that girls scored 53.4% correct, and boys scored 49.9% 
correct on a test of computation, [significant at the 0.01 level]. 
However, both national assessments report that the gender difference 
in computation disappears by grade 12 and age 17 respectively. 
While there is no definitive explanation for this observation 
(Armstrong, 1985), the fact that the advantage which girls possess 
at age 13 on computation suggests that at one time in their academic 
careers they performed better than boys. The disappearance of the 
advantage may be due to the fact that boys, given more sex-role 
ratification for mathematics learning than girls (Armstrong, 1985), 
improve their skills in mathematics, while girls, with less 
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ratification, improve, but not as quickly as boys at the high school 
level. 
Considering that girls did better than boys on algorithmic 
computation early in their education, and that many of the 
computational skills measured on the diagnostic test were taught 
predominantly at the middle school level, it is not surprising that 
once the course "refreshed" the memories of the students, the gender 
differences observed at the middle school level would reappear in 
college remedial mathematics. 
Women were not alone in their disproportionate gain in 
algorithmic skills over higher-order thinking skills. Both male and 
female student gains in algorithmic skills surpassed their gains in 
what is here termed higher-order thinking skills. Their ability to 
perform computations increased more than their ability for critical 
thinking needed to solve problems. This result is puzzling for two 
reasons. First, the main emphasis in the Math 010 course is problem 
solving. Very little class time is devoted to the explanation of 
basic algorithms. Although students are asked to prepare themselves 
for computational quizzes, they are seldom asked to perform 
computations for homework. Rather, almost all classwork and 
homework consists of problem solving from the Math 010 Workbook 
(described earlier). Second, the rationale for avoiding the direct 
instruction of algorithms lies with the supposition that students 
can and will invent algorithms in their attempt to solve 
challenging, conceptual, word problems. Based on research, it was 
also assumed that the use of concrete representations would aid 
students both in formulating and understanding algorithms and in 
using diagrams to solve problems. 
The question arises: does solving word problems succeed in 
teaching computational thinking more than it succeeds in teaching 
how to solve word problems? While the answer to this question is 
outside the scope of this study, it poses a problem for 
constructivist mathematics teaching. According to constructivism, 
student understanding of powerful mathematical constructions is 
manifest in problem solving. Algorithms are in effect tools which 
facilitate the problem solving process. Alone, they are incapable 
of guidance. Rather, algorithms must be interpreted and understood 
on a conceptual level to really be of use in problem solving. 
Genuine understanding, according to constructivism, comes about 
through active applied thought about which the student reflects. 
Only upon self-reflection is understanding for meaning made 
possible. This is what Piaget refers to as reflexive abstraction. 
More recently the activity has been referred to as metacognition. 
Perhaps the connection between algorithms and problem solving 
could be made clearer in Math 010. Instruction may miss the goal of 
affording the students opportunities for reflection on how specific 
algorithms relate to problems which the students are asked to solve. 
That students may in fact succeed with solving a particular problem 
does not insure that they have the opportunity to reflect on how the 
problem was solved, and which algorithmic tools may expedite its 
solution. 
Instruction may ameliorate the difficulties students have in 
combining algorithmic and conceptual knowledge. Using the reciprocal 
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teaching and cognitive apprenticeship models, discussed earlier, 
teachers may describe their thought processes aloud while solving a 
problem, and they may reflect aloud on their thought processes, 
interjecting their own understanding of the connection between 
algorithms, mathematical terminology, diagrams, similar problems, 
etc. as they solve the problem. Much of this could be done 
retrospectively as well, so long as the reasons for algorithms and 
their structure are made explicit. 
One conclusion of this study is that the objective of 
integrating algorithmic knowledge with word—problem solving is 
believed to require more explicit instruction. Teachers in the Math 
010 course vary in their abilities to articulate their understanding 
of how algorithms may be developed from problem solving. One 
criticism they and their students have voiced about the Math 010 
Workbook is that the book does not contain enough description of the 
ideas that the problems are supposed to teach. One possible remedy 
is to rewrite the book. 
Deborah Schifter and this author renewed our collaborative 
efforts in an attempt to rewrite a chapter of the Workbook [Appendix 
H] to aid students and teachers in their learning to integrate 
problem solving with an understanding of algorithms and the concepts 
and terminology of a unit of fractions. By including more 
algorithmic exercises inserted strategically among the word problems, 
we anticipate that students will discover a connection between the 
two types of skills taught. Additionally, a split notebook approach 
was incorporated into the presentation of thought process protocol 
solutions. In conjuction with the thought process solution to a 
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problem [appearing on the left aide of the page of text] a commentary 
ia added [on the right aide of the page of text] which explaina, from 
a mathematiclan'a perapective, how the aolution developa both the 
concept and the algorithm needed to solve problems involving 
operations with fractions. 
It is the authors' intention that the split notebook 
presentation suggests to students and teachers that conceptual 
understanding and algorithmic skills are fundamentally related, and 
that only by seeking both, in a reflective and self-conscious manner, 
can proficiency in mathematics be attained. 
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THOUGHT PROCESS PROTOCOL: A DESCRIPTION 
WHAT is a thought process protocol? 
A thought process protocol is a written problem solution which 
includes all of your thoughts about the problem you are working on -- 
from start to finish. 
WHY do we use a thought process protocol? 
We believe that by reviewing your thinking process you can learn 
where you succeeded and where you went wrong in your solution. 
Remember: There are many ways to solve a problem. However, there 
are also many misunderstandings of concepts (misconceptions) which 
can steer you in a wrong direction. 
HOW do you write a thought process protocol? 
As soon as you have read the problem, begin writing out your thoughts 
about the problem: what the problem is asking, how you might go 
about solving it and why you would approach it this way. . .Write 
anything that comes to mind. Keep in mind that you are trying to 
solve the problem and at the same time explain the solution. So, be 
sure to take as much time as necessary to clearly express your 
thoughts. 
There is no "right" or "wrong" approach to a problem solution. 
Sometimes you might start doing something and decide that it is 
wrong. Don't erase it or start over. Just continue. In the thought 
process protocol, you should include all of your thoughts—not just 
the ones you think are "right". 
If you use diagrams, pictures, or do manipulations like multiplying, 
dividing, etc., explain why. Why did you draw the picture? Why 
should you multiply or divide? The purpose of the protocol is to 
explain your thinking process as thoroughly as possible. 
Below are two lists: One which describes what a thought process 
protocol is, and the other which describes what it is not. 
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A Thought Process Protocol: 
IS NOT 
* a written assignment at least 
400 words long 
* all thoughts about the problem 
that you are working on 
* streams of consciousness 
* first reactions 
* similar to journal writing 
* a clear expression of your 
thoughts: write as much 
as necessary in order to explain 
how you are solving the problem 
* legible: make sure your hand¬ 
writing is neat enough to read. 
* a pre-organized essay 
* the only approach to 
solving the problem that 
will work 
* a bunch of numbers or 
manipulations on a page 
* graded on your grammar and 
punctuation: it is the 
content that counts 
A thought process protocol takes time. Set aside an uninterrupted 
block of time (45 minutes to an hour) to sit and write out your 
solution to the problem. 
EXAMPLES: 
For each topic in this book (e.g., Problem Solving, fractions, 
Decimals, etc.) there are sample problem solutions. The sample 
problem solutions demonstrate one way to solve the problem. There 
are many other ways to also arrive at the correct answer. The 
specific operations used in the solutions may not apply directly to 
other problems in that section. These problem solutions are intended 
to be model thought process protocols. They are not intended to be 
memorized for future quizzes, tests, etc. Each problem is unique and 
must be approached as such. You may find the sample problem 
solutions listed in the Table of Contents. 
On the following page, there is a sample thought process protocol. 
Read it and see if you can follow the student's thought process. 
Yes, the sample one really was a homework assignment. 
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SAMPLE PROBLEM SOLUTION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT: 
Flask Problem 
A flask containing 650 doses of medicine had 5 ml. of the 
medicine removed for experimentation. Because of an emergency, 
another clinic was sent one-fifth of the remainder. Afterward, only 
512 doses remained. Calculate the dosage in milliliters (ml.). 
Hint: Be careful to recognize that there's a difference between 
number of doses, and number of milliliters per dose. 
PROBLEM SOLUTION: 
I've read the problem a couple of times, and I'm not sure where 
to start. "A flask containing 650 doses of medicine..." — why don't 
I start by drawing a flask? 
650 doses Here is a full flask and 
it contains 650 doses. 
Next, 5 ml. are removed. I don't know how much that is in 
proportion to the 650 doses, so I will just shade in a little bit at 
the top which means it has been taken out. 
(Continued) 
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Now another clinic was sent one-fifth of the remainder. That means 
that will have to divide what is left in the flask into 5 equal 
drllS\- BUV°W 1 d° that? The flask is a funny »h«pe, and if I 
raw lines to separate it into 5 parts, I won't be sure that they 
nlU bX 5/,qU^1 parts- Is there another way I can draw the picture? 
Does the flask have to look like the kind in the chemistry lab, or 
can I just use a box to represent 650 doses? I don't see why not. 
After all, 650 doses is 650 doses—right? I think so. 
O.K. I’m starting over again. I'm going to draw a box which 
represents 650 doses of medicine. And, I'm going to take 5 ml. out 
of one corner. 
650 doses 
S' -- > 
I shaded it to show 
that it was taken out. 
Oh, no. I have the same problem as before. I can't separate 
the remainder (after I take the 5 ml. out) into 5 equal parts. I 
have to do it another way. I will take the 5 ml. out of one end. 
650 doses 
Good. Now I am left with 
something I can section 
into 5 equal parts. 
(Continued) 
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I will draw the 5 equal parts and shade in the portion send to 
another clinic which will mean that it has been taken out. 
650 doses 
r ~~— 
'■S' 
ION 
'///Z$$/?)¥?/>'/////// 
Now, the problem says that only 512 doses remained. That means 
that there are 4 equal parts remaining, which total 512 doses. Ah 
ha. Then, there are 512 - 4 * 128 doses in each part. That must 
also mean that the other clinic was sent 128 doses since their 
portion is the same size as each of the other equal parts. I will 
write this information in my drawing. 
512 
doses 
128 doses 
650 doses 
___ 
128 doses § 
128 doses 
128 doses '■S' 
> 
128 doses 
\ 
V////////// $5 
Let me review what the drawing tells me. There are 650 doses 
total. 512 doses are still in the flask and 128 doses were sent to 
another clinic. Then 512 + 128 - 640 doses accounted for. What 
about the 5 ml.? 
There are 650 doses in all. 640 of them are accounted for. 
Then, 10 remain. Those 10 doses must be 5 ml. 
(Continued) 
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If there are 5 ml. in 10 doses, how many ml. in one dose? This 
reminds me of one of those "miles per gallon" problems. Only now it 
is "milliliters per dose." With "miles per gallon", I always put the 
miles on the top and the gallons on the bottom like this: 
miles 
gallons 
1 will set up the "milliliters per dose" the same way: 
milliliters * 5 
dose 10 
If that is reduced, it comes to 1/2. That means there is 1 
milliliter for every 2 doses. So, if there is 1 milliliter in every 
2 doses, there must be 1/2 milliliter for every one dose. 
My answer for this problem is that there is 1/2 ml. of medicine 
for every dose of medicine in the flask. 
Note: This solution demonstrates one way to solve this problem. 
There are many other ways to also arrive at the correct 
answer. The specific operations used in the solution may 
not apply directly to other problems in this section. This 
problem solution is intended to be a model thought process 
protocol. It is not intended to be memorized for future 
quizzes, tests, etc. Each problem is unique and must be 
approached as such. 
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TOPIC II: NUMBERS AND THEIR USES 
Types of numbers appearing in this section and in this book: 
Integers—positive and negative 
Fractions (which are sometimes whole numbers) 
Decimals—another way of writing some, but not all, 
fractions 
Percents—how many hundredths? 
Powers—numbers with exponents 
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INTEGERS—Positive and Negative 
The dots on the numberline identify some integers: 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
A few which have been designated above are: 
-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3 
DECIMALS 
(Another way of writing some, but not all, fractions) 
The dots on the numberline identify some decimals. 
-2.5 
-.8 1.5 
-3 5 
-2 
-2 •1 4 
-5 
1 3 2 
-2 
Compare the decimals on this numberline to the fractions on the 
previous numberline. Note that -2.5 equals (or represents the same 
quantity as) -5/2, -.8 - -4/5, and 1.5 - 3/2. 
The fraction 1/3 is an example of a fraction which cannot be 
written as a finite decimal. 
Here 
1 
3 - 3 1.0000 
10 
zl 
10 
zl 
10 
This division process is never complete. 
It is called a repeating decimal. 
(Continued) 
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DECIMALS, like fractions, may also be pieces of things, the only 
difference being that things are cut up into ten pieces, one hundred 
pieces, a thousand pieces, ten thousand pieces, a hundred thousand 
pieces, etc. 
In the example of cutting the cake, when the cake was cut into 
five equal pieces, we saw that one piece was 1/5 of the cake. 
If the cake were cut into ten 
equal pieces, then one piece 
would be one-tenth. 
__1 - .1 = .1 
10 10 1.0 
of the cake. Two of these smaller pieces would be the same amount of 
the cake as 1/5. 
_2 
10 
J2 
10 2.0 
J. 
5 
.2 
5 1.0 
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FRACTIONS I 
Use pictorial representations to solve the following problems: 
Tom, Sue and John went to a pizza party where pizzas were being 
delivered throughout the evening. (The pizzas were large, and each 
was sliced into twelve equal pieces.) 
a. At this party, Tom ate two slices of the first pizza, one 
slice from the second and three slices from the third. What 
fraction of a whole pizza did Tom eat that evening? 
b. That evening, Sue ate five pieces from the first pizza, six 
from the second, and two slices later on. What fraction of 
a whole pizza did Sue eat that evening? 
(Continued) 
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c. At one point in the evening, John shared a pizza equally 
with two other people. He then shared a second pizza 
equally with three other people. Later, he ate another 
slice. What fraction of a whole pizza did he eat that 
evening? 
d. Five pizzas were totally eaten that evening, and each person ate 
at least one slice. What is the maximum number of people 
that could have attended the party, including all of the 
people in the three previous parts of this problem? 
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FRACTIONS II 
He J!b't00k 3 tIiP in WhiCh he traveled by car, foot and bicycle 
hour. trip at an average speed of 12 miles per 
Use line diagrams to answer the following questions. 
1. What fraction of the time of the entire trip did he 
spend: 
in the car? 
b. on the bicycle? 
c. walking? 
2. What fraction of the distance of the entire trip did he travel: 
a. by car? 
b. by bicycle? 
c. by foot? 
FRACTIONS III 
U. S. liquid-volume measurements: 
1 gallon contains 4 quarts 
1 quart contains 2 pints 
1 pint contains 2 cups 
1 cup contains 8 fluid ounces. 
Metric liquid-volume measurements: 
1 liter contains 1000 cubic centimeters 
1 liter contains 100 centiliters 
1 centiliter contains 10 milliliters 
Use the above information to answer the following questions: 
1. One ounce is what fraction of: 
a. a gallon? 
b. a quart? 
c. a pint? 
2. One cup is what part of: 
a. a gallon? 
b. a quart? 
3. One pint is what fraction of a gallon? 
(Continued) 
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4. One milliliter is what part of: 
a. a centiliter? 
b. a liter? 
c. a cubic centimeter? 
5. Draw a picture of a cubic centimeter. 
FRACTIONS IV 
A man left two-thirds of his total fortune to his cat and asked 
that one-fourth of what the cat received should be used to teach 
it to talk. 
a. What fraction of the total fortune was used for teaching 
the cat to talk? 
b. After two-thirds of the fortune went to the cat, what 
fraction remained? 
c. The man left one-half of the remainder to his wife. What 
fraction of the total fortune did the wife receive? 
d. The wife spent one-fifth of what she received on a new 
Italian sports car. What fraction of the total fortune was 
spent on the car? 
e. Using the information in the problem and your own knowledge 
of the world, estimate the cost of the cat's speech lessons. 
(Hint: First estimate the cost of an Italian sports car.) 
2. The math 010 office purchases bottled drinking water. Mrs. 
Gazebo's Mountain Spring Water comes in containers that hold 6-3/4 
liters. Two-thirds of the office container was drained last week to 
put out a fire in Ron's wastebasket. 
a. How many liters of water are left in the bottle? 
b. How many 3/8 liter glasses can be filled with the water 
that remains in the jar? 
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FRACTIONS V 
A researcher at a medical school would like to test a hypothesis 
that a certain drug may be administered in smaller doses than 
originally prescribed. He has a vial which contains 235 doses, and 
each dose is two and one-half milliliters. How many new-size doses 
will he have if he reduces the dose to three-fifths of the original 
dose? 
FRACTIONS VI 
pictorial representations to solve the following problems: 
Typical expenses from my monthly income are: 
1/3 rent 
1/4 food 
1/6 phone and utilities 
How much of my monthly income does this account for? 
Last month, I spent as much money on entertainment as I did on 
rent. Assuming that my other expenses were the same as usual, 
how much of my monthly income did I withdraw from my savings 
account? 
What fraction of the savings account was withdrawn? 
FRACTIONS VII 
1. A birthday cake is to be shared. The children, who are allotted 
half a piece each, consume twice as much cake as the adults, who 
are allotted two pieces for each man and one piece for each 
woman. 3/45 of the adults are male, and he is cutting the cake. 
How many children are at the party? 
Note: Everybody eats their share of the cake, and none remains. 
(Continued) 
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2. Four people share a pizza in the following way: Tom got a third 
and Mary got a third of the remainder while Dick and Harry shared 
equally what Tom and Mary did not get. 
What fraction of the whole pizza did Harry receive? 
FRACTIONS VIII 
A company of 266 persons consists of men, women and children. 
There are four times as many men as children, and twice as many 
women as children. How many of each were there? 
(Continued) 
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2. In Sarah's flower garden, one-third of the plants are marigolds, 
one-fourth are petunias, one eighth are zinnias, one twelfth are 
mums and there are ten other plants each of a different variety. 
How many plants are there of each variety? 
(Continued) 
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3. To convert 3-1/4 to an improper fraction, you multiply the 3 
times the 4 and add 1 to get 1-3/4. Using pictures to 
illustrate, explain in words what you are doing when you 
"multiply 3 times 4 and add 1", and why this gives the correct 
result. 
4. Use pictures to show that 2/3 of 3/4 equals 1/2. 
5. Is it also true that 3/4 of 2/3 equals 1/2? Again, use pictures. 
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SAMPLE PROBLEM SOLUTION 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Fractions VIII 
2. In Sarah's flower garden, one-third of the plants are marigolds, 
one-fourth are petunias, one-eighth are zinnias, one-twelfths 
are mums, and there are ten other plants each of a different 
variety. How many plants are there of each variety? 
PROBLEM SOLUTION: 
The problem asks "How many plants are there of each variety?" Well 
I wonder how many there are altogether. 
Here's the breakdown of different plants: 
1/3 marigolds 
1/4 petunias 
1/8 zinnias 
1/12 mums 
10 other plants 
All I know definitely is that there are 
other flowers), each of a different 
more than 10 plants altogether. 
10 plants (in addition to the 
variety. So, there must be 
OK. The fractions represent parts of the whole. ,F°" ^nSt^e'h‘” 
(fraction) of the plants (the whole) are marigolds. But, how 
many plants make up the whole? 
I am going to start with an empty box to represent all the plants in 
the garden: 
All of the plants 
(Continued) 
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How should I divide it up? How do I know how many parts to divide it 
into if I don't know how many plants there are? I don't know. 
Just to have some place to start, I'll start at the top of the list, 
with the marigolds. Since 1/3 of the plants are marigolds, I'll 
divide my box into three equal parts. I'll shade in one of the 
three parts to show that that part contains the marigolds: 
marigolds 
But, what does one-third of the box represent? One marigold? 
Obviously, there isn't just one marigold. That would mean there are 
only 3 plants in the garden, and I already know there are at least 
10. 
I still don't know how many plants there are altogether. But, since 
12 is the largest denominator of the fractions mentioned in the 
problem, I will start there. So, I will divide my box into 12 equal 
parts. (I have to remember that the box includes all of the plants.) 
The box is already divided into 3 equal parts. What do I do to 
divide it into 12 equal parts? Well, 3x4- 12. There are three 
columns; and if I make 4 rows, that will leave 12 equal parts within 
the box. 
12 equal parts 
in the box 
3 columns 
marigolds 
4 rows 
(Continued) 
248 
Now, one-third of the plants (or 1/3 of the box) is marigolds. What 
is 1/3 of the box now that it is sectioned into 12 parts? (One-third 
is still one part out of 3 equal parts.) 
But, how many equal parts are there in the one-third of the box? 1, 
2, 3, 4. There are four parts. Does that mean there are only 8 
other plants? No, that can't be true. I know that there are more 
than 10 plants in addition to the marigolds. Each individual part 
must represent more than one plant, so I have to further divide the 
box into more equal parts. 
I am going to further divide the box. Each column will be divided in 
half so there will be six columns in all instead of three. 
6 columns 
1/3 of the box (marigolds) 
I have changed the total number of equal parts in the box. Now there 
are 24 equal parts. 
One-third of the box ie still marigolds, but now there are 8 equal 
parts within that one-third whereas there were 4 equal parts before. 
OK I am going to continue to section off the box with the other 
plants. Whafs next? Well, the problem mentions ^ he 
netunias." So, I need to section off one quarter of the box for the 
petunias. How many parts are contained within 1/4 of the ox? 
First, 1 need to know how many parts there are altogether. There 
24 equal parts. Well, what is 1/4 of 24? 
1. x 24 = 24 = 6 
4 6 
There are 6 parts within 1/4 of the box 
(Continued) 
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I will shade in 6 parts of my box to represent the petunias. 
1/4 of the box - 6 equal parts 
a (petunias) 
7// 7 % 
ft i 
ft i % 
// /, \ 
1/3 of the box - 8 equal parts 
(marigolds) 
What's next? "One-eighth are zinnias." Now I have the same problem 
as before: how many parts represent 1/8 of the box? I know there 
are 24 parts altogether, and 1/8 of 24 is: 
_1 x 24 - 24 - 3 
8 8 
So, 3 parts represent 1/8 of the box or the zinnias. Now I will 
shade in that portion of the box: 
1/4 of^the box - 6 equal parts 
^ (petunias) 
7// 7 % 0 ( | 
V 7, 1 7, n 
1/3 of the box - 
8 equal parts 
(marigolds) 
1/8 of the box 
3 equal parts 
(zinnias) 
Next? “One-twelfth are mums." OK. How many parts represent 1/12 o£ 
the box? 1/12 of 24 is: 
1 x 24 = 24 = 2 
12 12 
(Continued) 
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There are 2 parts out of 24 that represent 1/12 of the plants (or the 
mums). I'll shade in 2 parts for the mums. 
1/4 of the box 6 equal parts 
(petunias) 
1/12 of the box 
2 parts (mums) 
1/3 of the box 
8 equal parts 
(marigolds) 
1/8 of the box 
3 equal parts 
(zinnias) 
OK. So far, so good. What's left? "...ten other plants, each of a 
different variety." I don't know what fraction of the plants is 
represented by the 10, so I can't figure this out the way I did the 
fractions. 
How many parts are left? There are 5. And I need a certain number 
of equal parts to represent 10 plants. Well, if each par 
represented two plants, I would have the 10 plants tak«» ‘are °f * 
That means I have to divide each equal part into two parts. Or, 
can just note on my diagram that each equal part represents 2 plan s, 
Letting each part represent 2 plants sounds simpler than dividing 
each part in 2. I will show this on my diagram: 
1/4 of the box - 6 equal parts 
(petunias) 
1/12 of the box 
2 parts (mums) 
5 parts “ 10 plants 
1/3 of the box 
8 equal parts 
(marigolds) 
1/8 of the box = 
3 equal parts 
(zinnias) 
Each part represents 2 plants. NOTE: (Continued) 
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What does this mean in terms of answering the original question? The 
problem asks: "How many plants are there of each variety?" And, I 
wondered how may there were altogether. I have to know how many 
plants there are in total to figure out how many plants are 
represented by the fraction. For instance, "one-third" doesn't tell 
me an absolute number; it just tells me the relative portion. One- 
third of 12 is not the same number as 1/3 of 24. One-third of 12 is 
4, and 1/3 of 24. One-third of 12 is 4 and 1/3 of 24 is 8. 
And, the ten plants gave me a reference point. The 10 plants helped 
me determine the size of each equal part in ray box. Now I know that 
each equal part represents two plants. With this information, I can 
look at ray diagram and figure out how many plants there are of each 
variety. 
1/4 of the box = 6 equal parts 
(petunias) 
1/12 of the box - 
2 parts (mums) 
5 parts = 10 plants 
1/3 of the box 
8 equal parts 
(marigolds) 
1/8 of the box 
3 equal parts 
(zinnias) 
NOTE: Each part represents 2 plants. 
Marigolds 
1/3 of the box = 8 equal parts. Each part 
plants. Therefore, 8 x 2 - 16 marigolds. 
represents 2 
Petunias . n 
1/4 of the box - 6 equal parts. Each part represents 
plants. Therefore, 3 x 2 = 12 petunias.. 
(Continued) 
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Zinnias 
1/8 of the box - 3 parts. Each part represents 2 plants. 
Therefore, 3x2-6 zinnias. 
Mums 
1/12 of the box - 2 parts. Each part represents 2 plants. 
Therefore, 2x2-4 mums. 
Other plants, each of a different variety. 
5 equal parts. Each equal part represents 2 plants. 
Therefore, 5x2- 10 other plants, each of a different 
variety. 
OK. That looks like the end of this problem solution. But, can I be 
sure? Have I accounted for each equal part within my box? There are 
24 equal parts, and each part represents 2 plants so there must be 24 
x 2 - 48 plants altogether. Let me add up the flowers I've already 
counted: 
12 marigolds 
12 petunias 
6 zinnias 
4 mums 
10 others 
48 TOTAL 
Yes, I now feel confident that all plants have been accounted for 
NOTE- This solution demonstrates one way to solve this problem. 
There are many other ways to also arrive at the correct 
answer tL specific operations used in solution may not 
apply directly to other problems in this section. This 
problem solution Is Intended to be a model thought process 
protocol. It is not intended to be memorized for future 
quizzes, tests, etc. Each problem is unique and must 
approached as such. 
FRACTIONS VIII 1/2 
A limited number of tickets were available for a jazz concert. Ruth 
bought one-fourth of the tickets, David bought one-sixth, George 
bought two-ninths, and Linda bought one-twelfth of the tickets. The 
remaining 50 pairs of tickets were bought by Nina. 
a. How many tickets did George buy? 
b. How many tickets were there altogether? 
FRACTIONS IX 
Use a pictorial representation to solve the following problem: 
The oil bill for a group house was for the months of January 
and February. Four people lived in the house during January, 
and a fifth moved in on February 1st. Assuming that the same 
amount of heat was used each of the two months, what fraction 
of the bill should each person pay? 
NOTE: The fifth person should not have to pay for January s 
heat. 
FRACTIONS X 
2. The area of one triangle is what portion of the area of the 
square? 
(Continued) 
3. The area of both of the triangles is what portion of the area of 
the square? 
4. What fraction of the perimeter of the square are three of its 
sides? 
5. The diagonal is what fraction of the perimeter of the square? 
(You may approximate your answer." 
6. The diagonal is what fraction of one of the sides of the square 
(You may approximate your answer.) 
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FRACTIONS XI 
1. In a certain population, two-thirds of all men are married, but 
only 3/5 of all the women are married. 
a. What fraction of the population is single? 
b. Are there more men or women? 
(Continued) 
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2. In a certain city, four-fifths of all homeowners are men, 
and 2/3 of all men who own homes are married. A full 3/5 of all men 
are property-less, even though half of them are married. What 
fraction of all men are single homeowners? 
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FRACTIONS PROTOCOL 
The following protocol was written my a student in response to 
the question below. It contains misconceptions which you should 
identify and clarify in your own 400-word protocol. 
Use a pictorial representation to answer the question: 
3 is what fraction of 9? 
I'll start my representing the numbers with circles. 
3 . ooo 
9 - ooooooooo 
I want a fraction so I’ll put the three circles over the nine 
circles since I know that the three is less than the nine. 
3 o oo_ 
”■9 ' 00000600© 
Since I can cancel equal things on top and bottom, the picture 
looks like this: 
<6 0e?o<5 "6’6 00 OOOOOO 
I'm left with 6 on the bottom and nothing on the top, so the 
answer 
must be 0/6 which is the same as zero, 
But that can't be, since I know the answer 
Looking back at what I did, I see that I forgot 
equal things, you get ones, not zeroe , 
1/6. 
can't be zero, 
that when you cancel 
the answer should be 
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APPENDIX D 
MATH DIAGNOSTIC TEST 
Please fill in the appropriate space on your 
Do not write on this test. Scrap paper will 
1) 1_ 4 
a. 
_6 
10 
b. 
_7 
12 
e. 
2) x __8 15 
4 b- c. d. 4 ]_ 32 e. 
3) 
2 
5 
a. 
e 
4) Convert 5/8 to a decimal, 
a. .5 b. .625 c. 1.6 d. .58 e 
5) Convert .7 to a percent. 
a. 70% b. 7% 
6) Add .06 + 4 + 3.8 
a. 8.4 b. 7.86 
7) Divide .048 by 2.4 
a. .002 b. .05 
c. .7% d. .07% e 
c. 7.8 d. 4.8 
c. .02 d. .005 
answer sheet, 
be provided. 
None of the above 
None of the above 
. None of the above 
. None of the above 
. None of the above 
. None of the above 
e. None of the above 
8) What is 20% of 7.5? 
26 1 
a. 1.5 b. 15 c. 3.75 d. 37.5 e. None of the above 
9) Four people share a pizza in the following way: Tom got a third 
and Mary got a third of the remainder while Dick and Harry 
shared equally what Tom and Mary did not get. What fraction of 
the whole pizza did Harry receive? 
a. 
1 
3 
b. 
1 
6 
c. 
2 
9 
d. 
1 
4 
e. 
3 
2 
10) A bicycle that regularly costs $360 is on sale for $306. By 
what percent has the price been reduced? 
a. 10% b. 11% c. 6% d. 54% e. 15% 
2: 
e. None of the above 
e. None of the above 
13) 5 . 3 + 2 - x - 2 
Evaluate the following expressions, when x - - 
11) x - 2(3 - x) - x(x - 5) 
a. 6 b. 0 c. 4 d. -26 
_1 
b. 25 c. -10 d. 25 
12) 
a. -25 
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15) Calculate the outside surface area of a hollow tube: 
Write the following numbers in 
a. 12.5 feet 
b. 150 square inches 
c. 50 inches 
d. 471 square inches 
e. 75 inches 
scientific notations: 
16) 3,583,000 
a. 3.5 x 106 b. 3.58 c. 3.583 x 103 d. 3.583 x 10 
e. 3583 x 103 
17) .00004 
a. ,45 b. 4 x 10'5 c. .04 d. .4 x 10" 
e. None of the above 
Solve the following equations (find the solution set): 
18) 2(5 - t) + 6t - t + 22 
32 , d !1 e. None of the above 
a. 6 b‘ 1 c. 3 d. 5 
19) 4t . 2t + 2 
10 
a. 
5 
4 
b. 10 
1. d _8 e. None of the above 
C* "8 
20) For every person who orders chocolate milk, five order white 
milk. Write an equation which shows the relationship between 
"C", the number of people who order chocolate milk, and "W" the 
number of people who order white milk. 
a. 5W + C = 6 b. 5W - C c. _C d. 5C - W e. C + W - 6 
5W 
21) What day precedes the day after tomorrow if four days ago was 
two days after Wednesday? 
a. Tuesday b. Wednesday c. Thursday d. Sunday 
e. None of the above 
22) A recipe for Crisp Crackers: 
1— cups wheat flour 
^ cup seeds (sesame or caraway) 
— cup peanut oil 
— teaspoon salt 
4 
— cup water 
If all I have is 1 cup of wheat flour, how much salt should I 
use? 
o 1 
a. 1 teaspoon b. j- teaspoon c. ^ teaspoon 
9 1 d. - teaspoon e. £ teaspoon 
23) How many jars o£ water are needed to ^ 
liter jug if each jar contains 0A liters? 
2.47. , —C—) 
-- - ~ ' c. ^(“j) d* 5^47 
fill a 23— 
5,47 
e. 2} 
a. 0.4(23.5) b. 23.5 - 0.4 
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24) All items in a store are discounted 20X. Identify the 
expression which will calculate the sale price of an item. 
a. 20P 2. 0.2P c. |p d. P - 20 e. 120P 
25) A bathtub can hold 124 liters of water. 1/4 of the tub was 
filled in 20 minutes with the faucet turned on. How much longer 
will it take to fill the tub completely? 
3 
a. — of an hour b.40 minutes c. 80 minutes d. 1 hour 
4 
e. none of the above 
26) How many millions are in 1.8 billion? 
a. 18 b. 1,800 c. 18,000 d. 1.8 e. 0.18 
3 ? 
27) Which number is closest to 
a. One Third b. 1.003 c. 3.100 d. 0.103 e. 0.031 
28) What is the perimeter of the right-angled place figure below? 
All measurements are in inches. 
40 
40 
a. 260 
b. 230 
c. 200 
d. 170 
e. None of the 
Above 
70 
APPENDIX E 
SUMMARY OF DIAGNOSTIC TEST STATISTICS FROM MERMAC 
Number of Items 28 
Mean Score 12.01 
Median Score 11.74 
Standard Deviation A.82 
Reliability (KR-20) 0.777 
S.E. of Measurement 2.28 
Possible Low Score 0 
Possible High Score 28 
Obtained Low Score 0 
Obtained High Score 26 
Number of Scores 618 
Blank Scores 0 
Invalid Scores 0 
Valid Scores 618 
APPENDIX F 
ITEM TEST BIAS ANALYSIS 
Reference group: Male # in Reference group: 122 
Focal group: Female # in Focal group: 154 
Test length: 28 
Run 2: Mantel - Haenszel Statistics Calculated using total i 
based on items identified as unbiased in run 1. Total score; 
on 27 items. 
Item P(Ref) P(FOC) Odds Ratio MH Chi-Square 
1 .62 .58 1.03 .00 
2 .50 .53 .67 1.62 
3 .69 .70 .75 .65 
4 .73 .62 1.62 1.56 
5 .46 .49 .66 1.67 
6 .86 .92 .39 2.82 
7 .69 .75 .61 2.40 
8 .70 .59 1.49 1.37 
9 . 18 .17 .73 .51 
10 .60 .55 .96 .00 
11 .33 .29 .96 .00 
12 .23 .15 1.17 .08 
13 .39 .30 1.39 .15 
14 .45 .42 .85 .15 
15 .27 .11 2.16 4.09 
16 .43 .24 2.12 5.41 
17 .48 .40 .98 .01 
18 .62 .61 .82 .35 
19 .25 .22 .81 .22 
20 .20 . 16 .81 .22 
21 .34 .31 .92 .02 
22 .49 .38 1.49 1.71 
23 .22 . 13 1.18 .06 
24 .36 .22 1.55 1,95 
25 .48 .48 .92 .02 
26 .61 .29 3.99 20.34 
27 .57 .51 .98 .01 
28 .30 .29 .78 
. 48 
* - Indicates significance at the .01 level. 
** - Indicates significance at the .001 level • 
based 
APPENDIX G 
DIAGNOSTIC TEST ITEM STATISTICS 
Item Distractors IRT parameters 
A B C D E Omit ABC 
1 Prop 0.17 0.02 (0.63) 0.05 0.13 0.01 0.82-0.12 0.20 
RPBI -0.38 -0.11 (0.45)-0.14 -0.04 -0.22 
2 Prop (0.52) 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.03 1.01 0.43 0.20 
RPBI (0.49)-0.31 -0.15 -0.08 -0.12 -0.22 
3 Prop 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.05 (0.68) 0.08 0.99-0.29 0.20 
RPBI -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 (0.44)-0.27 
4 Prop 0.03 (0.67) 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06 1.24-0.25 0.20 
RPBI -0.14 (0.53)-0.20 -0.26 -0.14 -0.27 
5 Prop 
RPBI 
(0.54) 0.19 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.01 
(0.48)-0.20 -0.13 -0.26 -0.05 -0.20 
0.98 0.42 0.20 
6 Prop 
RPBI 
0.02 (0.88) 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 
-0.05 (0.36)-0.06 -0.17 -0.27 -0.20 
0.64-2.79 0.20 
7 Prop 
RPBI 
0.12 0.04 (0.69) 0.03 0.09 0.03 
-0.09 -0.15 (0.29)-0.04 -0.11 -0.22 
0.23-1.36 0.20 
8 Prop 
RPBI 
(0.63) 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.05 
(0.35)-0.07 -0.16 -0.08 -0.10 -0.26 
0.62-0.19 0.20 
9 Prop 
RPBI 
0.11 0.47 (0.19) 0.14 '0.04 0.05 
-0.13 -0.05 (0.34)-0.04 -0.11 -0.14 
1.80 1.81 0.11 
10 Prop 
RPBI 
0.09 0.09 0.15 0.04 (0.57) 0.06 
-0.14 -0.06 -0.16 -0.14 (0.36)-0.14 
0.57 0.13 0.20 
11 Prop 
RPBI 
0.12 0.07 0.05 (0.28) 0.41 0.07 
-0.03 -0.08 -0.10 (0.38)-0.12 -0.23 
1.13 1.47 0.20 
12 Prop 
RPBI 
0.28 (0.22) 0.05 0.29 0.12 0.04 
-0.07 (0.40)-0.17 -0.09 -0.04 -0.24 
1.78 1,61 0.12 
13 Prop 
RPBI 
(0.37) 0.05 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.08 
(0.40)-0.08 -0.03 -0.21 -0.11 -0.20 
0.86 1.50 0.20 
14 Prop 
RPBI 
0.20 0.18 (0.41) 0.08 0.04 0.08 
-0.16 -0.12 (0.44)-0.07 -0.09 -0.24 
1.17 0.89 0.20 
Item Distractors IRT 
A B C D E Omit A 
15 Prop 0.04 0.55 0.11 (0.13) 0.06 0.11 1. 
RPBI 0.04 -0.06 -0.17 (0.31)-0.04 -0.07 
16 Prop 0.08 0.02 0.21 (0.34) 0.30 0.06 1. 
RPBI 0.01 -0.14 -0.21 (0.48)-0.13 -0.30 
17 Prop 0.09 (0.43) 0.01 0.29 0.13 0.05 0 
RPBI -0.17 (0.45)-0.08 -0.13 -0.12 -0.29 
18 Prop 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 (0.61) 0.10 0 
RPBI -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.07 (0.40)-0.30 
19 Prop (0.22) 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.24 0.19 1 
RPBI (0.38) 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.24 
20 Prop 0.11 0.46 0.16 (0.19) 0.05 0.04 1 
RPBI -0.10 0.04 -0.10 (0.26)-0.07 -0.21 
21 Prop 0.12 (0.32) 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.05 
RPBI -0.04 (0.27)-0.01 -0.14 -0.11 -0.12 
22 Prop 0.02 0.03 (0.40) 0.17 0.31 0.07 
RPBI -0.11 -0.05 (0.28)-0.12 -0.06 -0.16 
23 Prop 0.30 0.10 0.17 
RPBI -0.05 -0.16 -0.01 
0.11 (0.14) 0.17 
0.10 (0.33)-0.20 
24 Prop 0.11 
RPBI -0.13 
0.45 (0.24) 0.10 0.01 0.09 
0.15 (0.25)-0.24 -0.09 -0.21 
25 Prop 0.06 0.05 0.23 
RPBI -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 
(0.47) 0.11 0.09 
(0.27)-0.11 -0.17 
26 Prop 0.21 (0.40) 0.14 
RPBI -0.03 (0.31)-0.08 
0.06 0.07 0.13 
-0.13 -0.11 -0.16 
27 Prop 0.11 0.09 
RPBI -0.16 -0.13 
28 Prop (0.30) 0.31 
RPBI (0.33) 0.04 
0.11 0.06 (0.53) 0.10 
-0.25 -0.09 (0.50)-0.21 
0.02 0.09 0.17 0.11 
-0.06 -0.14 -0.13 -0.22 
parameters 
B C 
32 1.73 0.10 
51 1.13 0.20 
.93 0.93 0.20 
.46-0.08 0.20 
.68 1.56 0.15 
.05 2.24 0.12 
).55 2.06 0.20 
0.75 1.11 0.20 
2.00*1.59 0.11 
1.54 1.65 0.19 
0.37 1.05 0.20 
0.75 0.90 0.20 
1.30 0.24 0.20 
1.10 1.56 0.20 
APPENDIX H 
FRACTIONS CHAPTER REWRITE 
THE LANGUAGE OF FRACTIONS 
A Fraction is a part of a whole. 
Examples: 
One-Half 
One-Sixth 
V////////A 
□ Two-Ninths 
Five-Halves 
(Which is also 
(two and one-half). 
Note that each box was divided into equal 
This is not one-half, even though we have shaded one of two parts. 
What fraction of the whole would you estimate the shaded section 
to be? 
The number of equal parts in the whole is the number below the 
bar, and is called the denominator. 
In these pictures, the top number in the fraction refers to the 
number of shaded parts. It is called the numerator. 
numerator 
5 
12 
Denominator 
What fraction of the box is unshaded? 
FRACTIONS I 
Use pictorial representations to solve the following problems: 
Tom, Sue, and John went to a pizza party where 5 pizzas were 
delivered in the beginning of the evening. (The pizzas were 
large and sliced into twelve equal pieces.) 
a. At this party, Tom ate two slices of the first pizza, 
one slice from the second and three slices from the 
third. What fraction of a whole pizza did Tom eat that 
evening? 
b. That evening, Sue ate five pieces from the first pizza, 
six from the second and two slices later on. what 
fraction of a whole pizza did Sue eat that evening 
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c. At one point in the evening, John shared a pizza equally 
with two other people. He then shared a second pizza 
equally with three other people. Later, he ate another 
slice. What fraction of a whole pizza did he eat that 
evening? 
d. ive pizzas were totally eaten that evening and each 
person ate at least one slice. What is the maximum 
number of people that could have attended the party, 
including all o£ the people in the three previou p 
of this problem? 
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Solution Commentary; 
a. Tom ate two slices of the 
first pizza, one slice from 
the second, and three slices 
from the third. What fraction 
of a whole pizza did Tom eat 
that evening? 
In order to answer this 
question, I'm going to draw 
the three pizzas. Since it is 
easier to draw rectangles than 
circles, I'll draw rectangular 
pizzas cut into 12 pieces 
each. 
ill 
■ ■1 ■1 
1 f 
I drew the three pizzas from 
which Tom ate and shaded the 
part he ate. He ate 6 slices 
altogether. But when they ask 
what fraction of a whole pizza 
did Tom eat, they're asking in 
terms of one whole pizza, or 
12 pieces, not three pizzas 
which are 36 pieces. 
Therefore, the answer is 6/12. 
To see the answer, I can draw 
the picture as if he ate from 
one pizza. 
The picture shows me that he 
ate 6/12 of a pizza. But I can 
also see that that's the same 
as 1/2 of a pizza. 
The problem solver here has 
discovered that 6/12 and 1/2 
are equivalent fractions. In 
the context of the problem, 
both fractions represent the 
same amount of pizza. This 
happens because when we start 
out with the rectangle divided 
into 12 equal pieces, we can 
group together 6 of those 
pieces to make two larger 
equal pieces. The amount Tom 
ate is one of the larger 
pieces. The whole pizza 
contains 2 of the larger 
pieces. Thus, Tom ate 1/2 of 
a pizza. 
We can also group the 12 
smaller pieces in other ways. 
For example, we can group the 
pieces in pairs. Now the 
whole pizza is 
divided into 
6 pieces, 
and Tom ate 
3 of them. 
That is, 
Tom ate 3/6 
of a pizza. 
6/12 = 3/6. 
We could also group the 12 
pieces in groups of 3 to show 
that Tom ate 2/4 of the pizza. 
We can create equivalent 
fractions by dividing both the 
numerator and denominator by 
the same number. 
Note that we 
could also 
cut the 12 
pieces into 
smaller 
pieces and 
get 
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equivalent fractions that way. 
In this diagram, all of the 
pieces are cut into two. Now 
Tom has eaten 12 out of 24 
pieces. 6/12 - 12/24. We can 
also create equivalent 
fractions by multiplying both 
the numerator and denominator 
by the same number. 
b. Sue ate 5 pieces from the first pizza, 6 from the second, and 
2 later on. 
i 
m. s 
This picture represents what Sue ate. 13 pieces altogether. What 
fraction of a whole pizza did Sue eat that evening? Let me try to 
Since sue ate 13 pieces, but there are only 12 pieces in a whole, 
Sue ate more than one whole. I will designate this as 13/12, 
which is also 1 1/12. 
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Note: A fraction is written in lowest terms when there is no 
equivalent fraction with a smaller denominator. 
Commentary: 
A fraction is larger than 1 when the numerator is larger than the 
denominator. This is called an improper fraction. The picture 
makes it obvious that 13/12 is the same as 1 1/12. The one whole 
has twelve pieces (one whole equals 12/12) and then adding on the 
extra 1/12 gives 13/12. 
When the number is written as 1 1/12, it is called a mixed numbejr. 
Draw diagrams to show two equivalent fractions for each of 
the following numbers: 
Example: 
3 
4 
2. 
7 
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2 
5 
4 
6 
27 9 
Improper fractions [like 4/3, 8/7, 25/4, 3/2, etc.] can also be 
written as mixed numbers. 
Example: 
That is, the fraction three-halves can be written as a mixed 
number which includes a whole number and a fraction. 
3 
2 
1 
1 — 
2 
Fill in the appropriate equivalent fraction, picture or mixed 
number. 
Improper fraction Diagram Mixed Number 
1. 5 
4. 
5. 
II 
4 
Describe how to convert 
a mixed number to an improper fraction. 
Describe how to convert an improper fraction to a mixed number. 
FRACTIONS II 
Suppose you ate two-thirds of a chocolate bar in the morning 
and one-half of a similar (same size) chocolate bar in the 
evening. What fraction of a chocolate bar did you eat that day? 
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Solution C omme ntary: 
Suppose you ate two-thirds of 
a chocolate bar in the morning 
and one-half of a similar 
(same size) chocolate bar in 
the evening. What fraction of 
a chocolate bar did you eat 
that day? 
Using pictures we quickly see 
that more than one whole 
chocolate bar was eaten. 
This makes sense, since 2/3 is 
more than 1/2 so that 2/3 + 
1/2 must be more than 1/2 + 
1/2 - 1. But exactly how much 
more than 1? 
In order to be able to combine 
the shaded parts of the two 
candy bars, I'm going to have 
to get equal sized pieces. 
2 1 4 3 7 
3 2 6 6 6 
I can get that if I divide 
each of the thirds into two 
pieces and each of the halves 
into three pieces. Now both 
of the candy bars are cut into 
sixths. By counting, I see 
that seven of these sixths 
were eaten. Therefore, 7/6 
was eaten. 
The problem solver was looking 
to cut up the two candy bars 
into equal-sized parts and 
found that he could do this 
with sixths. Mathematically, 
this is called finding the 
common denominator between 2/3 
and 1/2. He found equivalent 
fractions to 2/3 and 1/2 that 
have the same denominator. 
That is 2/3 - 4/6 and 1/2 - 
3/6. Thus, 6 is a common 
denominator of 2/3 and 1/2. 
(Note that you can always find 
a common denominator by 
multiplying the two 
denominators together, but 
this does not always give you 
the smallest possible [least] 
common denominator.) It was 
necessary to find the common 
denominator in order to add 
the fractions. 
2 1 4 3 
3 2 6 6 
Once the addition problem has 
been written with equivalent 
fractions that have a common 
denominator, the addition can 
be performed: Add the 
numerator and keep the same 
denominator. 
4 3 7 
6 6 6 
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Make sure you understand this 
in terms of the picture. 
The answer, 7/6, is an 
improper fraction. It can 
also be written as a mixed 
number. 
7 
6 
1 1/6 
284 
The following examples illustrate both addition and 
subtraction of fractions. 
+ ? 
Common denominator: 5 x 3 - 15 
so 3 
3 
6 
15 
so 6 
15 
and 5 
5 
5 
15 
so 1 
3 
5 
15 
therefore 2 1 
5 3 
11 
15 
Now try subtraction: 
2 1 
3 
? 
2 
5 
1 6 5 
3 15 15 
1 
15 
Although this method will always succeed in adding and 
subtracting fractions, it is sometimes unnecessary and cumbersome. 
For instance: 1 2 
2 4 
We could multiply the denominators to find a common 
denominator: 
then 4 4 
8 8 
8 
8 
1 
but we can simplify our work by noticing that we can simplify one 
of t'he fractions so that both fractions have a common denominator 
and may be added. 
so that 
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Perform the following addition and subtraction problems. State 
your answer in lowest terms. 
1. 1 3 
8 4 
2. 1 3 
2 14 
3.4 3 
5 10 
4. 2 1 
3 6 
5. 1 4 
3 9 
6.4 3 
15- + 14— 
7 7 
7. 18 3 
13 26 
8. 6 12 
17 34 
9. 17 6 
6 17 
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FRACTIONS III 
Bob took a trip in which he traveled by car, foot and 
bicycle. He rode in a car for two hours at an average speed of 48 
miles per hour. He then walked 12 miles in three hours and 
bicycled the remainder of the 144 mile trip at an average speed of 
12 miles per hour. 
Use line diagrams to answer the following questions. 
1. What fraction of the time of the entire trip did he 
spend? 
a. in the car? 
b. on the bicycle? 
c. walking? 
2. What fraction of the distance of the entire trip did he 
travel: 
a. by car? 
b. by bicycle? 
by foot? 
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FRACTIONS IV 
U. S. liquid-volume measurements: 
1 gallon contains 4 quarts 
1 quart contains 2 pints 
1 pint contains 2 cups 
1 cup contains 8 fluid ounces. 
Metric liquid-volume measurements: 
1 liter contains 1000 cubic centimeters 
1 liter contains 100 centiliters 
1 centiliter contains 10 milliliters. 
Use the above information to answer the following questions: 
1. One ounce is what fraction of: 
a. a gallon? 
b. a quart? 
c. a pint? 
2. One cup is what part of? 
a. a gallon? 
b. a quart? 
(Continued) 
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3. One pint is what fraction of a gallon? 
4. One milliliter is what part of 
a. a centiliter? 
b. a liter? 
c. a cubic centimeter? 
5. Draw a picture of a cubic centimeter. 
FRACTIONS V 
The Jones Family's monthly budget requires 1/3 of their total 
monthly income to be spent on rent and utilities and another 1/4 
of their monthly income to be spent on food. After paying food, 
utilities and rent, they have $750.00 remaining to pay for their 
other expenses. 
A. Find the Jones Family's total monthly income. 
B. What fraction of their monthly income was spent on food, 
rent, and utilities together? 
29 1 
The Jones family spends 
1/3 of monthly income on rent 
and 1/4 on food. $750.00 
remaining. 
A. How much do they earn? 
B. What fraction was spent on 
rent and food tpgether? 
Solution: 
In order to solve a problem 
like this, I want to draw a 
diagram. Since the problem 
addresses fractions of the 
monthly income, I'll start 
with a rectangle that 
represents the monthly income. 
I also 
immediately 
see that I can 
divide the 
rectangle into 
3 equal parts 
to show that 
1/3 of the 
monthly income 
goes to rent. 
Now, 1/4 of the income goes to 
food, so I need to have four 
parts in the rectangle. If I 
just add one line, I will end 
up with four 
parts, but the 
parts aren't 
equal, so that 
doesn't help. 
If I just superimpose the four 
equal parts on the three equal 
parts, I can designate the 
money spent, but it's hard to 
see what the rest of the 
diagram is. 
Commentary: 
Initially, the student had 
trouble dividing the whole 
into both thirds and fourths 
in a way that is clear. She 
needs to do it in a way that 
still gives equal parts. By 
dividing it into thirds 
vertically and fourths 
horizontally, she has divided 
the whole into twelve equal 
parts. Her diagram shows that 
the fourths and thirds can 
both be represented as 
fractions using twelfths. 1/3 
is the same as 4/12 and 1/4 is 
the same as 3/12. Another way 
to say this is to say that 1/4 
and 3/12 are equivalent 
fractions and that 1/3 and 
4/12 are equivalent fractions. 
Since both fractions can be 
written as fractions with 12 
as the denominator, we say 
that 12 is a common 
denominator for 1/3 and 1/4. 
One way to solve this problem 
is to say that since 1/3 of 
the income is spent on rent 
and 1/4 on food, then the 
fraction of the income spent 
on rent and food together is 
1/3 + 1/4. The diagram has 
essentially performed the 
addition for us. In the 
diagram, we want to know how 
much of the whole is shaded 
in. Since the rectangle was 
already divided into twelve 
equal parts (using the common 
denominator), we can count up 
the shaded squares for the 
numerator (7) and the number 
of parts in the whole for the 
denominator (12) to get 7/12. 
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Maybe if I 
draw my 
fourths using 
horizontal 
lines, it will 
be easier to 
see. 
Okay, now I 
can see the 
three equal 
parts 
vertically, 
and the four 
equal parts 
horizontally. 
The problem is the 1/3 for 
rent and the 1/4 for food 
overlap. If the money that 
the box stands for already 
went out for rent, it can't 
also pay for food. Let's see, 
there are twelve of those 
smaller boxes of equal size. 
If each of them represents the 
same amount of money, there's 
no reason that I have to use 
that corner one for food. I 
can represent the spendings 
this way; 
-After rent and 
food have been 
paid, there 
are $750. left 
over. This 
gets spread 
over the five 
empty boxes. 
750 - 5 = 150. That means 
each box represents $150. The 
whole monthly income is made 
up of 12 boxes. 
That 
1 
is, 
1 4 3 7 
3 
+ 
4 12 12 12 
Note that only once we have 
found the common denominator, 
in order to add fractions we 
add the numerators while the 
denominator stays the same. 
Equivalent Fractions can be 
found by dividing both the 
numerator and denominator by 
the same number. The fraction 
is in lowest terras if there is 
no equivalent fraction with a 
smaller denominator. 
150 x 12 - 1800. That means 
the family earns $1800 each 
month. 
I can also see that $150 x 3 - 
$450 is what they pay for food 
and $150 x 4 = $600 is what 
they pay for rent. Therefore, 
the fraction of the total 
income that is spent on food 
and rent is: 
600 + 450 1050 
1800 1800 
(2) But I also see from the 
diagram that the fraction is 
7/12. Are they the same 
number? Let' s see. 
(3) 1050 105 Because both 
— 
-- the numerator 
1800 180 and the 
denominator 
are divisible 
by 10. 
105 21 because both 
— - — are divisible 
180 36 by 5. 
21 7 because both 
are 
— 
- — are divisible 
36 12 by 3. 
I get the same answer both 
ways: 
7/12. 
FRACTIONS VI 
Use pictorial representations to solve the following problems: 
Typical expenses from my monthly income are: 
1/3 rent 
1/4 food 
1/6 phone and utilities 
a. How much of my monthly income does this account for? 
b. Last month, I spent as much money on entertainment as I 
did in rent. Assuming that my other expenses were the same as 
usual, how much of my monthly income did I withdraw from my 
savings account? 
* c. What fraction of the savings account was withdrawn? 
* NOTE TO THE REVIEWER: This problem is intentional. The issue 
of part/whole will be addressed in the teacher's manual. 
FRACTIONS VII 
In Sarah s flower garden, one-third of the plants are marigolds, 
one-fourth are petunias, one-eighth are zinnias, one twelfth are 
mums and there are ten other plants each of a different variety. 
How many plants are there of each variety? 
FRACTIONS VIII 
I 
A limited number of tickets were available for a jazz concert. 
Ruth bought one-fourth of the tickets, David bought one-sixth, 
George bought two-ninths, and Linda bought pne-twelfth of the 
tickets. The remaining 50 pairs of tickets were bought by Nina. 
a. How many tickets did George buy? 
b. How many tickets were there altogether? 
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FRACTIONS IX 
1* Tuition amounts to 2/3 of the entire expense for attending 
school. What fraction of the annual school year bill is spent on 
one course if I take eight courses a year? 
2. On Tuesday, I came home with a half-gallon of ice cream. 
When I wanted some for dessert that night, I saw that only 1/5 of 
the container was left. How much of a gallon of ice cream did my 
roomates eat before I got any of it? 
3. At a certain college, 1/3 of all the students are women and 
1/5 of the women are engineering majors. What fraction of all 
students are women engineering majors? 
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Solution: 
I think that what the problem 
is asking me to find is what 
fraction of the entire school 
year's bill is being spent on 
just one course. Now if all 
the money just went toward 
paying for courses, then I 
would be paying 1/8 of my bill 
for each of the eight courses. 
But only 2/3 of the total bill 
is spent on tuition which 
means that one course costs 
1/8 of the tuition since 
tuition is for courses only. 
So what I need to find is 1/8 
of 2/3. 
Using a picture, I'll first 
find 2/3 of the total bill and 
then divide that 2/3 into 
eight pieces by cutting each 
third into four equal-size 
pieces. I see that one of 
these pieces is just one of 
twelve equal-size pieces which 
make up the entire school- 
year's expenses. So one 
course costs 1/12 of the 
normal school year bill. 
That comes out to the 
same fraction that I'd get if 
I multiplied the two 
fractions: 
12 2 1 
24 8 3 72 
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1. Use pictures to show that 2/3 of 3/4 equals 1/2. 
2. Is it also true that 3/4 of 2/3 equals 1/3? Again, 
pictures. 
use 
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Draw diagrams to represent the following amounts and say what 
fraction of a whole is shaded in: 
1. 1 1 
- of - 
2 3 
2.2 5 
- of - 
5 7 
3.2 3 
- of - 
9 2 
4. 1 1 
3 2 
5. 1 5 
- of - 
4 4 
6. 1 2 
- of — 
3 3 
7. 1 2 
- of — 
5 3 
8. 2 1 
3 
of 
5 
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Multiplying Fractions 
The algorithm (the rule) for multiplying fractions is to 
multiply the numerators and multiply the denominators. For 
example, 
2 3 2 . 3 6 
7 5 7.5 35 
Multiply the fractions in problems 1-8 on the previous page, 
and compare the product (the answer you get from multiplying) with 
the answer you get from the diagram. 
Why do you think the answers come out to be the same? 
[Description for teachers] 
FRACTIONS X 
Four people share a pizza in the following way: Tom got a 
third and Mary got a third of the remainder while Dick and Harry 
shared equally what Tom and Mary did not get. 
What fraction of the whole pizza did Harry receive? 
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Solution: Commentary: 
To start out, 
I can draw the 
pizza, (I draw 
rectangular 
pizzas). 
Since Tom got 
a third of the 
pizza, 
I divided the pizza into 3 
pieces and gave Tom one. If I 
assign one of those same-size 
pieces to Mary, then she also 
gets 1/3 of a pizza. But 
that's 1/2 of what remained 
after Tom ate his. Mary got 
only 1/3 of what remained. 
That is, she got 1/3 of the 
remaining 2/3 of the pizza. 
Here I've 
divided the 
remainder into 
thirds using 
horizontal 
lines. That 
is, each of 
the remaining 
pieces got cut into thirds 
giving six pieces to divide 
among Mary, Dick and Harry. 
Mary got 1/3 of these six 
pieces, giving her two pieces, 
Dick and Harry split the 
remaining 4 pieces, each 
getting two. 
What fraction 
of the whole 
pizza did 
Harry receive? 
He got two 
pieces at the 
end. 
MA- nr 
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The crucial question when 
considering the amount of 
pizza Mary ate was 1/3 of 
what? Mary ate a third of the 
remainder, which is less than 
a third of the whole pizza. 
In order to solve the problem, 
the problem solver took the 
remainder, which was 2/3 of 
the pizza, and divided that 
into thirds. The picture 
shows us that Mary's portion 
was 2/6 (equivalent to 1/3) o£ 
the remainder, which was the 
same 
the 
i amount of 
whole. 
pizza as 2/9 of 
1 2 2 
_ of- is — of the 
3 3 9 whole. 
But when the whole pizza is 
cut into equal pieces that 
size - including Tom's 
portion, there are 9 of them. 
Therefore, Harry got 2/9 of 
the whole pizza. I can check 
this by adding up all the 
portions. 
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 
- + - + - + + - + - + — 
99939999 
2 + 2 + 2 + 3 9 
- + - - 1 Whole 
9 Pizza. 9 
FRACTIONS XI 
At a particular college, 1/5 of the people who request 
information and applications actually send in their applications. 
Of those who apply for admission, 2/5 came for an interview. One 
fourth of the applicants who are interviewed are admitted to the 
college, and 1/12 of those who are not interviewed are admitted. 
Only 3/4 of the students who are admitted enter the college as 
freshmen. If 450 students enter this year as freshmen, how many 
people originally requested information and applications? 
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Use diagrams to perform the following division problems: 
1). How many 1/4's are in 1/2? 
1/2 - 1/4 - 
2). How many 1/3's are in 2? 
2-1/3 
3). How many 2/5's are in 4? 
4 - 2/5 - 
4). How many 3/2's are in 9? 
9 3/2 
FRACTIONS XII 
Mary and Sue decided to have a party with some friends in the 
dorm one night and ordered 4 shortcakes. When they arrived, they 
saw the cakes were rather small, and since they were quite hungry, 
they decided that each person should get 3/5 of a cake. How many 
portions could they get from the four cakes? 
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Solution: Commentary: 
In order to find out how many 
portions there are, I should 
start by drawing the four 
cakes and dividing them into 
fifths (since 3/5 is a 
portion). 
This is a division 
problem. How many times does 
3/5 go into 4? 4 - 3/5 - ? 
In working through the 
solution to this problem, the 
problem solver first drew four 
cakes and divided them into 
fifths. At this stage, she 
can compute the number of 
pieces she has: 
I immediately see that they 
can get 4 portions from the 
four cakes. But if a fifth 
person arrives, she won't care 
if she gets her full portion, 
from one cake. She can take 
two pieces from the fifth cake 
and one from the second. 
4 x 5 - 20. 
Since Mary and Sue had decided 
that 3 pieces make up a 
portion, in order to find the 
number of portions, the solver 
found how many groups of 3 
were in 20, which is the same 
as 20 divided by three. [20 - 
3=6 2/3.] Note that this is 
the same as taking 4, 
multiplying it by the 
denominator of the divisor 
(the second number) and 
dividing it by the numerator 
of the divisor. 4 - 3/5 = 4 
x 5 - 3 = 4 x 5/3. 
A sixth person can get her 
portion by taking one piece 
from the second cake and two 
from the third. 
Now I see that 6 people get 
their full portions. Then 
there are 2 pieces left over. 
That is, 2/5 of a cake is left 
over. But the question asks 
how many portions are there? 
Well, there are 6 whole 
portions, and the two pieces 
left over make up 2/3 of a 
portion, since 3 pieces make 
one portion and only two 
pieces remain! Therefore, 
there are 6 2/3 portions. 
3 
Check to see if this method 
works for the problems on page 
35. 
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Solve the following division problems using diagrams and using the 
rule for division. 
2. 1 
3 
2 
5. 7 
2 
6. 5 
2 
1 
3 
8. 13 3 
5 9 
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FRACTIONS XIII 
Use a pictorial Representation to solve the following problem: 
The oil bill for a group house was for the months of January and 
February. Four people lived in the house during January and a fifth 
moved in on February 1st. Assuming that the same amount of heat was 
used each of the two months, what fraction of the bill should each 
person pay? 
Note: The fifth person should not have to pay for January's 
heat. 
3 10 
FRACTIONS XIV 
1. In this square, one side is what fraction of the perimeter? 
2. The area of one triangle is what portion of the area of the 
square? 
(Continued) 
3. The area of both the triangles is what portion of the area of the 
square? 
4. What fraction of the perimeter of the square are three of its 
sides? 
5. The diagonal is what fraction of the perimeter of the square? 
(You may approximate your answer.) 
6. The diagonal is what fraction of one of the sides of the square? 
(You may approximate your answer.) 
FRACTIONS XV 
1. In a certain population, two-thirds of all men are married, but 
only 3/5 of all the women are married. 
a. What fraction of the population is single? 
b. Are there more men or women? 
FRACTIONS XVI 
In a certain city, four-fifths of all homeowners are men and 2/3 
of all men who own homes are married. A full 3/5 of all men are 
property-less, even though half of them are married. What fraction 
of all men are single homeowners? 
FRACTIONS XVII 
A company of 266 persons consists of men, women and children. 
There are four times as many men as children, and twice as many women 
as children. How many of each are there? 
APPENDIX I 
MATH 010 CLASS CHRONOLOGY 
Section 1, 9/26/88 
Homework on board: Workbook p. 82, 83, 84 
DMS read pp. 161-174 + 175-186. 
9:06: Ilene hands out a graded exercise [see attached] 
Two students complain that they don't know how to do these - 
Ilene says try and reassures them that it isn't all that urgent. 
Note: Assistant Andrew does not work the exercise. Has he worked it 
already? 
Note: a students pass a calculator between them. 
Suggestion: Wait until the time for the quiz is up before collecting 
completed quizzes, since it may disturb students who are still 
working - or intimidate them. 
9:20 Quizzes collected - ilene asks students to work on problem p. 
76 in pairs. Student asks what the problem asks for. I. answers by 
asking what his interpretation is. They agree on this 
interpretation. 
There are several groups of 3 and individual students. 
9:26. Ilene asks for solutions, gets 3 answers and writes them on 
the board. 
175.26 b $168,786 b $175,246,000,000 
Note: Ilene makes different mistakes at the board to provoke 
students into correcting her errors. example: [175,266,000], .37 
.30 
.3 
.4 
.82 
Note: Students debate whether to multiply or divide .18 + 973.7 b. 
Note: Student who understands multiplication + division thinks that 
dividing by .18 means finding 1/18 of the number. , 
9:45 Ilene asks if any number can be written as a fraction? 
Try .0000096 - 96 
1,000,000 
Ilene asks if this is correct? 
Student asks for one more zero. Ilene adds it. 
Another student asks for yet another zero. Ilene adds it. 
9:50 Ilene writes: 
hundreds ten thousandths millionths 
0000096 ten millionths 
tenths thousandths 100 thousandths 
Ilene erases 1 zero, gets: 
96 
10,000,000 
9:52 Ilene asks "Can we make a fraction into a decimal?" 
« 
1 
7 - ? 
Student suggests 1/7 - .7. 
Ilene writes it up. 
Another student suggests 1/7 = .14. 
Ilene asks 7/10 * ? 10 7. 
9:53 Student asks how to write .03070 
Ilene writes it up and takes solutions. 
Takes and writes 307 
100,000 
Asks, are they the same? 
3070 
100,000 
9:55 Students start packing up books, etc. 
9:55 Ilene starts on topic of rounding off. 
Asks how to round off 0.26 to the nearest hundredth. 
9:57 Students pack up and leave. Class ends. 
10:00 Ilene speaks to last student. Class adjourned completely. 
APPENDIX J 
PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX 
SEX PREHI PREAL PRE POSTHI POSTAL POST 
SEX 1.00 
PREHI 0.02 1.00 
PREAL 
-0.78 0.11 1.00 
PRE 
-0.42 0.38 0.78 1.00 
POSTHI 
-0.03 0.25 0.17 0.27 1.00 
POSTAL 0.17 0.01 0.30 0.26 0.17 1.00 
POST 0.22 0.09 0.37 0.43 0.57 0.75 1.00 
GRADE 0.14 0.73 0.18 0.23 0.38 0.44 0.59 
2-Tailed test for significance for 99 degrees of freedom. 
Correlation: .195 for .05 significance 
.23 for .02 significance 
.254 for .01 significance 
GRADE 
1.00 
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